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ABSTRACT 
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS REGARDING CHOICES OF ACCOUNTING 
METHODS AND SUBMISSIONS TO THE FASB: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
September 1985 
Thomas J Hogan 
B.A., University of Massachusetts 
M.B.A., University of Washington 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Pieter Elgers 
An empirical examination is conducted of the 
relationship between accounting decisions made by 
management and economic factors resulting from potential 
conflicts among groups involved in the financial reporting 
process. Firm characteristics include company size, the 
existence of profit sharing plans and debt covenants. 
Accounting decisions include the choice of accounting 
alternative regarding four accounting methods (pensions, 
inventory, taxes, and depreciation), and the decision to 
attempt to influence the establishment of financial 
accounting standards. Groups consist of company 
vi 1 
management, stockholders, bondholders and regulators. 
The present research develops variables for firm 
characteristics which are closer to the constructs 
reflecting potential conflicts between these groups (full 
model) than those used in previous research (reduced 
model). Statistical techniques involve Regression, 
Probit, Logit and Tobit Analysis as well as Multinomial 
Logit Analysis. 
The choice of accounting alternative is examined by 
considering each accounting method separately and all 
methods together as a strategy. Considering each 
accounting method separately, statistically significant 
incremental information is detected for the Depreciation 
and ITC models. Research on an income strategy for 
accounting method decisions is extended through use of the 
refined proxies for firm characteristics and through the 
development of estimates of the income effects of 
utilizing non-reported accounting alternatives. In 
general, the incremental information content of augmented 
models improves as income magnitudes are estimated and as 
estimates are measured over a five rather than one year 
time horizon. 
Incremental information is also noted for the full 
models involving the decision to attempt to influence the 
establishment of accounting standards, as well as models 
of the position taken relating to the timing of reported 
• • • 
vm 
income on these submissions. 
Finally, tentative evidence is presented to suggest 
that both types of accounting decisions stated above are 
made jointly, and are influenced by similiar firm 
characteristics. 
Policy implications of this research include the 
identification of influences on managerial decision-making 
which will assist the FASB in its deliberations. 
Constructing models composed of factors underlying 
accounting decisions will aid the accounting profession in 
its endeavor to make financial accounting more relevant to 
those parties involved in the financial reporting process. 
ix 
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The area of corporate financial reporting includes a 
number of interesting areas of research. This paper will 
examine previous theoretical and empirical work concerned 
with identifying forces underlying managerial accounting 
decisions in the areas of choice among alternative 
accounting methods and the attempt to influence the 
establishment of accounting standards. A number of 
improvements in variable definitions and testing methods 
will be suggested as extensions of this earlier research. 
A number of alternative accounting methods exist to 
value, allocate or classify an accounting transaction. 
Chambers (1966) has suggested that the extent of diversity 
permitted under generally accepted accounting principles 
in the areas of recognition of revenue, pension payment 
charges and taxes, allocation of depreciation and 
valuation of inventory could have resulted in over 30 
million possible sets of financial statements.1• Table 8 




As shown in Chapter 2, representatives from a large 
number of company representatives have sent letters 
expressing their views on accounting standards under 
consideration by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB). Table 2 of Chapter 2 shows that over 6700 letters 
have been sent to the FASB from 1973 to 1979. 
Organization of Dissertation. 
Theory suggests that the ramifications of 
interactions between various groups concerned with 
financial reporting drive management's actions in making 
accounting decisions. To test this proposed relationship, 
this dissertation develops and examines models of this 
process. 
The dissertation comprises eight chapters. Chapter 2 
discusses the theory suggested by potential conflicts 
between groups interested in financial reporting. A brief 
description of the financial accounting standard setting 
process is included in this chapter. Chapter 3 reviews 
previous relevant research. Chapter 4 discusses variables 
chosen to proxy for the firm characteristics resulting 
from potential group conflicts. Chapter 5 lists research 
propositions, models and statistical tests. One set of 
models is developed under the assumption that decisions 
3 
between accounting alternatives are made independently. 
Dropping this assumption leads to the construction of 
models considering all accounting methods simultaneously. 
Chapter 6 examines methods for the development of 
magnitudes for the income effects of the use of 
non-reported accounting alternatives. Chapter 7 presents 
the results of this research. The final chapter 
summarizes and discusses limitations of the research. 
Chapter 8 also offers suggestions for future research. 
4 
Footnotes 
1. See Chambers (1966) page 454. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND DESCRIPTION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARD SETTING. 
This chapter discusses the theory relating to 
potential conflicts between groups interested in the 
financial reporting process. This provides a basis for a 
search for relationships between variables representing 
types of accounting decisions and variables serving as 
proxies for theoretical constructs relating to potential 
group conflicts. 
A brief description of the process of setting 
financial accounting standards is included since 
management's perception of its ability to influence 
standard setters should be an important factor in its 
decision to make a submission to the FASB. 
The Financial Reporting Process. 
The financial reporting process is represented by 
Figure 1. This figure suggests that the type, amount and 
specific financial information released by a firm's 
managers is related to management's goals, its decisions 
and the actual states of the world. 
5 
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Managers might have a number of different goals. 
They might be concerned with maximizing the value of the 
firm to the benefit of the firm's stockholders. 
Alternatively, they might be primarily motivated by 
self-interest and seek to maximize their pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or by 
a desire to maximize their human capital (Fama, 1980). 
Another possibility is that managers might be motivated by 
fear of a corporate takeover resulting in their ouster or 
by a desire to increase their prestige through policies 
aimed at fostering growth and maximizing firm size. 
Allowing for different goals for the various groups 
concerned with financial reporting leads to the 
possibility of conflicts between groups. Potential 
conflict situations which have generated the most interest 
have been those between stockholders and bondholders, 
stockholders and regulators, and stockholders and 
managers. These conflicts have been examined by 
considering the relationship between accounting decisions 
and debt covenants, political costs and management 
incentive plans. 
Financial reporting influences economic factors 
representing potential conflicts between group goals 
(links D and E of figure one). Results reported on the 
7 
income statement affect management compensation through 
profit-related incentive plans. Income statement results 
are also related to the stockholder — bondholder 
conflict, since a number of debt covenants are related to 
the level of reported income. In addition, it has been 
suggested that the level of reported income has a bearing 
on the likelihood that a company would have to incur 
political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
Management makes production, financial and investment 
decisions. Management also chooses among alternative 
accounting methods. All of these decisions influence the 
financial reporting process. This is represented by link 
C in Figure 1. These decisions, together with the actual 
state of the world, affect what is reported by management. 
Link H demonstrates that management has the option to make 
changes in accounting methods after observing which 
particular world state has occurred. 
If managers can model the expected effect of the 
financial reporting process on the economic factors, then 
managers can also attempt to make those decisions which 
will result in a reported set of financial statements 
which influence economic factors in a way most beneficial 
to themselves. Thus, one can expect an association 
between economic factors and management decisions 
Figure 1 
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involving real magnitudes (link B) and choice among 
alternative accounting methods (link A). For example, 
when the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was 
considering the establishment of rules regarding 
contingencies, it released an exposure draft for comment. 
This draft disallowed the practice of establishing 
accounting reserves for self-insurance.1• In commenting on 
this draft, a number of managers suggested that this 
proposed accounting rule would effect a decision involving 
real magnitudes in the area of risk management.2• How much 
this or any other accounting standard have influenced 
decisions involving real magnitudes is outside the scope 
of the present work and is left for future research.3- 
Figure 1 suggests that the accounting method decision 
is influenced by the number and type of accounting 
alternatives allowed by the accounting standard setting 
bodies. The Securities and Exchange Commission has the 
legislative authority to establish accounting regulations 
for companies whose securities are publicly traded. For 
the most part, however, the SEC has allowed the private 
sector to establish accounting standards (Carey, 1970; 
Zeff, 1972). Currently, the establishment of accounting 
standards is the province of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB). 
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In setting accounting standards, the FASB encourages 
all interested parties to submit their views on any matter 
under consideration. Thus, company management can attempt 
to influence the setting of accounting standards in order 
to augment or maintain its preferences. This process of 
dual influence is represented by links F and G in Figure 
1. 
Figure 1 suggests that management is likely to employ 
a strategy involving both decisions concerning the choice 
of accounting alternative and decisions about whether or 
not to attempt to influence the establishment of 
accounting standards. This is similiar to the Information 
Inductance Theory (Prakash and Rappaport, 1975) , which 
suggests that management's adjustment of its decisions is 
motivated by how it expects shareholders to react to 
different sets of accounting numbers. To date, studies in 
this area have tended to look at only one decision at a 
time. The results have been disappointing because of the 
modest overall explanatory power of the models and the low 
level of statistical significance of the variables used to 
proxy for the economic factors representing potential 
conflicts between groups involved with the financial 
reporting process. Results for a number of studies are 
presented in Tables 3 through 6 of Chapter 3. Unless 
11 
management uses all instruments in the same direction at 
the same time, the consideration of each area separately 
could result in conflicting evidence. 
Theoretical Considerations. 
The possibility of group conflicts is the driving 
force behind the theory used to explain managerial 
decisions relating to accounting matters. Each of these 
potential conflicts between stockholders and other groups 
involved in the financial reporting process is discussed 
below. 
The Stockholder-Manager Conflict. 
Monsen and Downs (1965) suggest that while 
traditional economic theory was correct in assuming that 
people are primarily motivated by their own self-interest, 
the traditional theory erred in not emphasizing that the 
firm is not a real person. Traditional theory is 
appropriate when the manager is the owner of the firm. In 
this case, maximizing firm profits is consistent with the 
self-interest of the owner-manager. However, when the 
firm consists of a number of individuals and management is 
separated from firm ownership, the self-interest of each 
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individual may lead to decisions that prove incompatible 
with the best interests of the firm's owners. 
Monsen and Downes suggest that managers are 
interested in maximizing the present value of the expected 
income throughout their working lives. Expected income 
consists of both monetary and non-monetary items. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) relate the accounting 
stewardship relationship to previous work concerned with 
problems of maintaining due care for insured property to 
develop a theory of corporate ownership structure. This 
theory focuses on the interaction of various parties 
through a "nexus of contracts" to form the firm. They 
feel that managers are motivated by self-interest, which 
entails maximizing their pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
rewards. The theory is based on the degree of consumption 
of non-pecuniary rewards by the owner-manager as his 
ownership share in the firm decreases. The situation is 
analogous to the microeconomic consumption problem. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that if the equity market 
is characterized by rational expectations, then potential 
buyers of a portion of the firm will be aware of an 
incentive for the owner-manager to increase his level of 
non-pecuniary benefits when his ownership share is 
reduced. Thus, buyers will pay less than the current 
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value for each portion of the firm purchased, given the 
expected induced change in the behavior of the 
owner-manager. Under rational expectations, this loss in 
firm value is borne by the firm owner. 
A way to minimize this loss in firm value is to incur 
monitoring or bonding expenditures to enforce the 
owner-manager to continue to consume only the initial 
level of non-pecuniary benefits. Monitoring and bonding 
methods "... include auditing, formal control 
systems, budget restrictions, and the establishment of 
incentive compensation systems which serve to closely 
identify the manager's interests with those of the outside 
equity holders".4* 
An additional cost is the potentially profitable 
projects which the owner manager might be precluded from 
undertaking due to his limited wealth. A method of 
acquiring this additional financing without losing 
ownership control is to borrow the necessary funds. This 
leads to a discussion of the stockholder-bondhQlder 
conflict. 
The Agency Cost of Debt. 
Consider a firm with an opportunity to take one of 
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two mutually exclusive equal cost investment opportunities 
each of which yields a random payoff, Xj, T periods in the 
future (J=l,2). Assume that both opportunities follow the 
same payoff probability distribution and have the same 
expected value. Distributions will only differ in terms 
of the variances of the outcomes with the expected 
variance of the first project being less than the second. 
Since the systematic or covariance risk is assumed to be 
the same for each alternative, the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) will imply that 
the total market value of each alternative will be 
identical. 
If the owner-manager commits himself to one of these 
alternatives before acquiring outside financing, then no 
agency cost is incurred and the owner will be indifferent 
between the alternatives. However, if the timing is 
reversed and funds are obtained prior to a commitment by 
the owner-manager, then the manager has an incentive to 
promise bondholders to undertake the low variance project 
and then switch to the high variance project after 
receiving the outside funding. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) use the Black-Scholes 
(1973) option pricing model and the work of Merton (1973, 
1974) to show that, given rational expectations. 
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bondholders will expect the owner-manager to choose the 
second project. Accordingly, bondholders will demand a 
rate of interest so that there will be no wealth transfer 
to the owner-manager. A method of mitigating these higher 
interest costs is to incur monitoring costs to insure that 
the higher variance project will not be selected. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) also show that the owner-manager will 
incur a residual loss due to rational expectations if the 
expected return on the high variance project is lower than 
the expected return of the low variance project. This 
residual loss to the owner-manager as well as the 
monitoring costs constitute agency costs of debt. 
Conflict Between Stockholders and Regulators. 
To explain why the management of a firm would attempt 
to influence the establishment of accounting standards. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) (hereafter, WZ) develop a model 
based on potential conflicts between stockholders and 
managers, and stockholders and regulators to explain why 
the management of a firm would attempt to influence the 
establishment of accounting standards. Their model is 
based on the anticipated effects of the proposed 
accounting standard on potential political costs faced by 
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the firm and the management compensation plan possessed by 
the firm. Political costs are most commonly considered as 
potential additional taxes or the threat of divestiture or 
expropriation by a government. WZ suggested that 
potential political costs are related to the prominence of 
the company and the political climate at the time, i.e., 
the oil windfall profits tax levied on oil companies after 
the 1974 Arab oil embargo. 
It is expected that political costs will vary 
directly with the absolute magnitude of income and the 
size of the firm. Management incentive plans are 
typically stated in terms of some percentage of firm 
earnings. Thus, management wealth would vary directly 
with the magnitude of income if the firm possessed a 
management incentive plan. Accordingly, offsetting 
influences exist between political cost effects and 
management incentive effects. 
The WZ model suggests that small firms would make an 
unfavorable submission (the incentive compensation effect 
dominates the political cost effect) if the proposed 
financial accounting standard is expected to result in a 
reported earnings decrease. As firm size increases, no 
submission is expected. (Cost of information production 
and decrease in manager's incentive compensation offset 
17 
the expected decrease in political costs.) Finally, for 
very large firms, a favorable submission is expected since 
it is anticipated that the decrease in expected political 
costs would be larger than the effect on managerial 
incentive compensation and information production costs. 
If the proposed standard is expected to result in a 
reported earnings increase, the WZ model will predict that 
no submission would be made by small firms; the incentive 
plan influence will dominate the political cost effect. A 
favorable submission would not be made since it is assumed 
that the expected gain from increasing the likelihood of 
adoption of the standard would be less than the cost to 
the manager of making the submission. For large firms, 
the political cost effect dominates, and an unfavorable 
submission is anticipated. Thus, company size is expected 
to be an important political cost variable. 
In addition to company size, as shown in Chapters 3 
and 4, a number of proxies for the potential conflict 
between stockholders and regulators have been proposed. 
Before considering this research, a detailed explanation 
is made of the process by which accounting standards are 
set. This contributes to a better understanding of why 
managers might believe that they can influence the 
establishment of accounting standards. 
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Attempt to Influence the FASB. 
Previous research, to be discussed in Chapter 3, has 
considered the relationship between the reported income of 
the firm resulting from the choice among various 
alternative accounting methods, and firm characteristics 
associated with group conflicts between stockholders and 
managers (profit sharing hypothesis), bondholders (debt 
covenant hypothesis), and regulators (political cost 
hypothesis). This section examines why some firms send 
letters to the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB). 
The implicit hypothesis of past research has been 
that firms send letters to the FASB to influence its 
establishment of accounting standards. Based on this 
premise, a number of factors related to management's 
decision to attempt to influence standard setting have 
been suggested. A review of the standard setting process 
will help to determine whether accounting rules are 
fashioned in an environment which fosters discussion by 
all interested parties. 
19 
A Historical Review of the Standard Setting Process. 
To understand how management might be able to 
influence the establishment of accounting standards, it is 
necessary to discuss briefly the establishment of the 
FASB, and the process used to establish accounting 
standards. 
Prior to the establishment of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, accounting standards were set 
in the private sector by the Accounting Principles Board 
(1959-1964) and by the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
(1938-1959). Both of these bodies were intimately related 
to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), a private body that comprised a large number of 
certified public accountants. The Committee on Accounting 
Procedure, comprising 21 members, was a body of the 
Institute; while the APB, comprising from 18 to 21 
members, was organized and established by the Institute to 
replace the CAP. Carey (1970) is a good presentation of 
the history of the AICPA. 
Henricksen (1971) suggests a number of factors that 
contributed to the demise of the APB, 
predecessor of the FASB: 
the immediate 
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As a result of these basic criticisms (the 
inability of the APB to narrow the areas of 
difference and inconsistency in accounting 
practice and advance financial reporting in new 
problem areas) of the Accounting Principles 
Board, the rapid change in financial 
institutions, and the many abuses of financial 
accounting reporting during the 1960s and in 
1970, proposals were made to study the 
organizational structure for establishing 
accounting principles . .5* 
This led to the establishment of the "Wheat Study 
Group," which submitted a report (AICPA, 1972) which 
recommended the establishment of a Financial Accounting 
Foundation (FAF) and the formulation of a Financial 
Accounting Standards Board consisting of seven full-time 
members appointed by the board of trustees of the FAF. 
The second major function of the FAF was to secure 
adequate funding to assure the operation of the newly 
proposed standard setting organization, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. This report was adopted by 
the AICPA Council in June 1972, and the FAF, came into 
existence under the sponsorship of the AICPA as well as 
the following organizations: American Accounting 
Association, Financial Analysts Federation, Financial 
Executives Institute, National Association of Accountants 
and Securities Industry Association. 
Members of the FASB are appointed for staggered terms 
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of five years. Board members are full-time employees who 
must sever all prior employment and consulting 
arrangements and restrain from any outside activities 
which might interfere with their FASB duties. 
Rule 203 of the AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics 
recognizes that the FASB is authorized to establish 
generally accepted accounting standards. Similiarly, the 
SEC, authorized by the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 to 
establish accounting principles for firms whose securities 
are publicly traded, has stated that the principles, 
policies and standards approved by the FASB are considered 
by the commission to have substantive authoritative 
support, while those contrary to FASB pronouncements are 
considered not to have substantive authoritative support 
(SEC, 19.73). 
The FASB Deliberation Process. 
Previous research has implicitly assumed that letters 
sent by a company's management to the FASB on a matter 
under consideration constituted evidence of an attempt to 
influence the board as well as an indication of the manner 
in which management would prefer to see the issue 
resolved. Support for this view can be obtained by 
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considering the FASB1s deliberation process prior to the 
adoption of an accounting standard. 
In establishing accounting standards, The FASB has 
adopted a procedure which allows for consideration of a 
broad range of views. Topic agendas are developed by the 
Chairman of the FASB in consultation with other board 
members, the FASB's staff, members of an advisory council, 
representatives from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, as well as the business and financial 
communities, accounting educators and others. 
If the proposed topic is considered to be of broad 
interest or the issues are expected to be extremely 
complex, then typically, a task force is appointed to 
develop a discussion memorandum. The discussion 
memorandum is neutral in tone since it does not suggest 
adoption of any particular standard. Its purpose is to 
set forth the issues, arguments and alternative solutions 
while offering suggestions about the implications of 
adopting any particular alternative solution. 
Following the publication of any discussion 
memoramdum, a public hearing is held to receive comments 
and suggested solutions to the matter under consideration. 
The public is also invited to send written comments 
directly to the FASB on the matters covered by the 
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discussion memorandum. After considering these comments, 
the FASB prepares an exposure draft setting forth its 
position on a proposed statement for financial accounting. 
The FASB welcomes comments on its exposure draft from 
interested parties. Under the FASB's rules of procedure, 
final action cannot be taken on the proposed statement 
until the comment period has elapsed. The minimum comment 
period for an exposure draft is thirty days from its date 
of publication. Finally, a public hearing on the exposure 
draft is held. 
At times, the FASB has proceeded directly to the 
issuance of an exposure draft, however, " . . in no 
circumstances may a final Statement be issued without 
prior exposure for public comment for at least 50 days"^* 
Thus, the FASB officially acknowledges that it considers 
the input of interested parties prior to the final 
establishment of financial accounting standards. 
The adjustment or reaffirmation of views from the 
exposure draft to the final statement can be taken to 
indicate the degree that the FASB may be .influenced by 
outside parties. Table 1 presents data pertaining to this 
stage of the process. 
Table 1 reports the total number of letters that 
concur or disagree with the final position taken by the 
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Table 1 
Submissions to the FASB on Various Topics 
A. No change in FASB position -from Exposure Draft. 
Topic Concur Do not Concur 
(# of Issues) A B C D Total A B C D Total 
SFAS No. 2 (1 ) •Ji •ml* 6 34 46 0 11 3 17 31 
SFAS No. 5 (3) 6 1 1 14 10 41 4 0 4 73 81 
SFAS No. 12 (1 ) •ml1 5 9 12 1 1 5 38 45 
B. Change in FASB position from E xposure Draft. 
SFAS No. 2 (1 ) 1 0 5 12 18 9 1 0 16 19 
SFAS No. 5 (0) 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 
SFAS No. 12 (1 ) 1 0 5 29 “T cr OJ 3 'n jL. 4 jL 11 
14 16 35 87 1 CT'-V 1 10 15 16 146 187 
SFAS No. 2, Accounting for Research and Development costs. 
SFAS No. 5, Contingencies. 
SFAS No. 12, Accounting for certain marketable securities. 
Legend: 
A - Sponsoring Organization! 
B - Academicians 
C - Major Accounting firms 
D - Business enterprises 
Source: Adapted from FAF (1977), Exhibit B. 
25 
FASB on topics dealing with research and development costs 
(SFAS No. 2), accounting for contingencies (SFAS No. 5), 
and accounting for certain marketable securities (SFAS No. 
12). These topics are used in searching for a 
relationship between firm characteristics and the attempt 
to influence the establishment of financial accounting 
standards. Part A of the table provides data for the case 
where no change was made from the exposure draft to the 
final statement; part B presents similiar data for those 
issues on which the FASB changed its position. 
The original publication, FAF (1977), examined eight 
exposure drafts. Only three are considered in table one. 
The three selected topics relate to accounting issues 
which influence the timing of recognizing reported income; 
the other topics have balance sheet, disclosure, or income 
variability implications. 
Immediately evident is that the FASB does indeed 
change its position. Of the seven issues underlying the 
three topics, the FASB changed its position more than a 
fourth of the time (2 of 7 issues). If all topics were 
considered, the adjustment of views would have been even 
more pronounced (7 of 23 issues). This would support any 
potential belief by the management of a company that the 
FASB is not only willing to listen to counter arguments. 
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but is also capable of changing its collective mind. 
Table 1 also shows that, for the exposure drafts 
under consideration, the majority of the letters sent by 
the business community has not agreed with the views of 
the FASB. It is important to consider whether this 
failure to concur with the FASB has had an impact on the 
number of letters sent to that body. If the lack of 
success in influencing the accounting standard setters 
influences the likelihood of attempting to influence the 
FASB in the future, then it would be more difficult to 
model the process due to lack of any underlying stability. 
The question of whether it is more or less likely for 
a company representative to make a submission to the FASB 
given its making of a submission on a previous exposure 
draft, is beyond, the scope of the present research. 
Suggestive evidence, by no means definitive, of underlying 
stability in the making of submissions to the FASB can be 
obtained by examining the number of letters sent to the 
FASB by representatives of the business community. 
Table 2 shows the total and average number of 
submissions relating to discussion memoranda and exposure 
drafts by year of publication of the applicable final 
statement. From 1973, when the FASB was established, to 
1979, the year of current research interest, the number of 
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submissions averaged 152.1 for each exposure draft or 
discussion memorandum. The average number of submissions 
per year tended to be near this overall average. The 
years 1976 and 1977 exhibited unusual activity, possibly 
explainable by the issues under consideration at the time. 
Proposed statements on leases and segment disclosure 
generated above average interest during 1976, while 
proposed statements on accounting for costs pertaining to 
oil and gas exploration and accounting for troubled debt 
restructuring generated broad interest during 1977. 
Although the evidence is weak, it does suggest that 
interest in the setting of financial accounting standards 
has not waned. 
The above discussion demonstrates that the FASB 
deliberation process does encourage public comment. In 
addition, representatives from a number of business 
establishments have responded to various proposed 
financial accounting standards. This supports the 
implicit views of previous researchers who have attempted 
to relate firm characteristics to the decision to attempt 




Total and Average Number of Submissions to the FASB Regarding 
Discussion Memoranda and Exposure Drafts 
Year SFAS’s Total 
ED 
1973 1 1 
1974 2-3 n 
1975 4-12 12 
1976 13-14 5 
1977 1 5-20 7 
1978 21-24 4 
1979 25-34 13 
44 
Source: Adopted from various 
Standards. 
Total Average Submissions 







2051. 157. 8 
6715 152. 1 
Statement of Financial Accounting 
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Summary. 
This chapter has discussed theory relating to 
potential conflicts between groups involved in the 
financial reporting process. Understanding these 
theoretical relationships improves the ability to model 
the process. Models of the process are presented in 
Chapters 5 and 7. 
The next chapter presents a review of previous 




1. The actual wording in the exposure draft was as 
follows: 
For reasons set forth in Appendix 
B, the following two types of 
contingencies do not satisfy the 
conditions in paragraph 6 and shall 
not be charged to income prior to the 
occurrence of an event that causes an 
asset impairment or incurrence of a 
liability, and only then when the 
amount of the loss can be reasonably 
estimated (a) uninsured risks (risks 
transferred to an affiliated insurance 
company and not reinsured with an 
independent insurer are deemed to be 
uninsured risks for purposes of 
applying this statement), sometimes 
referred to as "self-insurance." 
Exposure Draft, Accounting for Contingencies. 
October 21, 1974, paragraph 13. 
2. A typical comment was expressed by the 
comptroller of E. I. DuPont DeNemours and 
Company: 
For well over a century, the 
DuPont Company has self-insured 
significant portions of its loss 
exposure. In addition to property 
losses, we maintain self-insurance 
reserves for public and product 
liability claims and for workmens 
compensation. In contention with 
property loss exposure, we have a 
large and competent staff of risk 
management experts who work closely 
with the financial staff in 
determining the appropriate mix of 
self-insurance and purchased 
insurance, consistent with the 
company's ability to absorb losses 
without serious financial impact. 
Based on long experience, we are 
convinced that DuPont's risk 
management programs and wide dispersal 
of assets (more than 100 plants) 
provide the basis for retaining part 
of the risk at significant overall 
savings. The operation of a 
self-insurance reserve is an integral 
part of this program, and we are 
convinced that an accounting rule 
precluding such reserves would 
introduce a bias against continuing 
(emphasis added) a long-standing 
practice which management considers to 
be economically and financially sound. 
Letter from Mr. W. E. Buxbaum to the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, dated 
December 13, 1974. 
A number of researchers have investigated the 
relationship between expenditure on research and 
development and firm characteristics associated 
with potential conflicts between groups involved 
in the financial reporting process. Chasteen 
(1971) failed to find any statistically 
significant differences in the ratios of 
inventory to total or current assets, or in 
inventory turnover, between firms utilizing 
different flow assumptions in pricing inventory. 
Dukes, Dyckman and Elliott (1980) used a matched 
pairs design to search for differences in R&D 
expenditures prior and subsequent to the FASB 
exposure draft on accounting for research and 
development costs. No change in . R&D 
expenditures over the period of the release of 
the exposure draft was noted. 
Horwitz and Kolodny (1980) (hereafter, HK) 
also considered the effect on R&D expenditures 
of the 1974 exposure draft on the accounting for 
research and development costs. Contrary to the 
results of Dukes et al. (1980) , HK concluded 
that the expense-only rule caused a relative 
decline in R&D outlays for small, 
high-technology firms which had previously used 
the deferral method of accounting for R&D costs. 
Elliott, Richardson, Dyckman and Dukes (1984) 
32 
reproduced the HK study. They noted a selective 
decline in R&D expenditures prior to the 
issuance of the statement of accounting for R&D 
costs in 1974. They also noted a willingness of 
capitalizers of R&D expenditures to switch prior 
to the mandatory date of the statement. Elliott 
et al. (1984) suggest that this evidence calls 
into question the results of HK. 
Finally, Larker (1983) found that firms 
adopting management performance plans exhibited 
significant growth in capital expenditures 
following adoption of the plan. Larker 
postulated that a performance plan causes 
managers to become more concerned with long-term 
rather than short-term results. This long-term 
emphasis causes managers to be willing to expend 
more on investment. 
4. See Jensen and Meckling (1976); page 323. 
5. See Hendersen (1971); page 85. 
6. See FAF (1977); page A-3. 
CHAPTER III 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH. 
Previous accounting researchers have searched for a 
relationship between accounting decisions and firm 
characteristics. Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) provide a 
summary of empirical evidence of the economic consequences 
of accounting alternatives. Accounting decisions include 
the choice of the accounting alternative and the attempt 
to influence the establishment of financial accounting 
standards. Firm characteristics relate to the potential 
conflicts between groups interested in the financial 
reporting process. Research pertaining to each decision 
area is considered separately. 
Choice of Accounting Alternative. 
A number of studies have investigated the association 
between economic factors and choice of alternative 
accounting methods. Topics considered have included the 
choice of method for inventory valuation (Ilagerman and 
Zmejewski, 1979) , the method of allocating fixed asset 
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costs (Hagerman and Zmejewski, 1979; Dhaliwal, Salamon and 
Smith, 1982) , the method of accounting for the investment 
tax credit (Hagerman and Zmejewski, 1979), the 
amortization period of past service pension costs 
(Hagerman and Zmejewski, 1979), the accounting for 
interest costs (Bowen, Noreen and Lacey, 1981) , the method 
of accounting for long-term construction contracts 
(Trotman, 1980), and the method of accounting for oil 
exploration costs (Dhaliwal, 1980; Daley and Vigeland, 
1983) . 
The design of previous research can be classified 
according to the treatment of the variable representing 
the accounting method alternative. Research using 
multivariate techniques treats this variable as a 
dependent variable. An alternative treatment is to 
consider it as a grouping variable and to utilize 
univariate statistical techniques. In both situations, an 
a priori determination is made to determine which 
particular alternative will increase or decrease reported 
income. 
When the accounting method alternative is considered 
as a dependent variable, probit or logit analysis, 
depending on assumption of the density function of the 
error term of the model, rather than regression analysis. 
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is typically employed to estimate model coefficients. 
This is due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable. Independent variables are proxies for economic 
factors suggested by potential conflicts between 
stockholders and other groups involved with the financial 
reporting process. 
Zimmerman (1982) has suggested that these conflicts 
result in the following hypotheses • 
Debt Covenant Hypothesis (DC). 
Ceteris paribus, the greater a firm's 
debt-equity ratio, the more likely the firm's 
equilibrium accounting procedures will increase 
the present value of reported earnings? 
Political Cost Hypothesis (PC). 
Ceteris paribus, the larger the firm (the 
greater the political costs), the more likely 
the equilibrium accounting procedures will 
reduce the present value of reported earnings; 
Profit Sharing Hypothesis (PS). 
Ceteris paribus, firms with bonus plana are 
more likely to have accounting procedures which 
increase the present value of reported earnings. 
Tests of hypotheses involve testing the model for 
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overall statistical significance along with a comparison 
of the actual and expected signs of model coefficients. 
Univariate statistical tests are utilized when the 
accounting method alternative is treated as a grouping 
variable. Typically, an attempt is made to match 
companies on one or more variables serving as proxies for 
potential group conflicts. After matching, a comparison 
is made between groups of the central tendency of some 
firm characteristic considered to be related to the choice 
of accounting alternative. Differences in central 
tendency are tested for significance using parametric and 
non-parametric statistical techniques. 
In considering previous research involving the choice 
of the accounting alternative, several deficiencies are 
apparent. These deficiencies suggest avenues for future 
research. First, proxies for theoretical constructs of 
interest tend to be accounting ratios or accounting 
levels. Superior proxies of firm characteristics relating 
to debt-covenant and profit-sharing hypotheses can be 
suggested. Chapter 4 presents a number of variables which 
are closer to the theoretical constructs of interest than 
those used in previous research. Second, models tested in 
Chapter 7 include proxies for all factors suggested by 
potential group conflicts. Previous research generally 
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has considered only one conflict area at a time, while 
failing to control for other possible influences on the 
process. 
A third approach is to improve upon the dependent 
variable used in testing accounting-method income strategy 
models by developing pro forma estimates of the income 
effect of non-reported accounting alternatives. These 
estimates are obtained through procedures described in 
Chapter 6. These suggested improvements to previous 
research should be kept in mind while reviewing the 
previous research discussed below. 
Accounting Alternative as Grouping Variable. 
Dhaliwal (1980) , Trotman (1980) , and Bowen, Noreen 
and Lacey (1981) have all treated the choice of accounting 
alternative as a grouping variable. These studies are 
summarized in Table 3 and discussed below. Table 3 
includes the particular accounting procedure of interest, 
along with expected and actual differences in central 
tendency between groups. Statistical tests and levels of 
significance are also listed. 
Dhaliwal (1980) argued that an accounting standard 
which causes a reduction in reported earnings or equity 
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Table 3 
Previous Research: Choice o-f Accounting Alternative as a 
Grouping Variable 





Method o-f accounting 







versus completed con¬ 
tract methods. ( + ) 
Actual Relationship 
and Statistical 
Si gni -f i cance 
PS DC PC 
+ns 
. 05a 
Comments: Test di-f-ference in group means. Ha is that percentage 
completion group which had higher ratio. Statistical 
tests: Mann-Whitney U test and Wilcoxon method matched 
pairs (a) differences were significant after matching 
on total assets. 
PS DC PC 
Dhaliwal (1980) Full costs verus 
Method of accounting successful efforts 
for oil exploration methods. ( + ) +.09 
costs. Debt-to- 
equity ratio. 
Comments: Difference in average financial leverage using a 
matched pairs t-test. Results indicated full—cost 
firms had more leverage as expected. Matching on sales 
as control for size effects. Author did not review 
actual debt convenants. 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Previous Research: Choice ot Accounting Alternative as a 
Grouping Variable 
Boween, Noreen and Lacey Capitalize versus PS DC PC 
(1981) response (+) 
Accounting tor interest 
costs: 
■Dividends to un- +.01 
restricted retained 
earnings 
■Times interest +.06 
earned 
•Net Sales (Mann- NS 
Whitney L) test) 
Comments: As expected, the dividend constraint was more binding 
and the times-interest-earned variable smaller, tor the 
interest capitalizes than tor those expensing interest 
costs. Statistical tests included a sign test and 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks tests. Results 
under both tests were similar. Only the results tor 
the sign test are presented above. 
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and/or increases the volatility of reported earnings may 
put a firm into technical default on its debt covenants. 
This reasoning led him to hypothesize that highly 
leveraged firms would not be inclined to adopt such 
accounting alternatives. To test these notions, he 
gathered data on the debt-to-equity ratios for companies 
involved in oil exploration. 
Thirty-three matched pairs of companies utilizing 
either the successful efforts or full cost method of 
accounting for oil exploration costs were found. Matching 
was based on sales revenue. Matching was an attempt to 
control for the political cost hypothesis. As discussed 
below. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) found that sales was 
statistically significant as a firm characteristic related 
to the decision to make a submission to the FASB. 
Employing both a matched-pairs t-test and a Wilcoxon 
matched pairs signed-rank test, Dhaliwal (1980) observed 
the expected results. The average debt-to-equity ratio of 
firms using the full cost method was higher than that of 
firms under successful efforts (p-level of .09). No 
attempt was made to place asset values on an equivalent 
accounting basis. Since the full cost altenative 
capitalizes oil exploration costs, the asset base will 
tend to be higher for a firm under full cost than for a 
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similiar firm under the successful efforts alternative. 
This results in a bias against rejecting the null 
hypothesis of equal debt-to-equity ratios for both groups. 
Dhaliwal (1980) utilized a second test involving the 
difference in average level of long-term debt between 
groups. This test avoided the problem of non-equivalent 
asset bases. Again, as expected, firms using the 
full-costing alternative had significantly higher 
long-term debt than firms under the successful efforts 
alternative (p-level of .025). These tests support the 
debt-covenant hypothesis articulated by Zimmerman (1982). 
Trotman (1980), following the work of Dhaliwal 
(1980), examined the impact of a firm's capital structure 
on management's choice of accounting method for long-term 
construction projects. Forty-nine companies listed on the 
Sidney stock exchange during 1979 were identified as 
possessing long-term construction contracts. The total 
debt-to-equity ratio for each company was calculated. 
Using a Mann-Whitney U test, the null hypothesis of no 
difference in average debt-to-equity ratio for companies 
using the completed contract method and companies using 
the percentage of completion method could not be rejected 
at reasonable levels of significance. 
Trotman (1980) noted several deficiencies is his 
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study. First, there was an identification problem. The 
total-asset value of a company is effected by the choice 
of accounting method. Thus, the level of debt-to-equity 
ratio considered to have an impact on accounting 
techniques is itself effected by accounting technique. 
Second, no attempt was made to determine if companies 
possessed debt covenants, and, if so, how close the 
company was to violation of a debt covenant. Finally, no 
attempt was made to control for the size of the company. 
In a second test, Trotman (1980) controlled for size 
by matching, on total assets, each of seven companies 
using the completed contract method with companies using 
the percentage completion method. After matching, use of 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs test resulted in the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of equivalent debt-to-equity ratios 
(p-level of .014). This provides support for the debt 
covenant hypothesis. 
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey (1981) formed 99 matched 
pairs of companies which either capitalized or expensed 
interest costs associated with capital expenditures. 
Matching was based on four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. As expected, the dividend 
constraint was more binding, and the times interest-earned 
variable was smaller, for interest capitalizers than 
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interest expensers. Statistical tests included a sign and 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks tests. Results 
support the debt covenant hypothesis. 
A summary of research using the choice-of-accounting 
alternative as a grouping variable can be found in Table 
3. The next section considers research utilizing the 
choice-of-accounting alternative as a dependent variable. 
Accounting Alternative as Dependent Variable. 
The following studies assume that the choice of the 
accounting alternative for each accounting method is an 
independent decision. For any particular accounting 
method of interest, an a priori determination is made of 
the reported income effect of each accounting alternative. 
Based on this determination, companies are coded as either 
income maximizers or minimizers. Independent variables 
are proxies for potential conflicts between company 
stockholders and regulators (PC), stockholders and 
bondholders (DC), and stockholders and managers (PS). 
Table 7, shown in the next chapter, lists various 
definitions for independent variables used in previous 
studies. 
Models of the process can be represented as follows: 
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Accounting Method 
Alternative = f( PC, DC, PS ) 
Since the dependent variable is coded as either zero or 
one, probit or logit analysis, rather than regression 
analysis, are employed to estimate model coefficients. 
The choice between probit or logit analysis depends on the 
distributional assumption of the error term of the model. 
If the error term is assumed to follow a cummulative 
normal distribution, then probit analysis is utilized. If 
a logistic distribution is assumed, then logit analysis is 
employed. The logistic and normal density functions are 
fairly similiar. The logistic function has slightly 
thicker "tails" than the normal distribution (Amemeya, 
1981) . Table 4 summarizes a number of studies using this 
research design. 
Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) (hereafter, HZ) 
considered four different accounting methods. Probit 
analysis, utilizing the maximum likelihood technique, was 
used to estimate model coefficients. For each accounting 
topic, the level of significance and the percent of 
companies correctly predicted by the model is as follows: 
depreciation method (p-level of .01, 85.3%), inventory 
method (p-level of .05, 58.0%) , investment tax credit 
method (p-level of .10, 73.3%) and pension costs 
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Table 4 
Previous Research: Choice o-f Accounting 
Alternative as Dependent Variable 
Study, Accounting Independent Variable Actual Relationship 
Procedure and Expected Relationship and Statistical 
Dependent Variable Si gni -f i cance 
PS DC PC 
Hagerman and Size (-) -ns 
Zmejewski (1979) Risk (-) +ns 
Inventory Method. Capital Intensity (-) -.10 
Binary-Increase or Concentration -.10 
decrease to Net Ratio (-) 
Income. Incentive Plans ( + ) -ns 
E-f-fective tax +ns 
Rate ( + ) 
Hagerman and Size (-> -.05 
Zmejewski (1979) Risk (-) -.05 
Depreciation Capital Intensity (-) + .10 
Method. Same as Concentration -ns 
above. Ratio (-) 
* Incentive Plans ( + ) + .10 
Hagerman and Size (-) -.10 
Zmejewski (1979) Risk (-) -ns 
Investment Tax Capital Intensity (-! I +ns 
Credit. Same as Concentration -.10 
above. Ratio (-) 
• Incentive Plans ( + ) +ns 
Hagerman and Size (-) -ns 
Zmejewski (1979) Risk (-) -ns 
Amortization period Capital Intensity (-1 > -ns 
o-f past service Concentration -ns 
pension costs. Ratio (-) 
Incentive Plans ( + ) + .10 
Efoween, Noreen and Mgt. Comp. Plan (+) -ns 
and Lacey (19S1) Div. Payout Con- + .02 
Method o-f accounting constraint ( + ) 
-for interest costs. Interest Coverage (-1 l -.12 
• Fin. Leverage (-) -. 11 




Table 4 (Continued) 
Previous Research: Choice of Accounting 




Independent Variable Actual Relationship 
Expected Relationship and Statistical 
Significance 
PS DC PC 
Dhaliwal, Salamon 
and Smith (1981) 
Depreciation Method. 
Straight line or 
accelerated method. 
Size (-) -.15 
Total debt to total +.01 
assets (+) 
Type of control (+) +.03 
Daley and Vi gel and 
(1983) 
Accounting for R&D 
costs prior to 
adoption of SFAS 
No. 2. Expense or 
capital ice. 
Private long-term debt 
to tangible assets (+) +.03 
Interest coverage (-) -ns 
Dividends to retained +.04 
Earnings (+) 
Size (Sales) (-) -.04 
Public leverage (+) +.03 
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amortization period (p-level of .15, 77.0%). 
Evident from reviewing table 4 is that HZ did not 
include any variables to test or control for the debt 
covenant hypothesis. In addition, a number of 
coefficients were not statistically significant, and some 
statistically significant coefficients were not of the 
expected sign. HZ offered two explanations for the lack 
of statistical significance of model coefficients within 
and across models. First, they suggested the possible 
omission of important variables in the models. Second, 
they suggested that management might be influenced by 
different factors when making decisions on the choice of 
the accounting alternative for different accounting 
methods. A third possibility is the presence of severe 
multicollinearity. HZ tested for multicollinearity and 
concluded that it was not a problem. 
Healy (1985) suggests that lack of statistical 
significance for variables serving as proxies for the 
profit sharing hypothesis may be due to a flaw in the 
methods used by previous researchers. He. suggests that 
they failed to distinguish between incentive plans based 
on pre-tax and after-tax earnings. This criticism would 
be especially damning for any accounting method based 
merely on a tax effect. Since this is the case for HZ's 
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study on the method of accounting for the investment tax 
credit, it is not surprising that their variable for 
incentive plans lacked statistical significance. 
In addition to univariate tests based on the use of 
the accounting alternative as a grouping variable, Bowen, 
Noreen and Lacey (1981) (hereafter, BNL) developed a model 
considering the method of accounting for oil exploration 
costs. Ninety-one matched pairs of interest capitalizers 
or expensers were obtained. Matching was based on the 
four-digit SIC code. Probit analysis was used to estimate 
model coefficients. Three analyses were conducted: all 
firms, all but petroleum firms, and only petroleum firms. 
Since similiar results were obtained, only those for the 
model using all firms are reported in Table 4. The model 
had a chi square value of 14.17 with 5 degrees of freedom 
(p-level of .014). A total of 67.6% of the companies were 
correctly classified. 
As shown in Table 4, BNL utilized proxies for each of 
the potential group conflicts. Coefficients tended to be 
of expected sign; however, not all coefficients were 
statistically significant. BNL offer no explanation for 
the lack of statistical significance of individual 
coefficients. In any event, the significance of the 
overall model provides evidence supporting theorized 
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relationships. 
Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1981) (hereafter, DSS) 
examined the relationship between choice of the 
depreciation-method alternative and firm characteristics. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the ownership control 
status of the firm. Firms were designated as 
owner-controlled if one party owned 10% and exercised 
active control as a company officer or member of the board 
of directors, or if one party owned 20% or more of the 
voting stock. Fifty-seven management controlled and 
fifty-three owner controlled firms were identified for 
1962. 
As shown in Table 4, model coefficients tended to be 
statistically significant and of the expected sign. The 
overall model was statistically significant (p-level of 
.01). Classification results were not reported. 
Daley and Vigeland (1983) (hereafter, DV) related 
firm characteristics to the method of accounting for R&D 
costs, prior to adoption of SFAS No. 2. Their sample 
consisted of 178 R&D expensing firms and 135 capitalizing 
firms. Data to calculate firm characteristics were 
obtained for 1972. As shown in Table 4, coefficients of 
variables selected to proxy for debt coefficients and 
political costs were statistically significant and of the 
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expected sign. DV utilized a jackknife procedure to avoid 
the problem of classifying the same firms used to estimate 
model coefficients. Using this technique, the overall 
model was statistically significant (p-level of .01) and 
65.2% of all firms were correctly classified. DV also 
employed probit analysis and obtained similiar results. 
These results support the theory involving potential 
conflicts between groups participating in the financial 
reporting process. 
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Accounting Method Strategies. 
Zmejewski and Hagerman (1981) (hereafter, ZH) discard 
the assumption that the choice of each accounting method 
is made independently. They suggest that these decisions 
are made by management as part of an overall strategy. To 
test this notion, they selected four accounting methods 
and classified firms as income maximizers or minimizers or 
some combination thereof based on the particular 
alternative accounting method chosen. The selected 
accounting methods and their assumed impact on net income 
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ZH's work can be represented by the following 
relationship: 
Income Strategy = f(PC, PS, DC) 
The degree of association between estimated income effects 
and variables serving as proxies for firm characteristics 
was determined using n-chotomous probit analysis. 
ZH translated the choice of the accounting method 
into an income strategy by assuming various income effects 
based on the choice of each accounting alternative. For 
example, one set of assumptions posited that each method 
affected reported earnings equally. By making this 
assumption, they were able to classify companies into five 
categories, from income maximizer (choice of all income 
increasing alternatives) to income minimizer (choice of 
all income decreasing alternatives). 
Table 5 presents results from the ZH study. This 
table shows the actual and expected relationships as well 
as the level of significance of model coefficients. The 
model had an overall statistical significance of .01. 
Forty percent of the 324 companies considered for 1975 
were correctly classified. Although a number of model 
coefficients were not statistically significant, all 
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sign. The HZ results are consistent with theory 
suggesting a relationship between the accounting method 
income strategy used by management and firm 
characteristics associated with potential conflicts 
between groups involved in the financial reporting 
process. 
The next section examines research on the 
relationship between firm characteristics and management's 
decision to try to influence the establishment of 
accounting standards. 
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Attempt to Influence Financial Accounting Standards. 
Previous researchers have examined the relationship 
between firm characteristics and the position taken by 
firm representatives on a number of proposed accounting 
standards. Discussion memoranda and exposure drafts 
considered include general price level adjusted financial 
statements (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978), interest cost 
capitalization (Lasater, 1982 and Dhaliwal, 1982) and the 
accounting for oil exploration costs (Dhaliwal, 1980) . 
These studies are summarized in Table 6. 
As these studies are being reviewed, a number of 
points should be kept in mind. First, as can be seen by 
reviewing Tables 6 and 7, improvements are possible in 
proxies for theoretical constructs of interest. This was 
mentioned above while discussing research involving the 
decision concerning the accounting method alternative. 
Second, only one study (Lasater, 1982) has attempted to 
model the decision of whether to make a submission to the 
FASB as opposed to the position taken on those 
submissions. Third, only a few topical areas have been 
considered. Examination of different discussion memoranda 
and exposure drafts should help to determine the general 
applicability of the theory to this type of accounting 
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decision. Finally, no direct test of the relationship 
between both types of accounting decisions has been 
undertaken. Such a test is proposed and investigated in 
Chapters 5 and 7 of the current research. 
To explain why the management of a firm would attempt 
to influence the accounting standard-setting process, 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) (hereafter, WZ) developed a 
theory based on the potential conflict between 
stockholders and regulators. As a test of their theory, 
they examined firm submissions pertaining to the 1974 FASB 
discussion memorandum on general price-level (GPLA) 
changes in financial statements. 
WZ utilized discriminant analysis as a multivariate 
test. The dependent variable was firm position concerning 
the GPLA proposal. Independent variables were (1) 
unadjusted depreciation expense in 1973 deflated by market 
value of stockholder equity, (2) net monetary asset 
position in 1973 deflated by the maket value of 
stockholder equity, (3) sales multiplied by CHG, where CHG 
was a zero-one variable relating historic cost income to 
price-adjusted income, (4) sales divided by industry sales 
multiplied by CHG, (5) a zero-one dummy variable for the 
presence or absence of a managerial incentive scheme, and 
(6) a zero-one variable to designate regulated or 
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non-regulated. 
The first two variables were suggested by literature 
relating to general purchasing power accounting. WZ felt 
that these variables would capture the tax effects and 
have a positive relationship with the dependent variable 
as defined. Variables three and four were proxies for 
political costs and were predicted to have a positive 
sign. Variable five proxied for a management compensation 
plan and was expected to have a negative sign. 
Various models were constructed using all and various 
subsets of independent variables. The coefficient of 
determination of the full model was .358. The model's chi 
square value was only 9.25 with 6 degrees of freedom. 
Thus, the model was not statistically significant (p-level 
of .15). The size proxy, sales, had the largest t-value 
and was the most stable coefficient across the various 
models. The model with sales, as the only independent 
variable, was statistically significant (p-level of .025). 
The coefficient of determination of this model was .201. 
WZ suggest that more than half of the explained variation 
of the full model was represented by sales as a proxy for 
political costs. Based on these considerations, WZ 
concluded that ". . . firm size is the most important 
2. variable". 
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Whether or not sales is the most important variable 
is subject to question. WZ do not present results from 
other models employing only one independent variable, 
therefore, comparisons to the model using sales as an 
independent variable are not possible. In addition, as 
shown in Table 7, there are other alternative political 
cost proxies than those used by WZ. Coefficients from the 
WZ models, with actual and expected signs, are presented 
in Table 6. 
WZ present classification results for 34 regulated 
companies. The model classified 32 correctly. However, a 
holdout sample or jackknife procedure was not employed. 
Using a model to classify the same firms used in 
constructing the model maximizes the classification 
success of the sample, which might differ from that of the 
underlying process. McKee, Bell and Boatsman (1984) 
(hereafter, MBB) criticize WZ on this point and for their 
assumption of proportional prior probability of group 
membership. Using the WZ data with a jackknife procedure 
and equal priors, MBB classified only 24 . of 34 firms 
correctly. 
Christensen (1983) criticized the methodology of 
Watts and Zimmerman. He argued that concern with 
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Debt to equity (+) +,01 
Interest cost currently +.10 
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Reported effective +ns 
tax rate (+) 
Earnings before +.10 
taxes (+) 
Additions to current +.10 
work-in-process (+) 
Number of sub- +.20 
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Lasater (1982) 
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Debt to eqity ( + ) -ns 
Interest cost currently +ns 
capitalised ( + ) 
Reported e-f-fective -His 
tax rate ( + ) 
Earnings before +.01 
taxes (+) 
Additions to current -ns 
work-in-process (+) 
* Number o-f sub- +ns 
sidiaries (+) 
Management compen- -ns 
sation (-) 
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phenomenon required a search for contradictory, rather 
than confirmatory, evidence. Thus, the WZ theory can not 
be considered as all inclusive since it fails to explain 
all possible observed cases. In addition, the focus on a 
company's position regarding proposed accounting standards 
fails to address why certain companies do not make a 
submission to the FASB. It would appear that if firm 
characteristics are indeed related to the position taken 
on submissions to the FASB, then firm characteristics 
should also be related to the decision of whether to make 
a submission to the FASB. 
Lasater (1982) related firm characteristics to both 
the decision to make a submission to the FASB and the 
position taken on any submission. In his study, the topic 
of manager's lobbying behavior was the exposure draft on 
interest cost capitalization (SFAS No. 34). Logit 
analysis was used to estimate model coefficients. Both 
models were statistically significant (p-level of .01). 
As shown in Table 6, statistically more significant model 
coefficients were obtained for the position, rather than 
the submission model. Lassater (1982) suggests that 
different factors might be involved regarding the original 
decision to make a submission to the FASB and the position 
taken on any letter submitted. 
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In another study, Dhaliwal (1980) considered the 
magnitude of association between the degree of financial 
leverage possessed by a company and the attempt by the 
managers of the company to attempt to influence the FASB. 
An indirect technique was used in that Dhaliwal apparently 
did not review actual submissions to the FASB. Instead, 
he relied on previous work which had observed that firms 
using the full cost method of accounting for oil 
exploration costs tended to oppose SFAS No. 19 "Financial 
Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing 
Companies," which mandated the successful efforts method 
of accounting for oil exploration costs (Lev, 1979; 
Dyckman and Smith, 1979) . 
The actual test of the association between leverage 
and choice of accounting method was made by calculating 
the average debt-to-equity ratio for two groups of firms 
using either the full cost or successful efforts methods 
of accounting for oil exploration costs. Thirty-three 
matched pairs were obtained. The matching was on sales 
revenues as a control for the size effect found by Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978). 
Dhaliwal (1980) concluded that his results were 
consistent with the view that highly levered firms would 
tend to oppose an accounting standard which would cause a 
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reduction in reported earnings or equity, or which would 
increase the variability of reported earnings which might 
put a firm in technical default on its loan agreements. 
Dhaliwal (1982) examined the impact of capital 
structure, firm size, and the presence or absence of a 
management incentive plan on the lobbying behavior of 
management. The issue was the FASB proposal on the 
capitalization of interest costs. Independent variables 
proxied for debt covenants, political costs and management 
compensation factors. Position papers submitted by firms 
reacting to the FASB proposal on the capitalization of 
interest costs were related to firm characteristics. A 
total of 120 position papers were submitted. Firms in 
regulated industries and banks and financial service 
companies were excluded "in order to obtain a set of firms 
which were homogeneous except for the characteristics 
under examination"^• This resulted in 30 firms which 
opposed capitalization of interest costs and 14 firms 
which opposed expensing of interest costs. 
Univariate and multivariate tests were undertaken. 
The general tendency of the univariate and multivariate 
tests led Dhaliwal to conclude that "Highly levered firms 
would be expected to oppose an accounting change which 
reduces reported earnings or equity, or increases the 
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volatility of reported earnings"^* 
Summary. 
A review of the previous literature provides 
tentative evidence to support the proposition that 
accounting decisions are related to firm characteristics 
selected to proxy for potential conflicts between groups 
involved in the financial reporting process. Deficiencies 
in this research have been noted. First, proxies for 
theoretical constructs tend to be simple accounting ratios 
rather than the underlying debt covenants or 
profit-sharing plans. Table 7, included in the next 
chapter, summarizes the variables used by previous 
researchers to proxy for theoretical constructs of 
interest. Second, the search for an accounting-method 
income strategy has relied on untested assumptions about 
the income effect of non-reported accounting alternatives. 
Third, this research area is of recent origin. Only a 
limited number of accounting alternatives in each decision 
area have been examined. 
Chapter 5 discusses propositions, models, and 
statistical tests proposed to extend previous research. 
Chapter 6 discusses methods to improve the research 
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involving a possible accounting method income strategy. 
The next chapter discusses additional variables for 
consideration as proxies for theoretical constructs. 
66 
Footnotes 
1. Zimmerman (1982), page 9. 
2. See Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Page 129 
3. Dhaliwal (1982), page 259. 
4. Dhaliwal (1982), page 263. 
CHAPTER IV 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, DATA SOURCES AND VALIDITY CHECKS. 
This chapter defines the independent variables 
employed in this study, discusses data sources used in 
these definitions and explains how the data have been 
checked for reliability. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, this study presents a 
number of models of firm characteristics which theory 
suggests relate to accounting decisions made by 
management. Proxies for these decisions constitute the 
dependent variable of the models, while independent 
variables consist of firm characteristics suggested by 
theory. 
Definitions of Independent Variables. 
Independent variables are classified into three 
groups. Each group reflects theoretical considerations 
involving the potential conflicts between stockholders and 
regulators (political costs), stockholders and bondholders 
(debt covenants) and stockholders and managers (profit 
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this and previous studies. 
Political Costs. 
Political costs can be imposed on all firms, 
regulated and unregulated alike. These costs include the 
threat of nationalization, expropriation, and break-up; or 
regulation of the company, or subjecting it to special 
taxes. The possibility of incurring political costs 
appears to be related to the notoriety of the company, 
which, in turn, is related to its size, the absolute 
number of company owners, the sensitivity of the industry, 
and the level of the firm's total profits. 
Sales (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and 
Zmejewski, 1979; Larcker, 1983), total assets (Dhaliwal, 
Salamon and Smith, 1981), and number of employees can be 
used as size proxies. Total assets has an inherent 
disadvantage because it is affected by the choice of 
accounting method. This must be considered when deciding 
among financial measures of size. The number of employees 
serves as a non-financial size proxy. 
Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) (hereafter, HZ) argue 
for including some measure of capital intensity, or 
operating leverage, as a proxy for political costs: 
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Firms that use a capital intensive 
technology do not include the opportunity cost 
of capital in computing net income. Therefore, 
on average, a capital intensive firm will report 
higher profits than a labor intensive firm even 
though the economic income of the two firms is 
the same. Thus, we hypothesize that firms that 
are relatively capital intensive and subject to 
political costs will have an incentive to reduce 
reported income by selecting the appropriate 
accounting principles.-*-* 
As in HZ, capital intensity is defined as gross 
assets relative to sales. Similiarly, the degree of 
capital intensity of an industry relative to all firms 
included in the study can be defined as the sum of all 
gross fixed assets relative to total sales for all firms 
in the same three-digit SIC code divided by the sum of 
gross fixed assets relative to total sales for all firms 
in the study. 
Industry sensitivity is apt to be related to the 
number of companies in the industry. The federal 
government has had a long history of discouraging the 
formulation of industry monopolies and oligopolies. Thus, 
the greater the degree of industry dominance, by one or a 
small number of companies, the greater the likelihood of 
attracting the attention of governmental regulators. A 
number of variables can be defined to signify a 
concentration ratio. Total industry sales relative to 
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total sales for all companies in the study, and company 
sales relative to total industry sales (Hagerman and 
Zmejewski, 1979) serve as proxies for the likelihood that 
regulators focus on an industry or a company within an 
industry, respectively. All information needed to 
calculate the above variables is available on the 
COMPUSTAT industrials tapes. 
Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) include variables 
representing systematic market risk and accounting 
earnings risk. 
The normal return to capital and thus 
absolute profits given size, is affected by the 
risk of the corporation. In equilibrium the 
expected return on capital is positively related 
to systematic risk. Thus, firms with higher 
systematic risks, on average, have higher 
accounting returns. This means that unless the 
public and politicians make adjustments for 
risk, riskier firms will appear to make 
excessive profits and thus be subject to 
negative wealth transfers. 
A second risk factor that may influence the 
choice of accounting principles is the 
variability of accounting earnings. Firms that 
have highly variable earnings will naturally, 
from time to time, appear to earn abnormal 
profits. This subjects such firms to political 
costs. Thus, these firms have incentives to 
reduce the mean of their reported earnings 
distributions by choosing income deflating 
accounting alternatives. The beta of accounting 
earnings should serve as a reasonable 
earnings variability of accounting 
since systematic 
total risk, so 
risk is a large component 
we expect higher risk firms 






A firm's accounting earnings are related to its 
choice of accounting method. Thus, utilizing the 
accounting beta might merely introduce a spurious 
association into the model. Accordingly, systematic 
market risk will be the only risk measure used, except 
when previous studies are replicated. 
Determination of Accounting and Market Risk. 
This section outlines procedures for calculating 
accounting and systematic market risk. Income before 
extraordinary items is used to construct accounting betas. 
The arithematic mean for all companies on the COMPUSTAT 
industrials tape with usable data is used as a market 
proxy. A time series regression was run for yearly data 
from 1963 through 1979. The dependent variable is the 
income before extraordinary items for each company, while 
the independent variable is the corresponding market 
average. The accounting beta is defined as the slope 
coefficient of this regression. 
To calculate the systematic market beta, company 
market prices and dividends are obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT Price-Dividends-Earnings tape. Monthly data, 
from 1975 through 1979, are obtained for all companies 
included in this study. Companies with missing data 
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received a missing value code as their value for the 
systematic market-risk variable. 
The systematic market-risk variable is defined as the 
coefficient of the regression of the company's return on 
the monthly return of the Center for Research in Security 
Prices' (CRSP) equal-weighted market index. A company's 
return is calculated as follows: 
RETURN. ■ 
it t-l+ 
for company i, time period t. 
where 
P - Market value of company's stock. 
D - Dividends paid during period t. 
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Debt Covenants. 
Debt covenants represent contracts between 
bondholders and the management of a company as 
representatives of the stockholders. These contracts 
relate to financial characteristics reported by the 
company. If the debt is privately placed, the parties are 
free to define covenants in any manner agreeable to all 
concerned. Covenents could be written so that the amounts 
are computed in terms of accounting principles generally 
accepted at the time the debt is first issued (frozen 
GAAP), or in terms of current generally accepted 
accounting principles (rolling GAAP). If the covenants 
are parts of private agreements, their definition can fall 
outside generally accepted accounting principles 
(Fogelson, 1978; Leftwich, 1983). 
Smith and Warner (1979) (hereafter, SW) identified 
four sources of the stockholder - bondholder conflict: (1) 
dividend payout (the possibility of a -liquidating 
dividend), (2) claim dilution (through the issuance of 
additional debt), (3) asset substitution (substitution of 
high-variance income projects for low-variance projects), 
and (4) underinvestment (the rejection of projects with a 
positive net present value, Myers, 1977). 
Debt covenants have become standardized over time. 
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As discussed by SW, the language for a typical debt 
covenant can be found in an American Bar Foundation 
compendium entitled "Commentaries on Indentures." SW 
reviewed typical debt covenants and classified them 
according to the above sources of potential conflict. 
This classification scheme forms the basis in the current 
research for gathering data on a company's existing debt 
covenants. Information on debt covenants used by a 
company is obtained by examining outstanding debt issues 
for a company shown in Moodys Industrial Manual. These 
debt issues are for public issues and are stated in terms 
of current generally accepted accounting principles. 
As shown in Table 7, variables used in previous 
research to proxy for the effects of debt covenants have 
included, leverage, dividend-payout and interest-coverage 
ratios. These variables can be related to the stockholder 
- bondholder classification scheme used by Smith and 
Warner. Dividend-payout covenants place direct 
restrictions on the payout of dividends. Indirect 
restrictions on the payout of dividends are achieved using 
leverage covenants, since management must be concerned 
with maintaining a certain amount of assets. Leverage and 
interest-coverage covenants also indirectly protect 
against claim dilution by limiting the amount of debt that 
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a company can issue. Thus, previous research has focused 
on two aspects of the stockholder - bondholder conflict, 
while two areas — asset substitution and underinvestment 
— have not been utilized. 
Smith and Warner noted that debt covenants generally 
do not contain extensive restrictions on the firm's 
investment policy.3* This might be due to the difficulty 
of objectively evaluating that policy. Projections of 
future cash flows are intrinsically subjective; monitoring 
a firm's investment policy is more difficult than 
reviewing more objective measures such as the extent of 
dividend payout or firm leverage. SW did note several 
restrictions on a firm's investment policy dealing with 
asset substitution involving merger activity; however, 
they did not list any covenants dealing with 
underinvestment. 
The theory of stockholder - bondholder conflict 
suggests that debt covenants act as insurance against the 
transfer of wealth from bondholders to stockholders. 
Several possible situations can be conceptualized. Once a 
debt covenant is in place, management must be concerned 
with the possibility that it will be violated, and, if so, 
the cost consequences of violating the covenant. Prior to 
the formalization of debt covenants, these concerns do not 
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exist. In fact, it could be argued that the establishment 
of debt covenants will benefit the firm's stockholders, 
since by assuring bondholders about the safety of their 
investments, bondholders might be satisfied with a lower 
rate of interest than if this assurance were lacking. 
Thus, it seems important to ascertain the extent and type 
of debt covenants currently in place instead of merely 
assuming that the more debt possessed by a company or the 
lower the interest coverage or inventory of payable funds, 
the more likely are debt covenants to exist. This step 
was not performed in those studies shown in Tables 3 
through 6, nor was any determination made about how near 
the company actually was to violating existing debt 
covenants. These deficiencies are corrected by obtaining 
information on existing debt covenants from 
Moodys Industrial Manual. This information is classified 
using a data-accumulation worksheet shown in the appendix. 
In the current study, four sets of variables are 
defined. First, a dummy variable indicates the presence 
or absence of each type of debt covenant. A. second class 
of variable represents how near the company is to 
defaulting on an existing debt covenant. The proximinity 
to the debt-covenant limit is defined as: 
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1 - (Limits - PA)/(Limits) 
where 
Limits - Limits per debt covenant. 
PA - Actual amount. 
The third class of variables consists of accounting ratios 
employed in previous research. These variables can be 
found in Table 7. 
A fourth set of debt-covenant variables can be 
derived by considering the potential costs of default. 
Various strategies can be envisioned for a company in 
danger of default. First, the company could renegotiate 
the debt covenant. This usually requires the concurrence 
of 2/3 of the outstanding bondholders. A second strategy 
would be to default. A third strategy would be to adjust 
accounting and other decisions resulting in changes to 
reported income, thereby technically avoiding default. 
The first two strategies could involve an adjustment in 
the coupon rate of interest of the issue of concern, 
especially if interest rates have risen since the date of 
original issue. This would lead to higher reported 
interest expense. Assuming that the company's status has 
remained unchanged from the date of original issue, then 
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the difference between the interest rate for high grade 
corporate bonds (bonds coded Aaa) at the current balance 
sheet date and at the date of the initial offering of the 
bonds times the outstanding principal balance of the bonds 
is an estimate of the increase in reported interest costs. 
This procedure would likely understate the true costs of 
violating the covenant since, if a company is in danger of 
default on its debt covenants, it is unlikely that it 
would be able to obtain financing at a rate with the same 
spread from the interest rate for high-quality bonds as 
before. In addition, the company would probably incur 
legal and accounting fees, as well as a loss in its 
financial reputation. Any attempt to quantify these later 
types of costs is beyond the scope of the present work. A 
company typically would not default on a debt covenant in 
order to recind the contract in periods of falling 
interest rates due to these potential costs. Accordingly, 
the proxy for cost of default would not be defined for 
periods over which the interest rate has fallen. The time 
period of interest for this study is 197.9, a period of 
high and generally rising interest rates, as shown in 
Table 8. Monthly interest rates are obtained from various 
issues of the Economic Report of the President. 
In summary, the following types of variables are used 
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Table 8 
Interest Rates for High Grade Corporate Bonds: 1960-1979 
Year Interest Rate Year Interest Rate 
1960 4.41% 1970 8.04% 
1961 4.35 1971 7.39 
1962 4.33 1972 7.21 
1963 4.26 1973 7.44 
1964 4.40 1974 8.57 
1965 4.49 1975 8.83 
1966 5.13 1976 8.43 
1967 5.51 1977 8.02 
1968 6.18 1978 8.73 
1969 7.03 1979 9.63 
Average Interest Rates on corporate bonds, rated Aaa by Moodys. 
Source: Various issues of the Fmncmir. Report of the President. 
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in examining the relationship between the potential 
conflict between stockholders and bondholders and the 
choice between alternative accounting methods: 
1. A dummy variable representing the existence 
of various types of debt covenants. 
2. A variable, between zero and one, 
representing the proximity of the company's 
present position to the debt covenant 
limits. 
3. Variables used in previous literature 
relating to dividend payout and limitations 
on the issuance of additional debt. 
4. A variable designating the cost of default 
in terms of current reported income. 
Variable Weighting Schemes. 
A company is likely to have a number of debt issues, 
each with different interest rates and different types of 
debt covenants. In defining debt-covenant variables, it 
is necessary to devise some strategy for accumulating and 
aggregating this information. There are several 
possibilities. First, a weighted-average debt covenant 
could be devised. One possible weighting scheme would be 
to multiply each issue by its proportion of principal to 
the total outstanding long-term debt. A second possible 
strategy would be to take the largest debt issue in terms 
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of principal and consider it to be the representative 
issue. A third strategy would be to consider as 
representative those issues with the most restrictive debt 
covenants. Implementing this would require deciding which 
debt covenants are most restrictive. At present, no 
theory or empirical evidence is available to suggest which 
strategy is preferable in actually representing how 
management views debt covenants. 
To resolve this problem, debt issues will be ranked 
by size of outstanding principal, and information will be 
gathered on the largest issues constituting at least 50% 
of the total debt. In addition, issues with the most 
restrictive debt covenants in terms of specific provisions 
likely to be violated will also be recorded. This will 
provide sufficient data to construct each of the above 
mentioned variable definitions. 
In models presented in Chapter 7, the presence of a 
debt covenant variable will be coded as "one" if the 
particular debt covenant is noted on any of the up-to-five 
outstanding debt issues included in this study. The 
variable representing the most restrictive debt covenant 
and the potential for default will relate to whichever of 
the issues has the greatest restriction regarding the 
particular debt covenant of interest. Consideration of 
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other possible weighting schemes will be reserved for 
future research. 
Having discussed debt covenants, the next section 
discusses proxies for the potential conflict between 
stockholders and company managers. 
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Profit Sharing Hypothesis. 
Table 6 lists variables used to proxy for firm 
characteristics relating to the potential stockholder - 
manager conflict. Typically, variables used in research 
have merely signified the presence or absence of a 
management incentive plan tied to reported income, and the 
degree that owners perform the management function. 
The more diverse the ownership of the company, the 
less likely that any particular individual or group will 
be able to exert active control over the management of the 
company. Conversely, the larger the ownership fraction 
controlled by any individual, the more likely it is that 
the individual would attempt to monitor management's 
actions. This implies that the larger the degree of 
control exerted by a single party, the less negative will 
be the consequences of the stockholder - manager conflict. 
If the management function is being performed by the 
owners of the company, an agent - principal conflict would 
be impossible. 
Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982) use this type of 
argument in developing a variable designating the type of 
control. However, they do not distinguish between the 
potential for monitoring the behavior of management and 
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the likely absence of any conflict. They classified 
companies as owner controlled "... if one party owned 
10 percent or more of the voting stock and exercised 
active control, or if one party owned 20 percent or more 
of the voting stock. Representation on the board of 
directors or in the top management of the firm was taken 
to be evidence of active control."^* 
The present research considers each situation 
separately. Additional information about the level of 
income threshold stated in the plan is also obtained. The 
income threshold is that level of reported income which 
must be earned before any bonus can be paid. An income 
threshold in a profit-sharing plan would likely affect the 
strategy used by management in financial reporting. The 
larger the threshold, the more likely that management 
would make decisions which increase reported income in the 
current period at the expense of some future period. By 
"front loading" reported income, the manager would 
maximize the present value of his bonus over any given 
time, assuming that all parameters of the plan remained 
unchanged. 
Thus, the current research consists of four classes 
of variables relating to the existence and content of 
incentive plans, the likelihood of monitoring the actions 
of the management group, and determining if stockholders 
perform the management function. Each variable type is 
discussed below. 
Existence of a Bonus Plan for Key Executives. 
Plan existence is denoted by a "zero-one" variable. 
A plan exists if company management receives additional 
remuneration based on the reported income of the company. 
Plan existence is verified by examining company proxy 
statements filed with the SEC. 
Content of the Plan. 
A relative threshold effect is determined by 
standardizing the limits which a plan has to exceed before 
management receives any bonus. The threshold level can be 
standardized by dividing it either by current reported 
income, or by the potential maximum reported income per 
the pro forma estimate of alternative accounting methods. 
A second variable will denote the rate of reported 
earnings payable by the plan. The larger this rate, the 
more likely that the profit-sharing plan will be a 
significant part of management's remuneration. The more 
important this segment of income, the more likely that 
management would utilize income-increasing 
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accounting-method alternatives. Whether the plan is 
specified in terms of before- or after-tax profit will be 
noted as per the suggestion of Healy (1985). 
Information depicting the rate of bonus and threshold 
level can be obtained from a company's proxy statement. 
The Kaiser Cement Co. describes its incentive plan as 
follows: 
(the plan) . . provides for a corporate 
contribution of 6% of the Corporation's pre-tax 
earnings (payable out of pre-tax earnings in 
excess of 8% of net worth at the end of the 
preceding fiscal year) up to 5% of the aggregate 
compensation of all participants (which may be 
increased by the Board of Directors to not in 
excess of 15%), but with a minimum contribution 
of 2% of aggregate compensation of all 
participants.^• 
Likelihood to Monitor Management. 
This variable relates to the potential to monitor 
management by determining if any outside party -owns 20% or 
more of the outstanding stock of the company. Outside 
party designates any individual or company/trust 
representative who is not a member of the board of 
directors. Twenty percent is consistent with the 
definition used by Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982). 
Since theory does not suggest the appropriate percentage 
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to employ, an alternative variable is defined. This 
variable consists of the percentage of common stock owned 
by the largest shareholders. Relevant information is 
obtained from the proxy statement, which lists those 
shareholders with an interest of five percent or more of 
the outstanding stock of the company. 
Group Performing the Management Function. 
The final set of variables relates to whether or not 
stockholders perform the management function. Sufficient 
data are gathered so that a number of definitions can be 
developed. First, a company is designated as 
owner-managed if top management and the board of directors 
as a group own 20% or more of the company’s outstanding 
stock. In addition, since theory is silent regarding what 
percentage of stock ownership actually constitutes 
ownership control, the percentage of stock owned by top 
management and the board of directors as a group is used 
as a second variable. Finally, potential ownership could 
be considered by adding the number of outstanding stock 
options possessed by top management to the number of 
shares of stock also possessed by them and then 
recalculating each of the above variables. 
The number of shares and stock options possessed by 
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top management and the board of directors is obtained from 
company proxy statements. 
Key Executive Incentive Plan Questionnaire. 
For some companies it was either impossible to 
determine from proxy statements whether an incentive plan 
for key executives existed, or the details of the plan 
were unclear. This was true even after proxy statements 
had been reviewed for the years, 1980 through 1970. 
Earlier proxies were not readily available. 
To obtain incentive plan information for these 
companies, a questionnaire was devised and mailed to all 
companies for which information was not readily available 
in the proxy statements. A total of 154 questionnaires 
were sent. Follow-up consisted of a second questionnaire, 
sent to non-responding companies approximately one month 
after the original mailings. Fifty-eight companies 
replied to the questionnaire yielding a response rate of 
38%. Of the respondents, a total of 33 questionnaires 
were usable. A copy of the questionnaire and cover letter 
appears in the appendix. 
Companies Included in the Study. 
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A total of 583 companies are included in this study. 
These include all Fortune 300 companies for 1979 and 283 
non-Fortune 300 companies.Companies were originally 
selected by considering all manufacturing companies on the 
COMPUSTAT industrials tape with complete data for those 
data elements listed in Table 7. Of the 1762 companies 
included on the tape, 1332 had missing data. Of the 430 
companies with complete COMPUSTAT data, 147 were Fortune 
300 companies. To render the results more generalizable, 
all Fortune 300 companies are included in the study. 
Moreover, an attempt is made to locate any missing data 
for these remaining 153 companies by reviewing their 
financial statements. A list of non-Fortune 300 companies 
also appears in the appendix. 
Data Sources. 
In general, financial data for all companies in the 
study have been obtained from the COMPUSTAT industrials 
tape. Manually gathered data consisted of. a company's 
debt covenants, accounting alternatives utilized and 
information pertaining to any key executive incentive 
plan. This information was accumulated on a data 
worksheet, a copy of which appears in the appendix. 
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Moodys Industrial Manual, for 1980, is used as a data 
source for debt covenants pertaining to a company's 
outstanding debt as of the end of 1979. If the date of 
issue of a particular debt issue was not shown, then the 
manual for previous years was reviewed until the issue was 
first detected. This year was taken as the date of issue. 
This information is essential to defining the variable to 
estimate the cost of default, as explained above. In 
addition to information on debt covenants, for a number of 
companies, Moodys also contained several footnotes from 
the company's annual report.7* Appropriate data from 
applicable footnotes were included on the data 
accumulation worksheet. 
The particular accounting alternative utilized by a 
company for each of the four accounting methods used in 
this study was obtained by reading the footnotes to the 
company's annual report for 1979. If information had 
already been obtained from Moodys Industrial Manual, this 
information was verified against that obtained from the 
annual report. Any discrepancies were investigated, with 
the annual report serving as the final data source. If 
the particular alternative was not disclosed in the 1979 
annual report, financial statements for prior years were 
reviewed, carefully checking for disclosure of accounting 
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changes. In addition, accounting changes made during 1979 
were identified, with the net income effect and estimate 
of the percentage of the account undergoing the noted 
change. This information provides a validity check of the 
pro forma estimation models as discussed in Chapter 6. 
Information about key executive incentive plans is 
obtained by reviewing company annual proxy statements. 
Typically, these plans are approved by the board of 
directors, and also may require approval from the 
company's stockholders. The proxy statement issued 
immediately after the company's 1979 year end was first 
i reviewed. If this statement did not disclose information 
pertaining to a key executive incentive plan, proxies for 
previous years were reviewed with particular attention 
placed on whether the information appeared to be 
applicable to 1979. If it did not, the variable 
__ designating incentive plans was coded as missing. As 
discussed above, questionnaires were sent to companies to 
obtain information about incentive plans for key 
executives if such information was not disclosed in the 
company proxy statements. 
Reasonableness of Data. 
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Several steps were taken to test the data used in 
this study for reasonableness.^* First, company outliers 
were compared with the original data entry sheets, an 
example of which appears in the appendix. An outlier was 
a data element with a value exceeding three standard 
deviations from the arithmetic mean of that data element. 
Second, the distribution of accounting alternatives was 
compared with independent sources. Independent sources 
included data from Accounting Trends and Techniques for 
various years and from Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) 
(hereafter, HZ).9* 
As a measure of the degree of accuracy of the 
manually collected data on the accounting method used by a 
firm, the proportion of companies choosing the a priori 
income-increasing accounting alternative based on data 
used in the current study is compared with similiar data 
from HZ. Proportions are as follows: pension period, .227 
versus .230; depreciation, .824 versus .850; ITC, .889 
versus .723; and, inventory, .57 versus .503. A test of 
proportions for each of the four . a priori 
income-increasing accounting alternatives was made. For 
two methods it was not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal proportions at normal levels of 
significance. These methods are the amortization period 
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of past service pension costs and the choice of 
depreciation method. However, the null hypothesis was 
rejected for the choice of inventory method (p-level of 
.06) and the method of accounting for the investment tax 
credit (p-level of .01). These later methods are compared 
with data reported by Accounting Trends and Techniques for 
1979. 
As shown in Table 9, 88.9% of the companies surveyed 
choose the flow-through method of accounting for the 
investment tax credit. It is not possible to reject the 
null hypothesis of equal proportions in comparing the 
survey data with data used in the current study for the 
ITC method. Regarding inventory method, 62.8% of firms 
surveyed chose the a priori income-increasing accounting 
alternative. This proportion is greater than the 
comparable data for the current study (57%) , which is 
greater than the proportion found by HZ (50.3%). Although 
differences are statistically significant, the proportion 
for the current study is spanned by results obtained by 
previous researchers. 
Table 10 shows that the number of companies using 
various accounting alternatives tends to be consistent 
over time. Additional evidence on the stability of the 
process is obtained through a partial replication of the 
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Table 9 
Number of Companies Utilizing Alternative Accounting Methods 
Accounting Method 
Depreciation Method 
A priori Income Increasing 




A priori Income Increasing 
A priori Income Decreasing 
Missing Data 
Total 
Amoritization Period of ITC 
A priori Income Increasing 
A priori Income Decreasing 
Missing Data 
Total 
Amoritization Period of Past 
Service Pension Costs 
A priori Income Increasing^ 
A priori Income Decreasing 
Missing Data 
Total 


















Amoritization Period of Past 
Service Pension Costs 
A priori Income Increasing^ 401 
A priori Income Decreasing 101 
Missing Data 81 
Total 583 
A - Income Increasing Alternative >30 years 
B - Income Increasing A1ternative ^30 years 
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Table 10 
Number of Companies Utilizing Accounting Alternatives 
Over Various Years 
Accounting 
Alternative 1974 1975 1976 
Year 
1977 1978 1979 
Inventory* 
FIFO 375 376 389 392 392 390 
LIFO 303 315 331 332 343 374 
Average Cost 236 235 232 227 224 241 
Depreciation* 
SL 563 567 567 559 560 556 
ECB 71 80 66 67 67 63 
SID 45 46 37 34 35 34 
Accelerated-Not 
Specified 74 73 71 60 67 71 
rrc 
Flow Through 504 518 502 504 521 529 
Deferral 72 60 76 75 71 67 
No Reference 24 22 22 21 8 4 
*Does not total 600 
alternative. 
since companies may utilize more than one 
S0UrCe! Y^lous issues of account-Trp-vis 
^°^tion t° tte^rtizati^nperiodTfD^T^rvice 
Pension costs is not presented 
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Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) study. The results of this 
replication are presented in Table 27 of Chapter 7. In 
this replication, variables are defined as before; 
however, particular companies included in each study 
differed as did the time period of interest, discussed 
above. Even with these differences, results in terms of 
the chi square values of the models and the classification 
percentage are very close. 
Based on the above analysis, it is felt that the data 
set possesses an acceptable degree of accuracy for use in 
examining the relationship between accounting decisions 
and firm characteristics. 
This chapter discussed the types of variables 
employed in the present study; the next chapter will 




1. See Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979), page 143. 
2. Ibid. See page 143. 
3. See Smith and Warner (1979), page 125. 
4. See Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982), page 48. 
5. See Kaiser Cement Company 1982 Proxy Statement, 
page 6. 
6. A list of Fortune 300 companies can be found on 
page 300 of the 30 May 1980 issue of Fortune 
magazine. A list of non-Fortune 300 companies 
can be found in the Appendix. 
7. Moodys Industrial Manual consists of four 
sections. The least amount of disclosure is 
found in the "Standard Section", which provides 
a brief history of the company, condensed 
financial information and limited details on a 
company's long-term debt and related debt 
covenants. The company must pay a fee to be 
included in any of the other sections. The 
"Comprehensive Section" provides the following 
information about a company: (1) five years of 
financial information on income accounts, 
balance sheets, and financial and operating 
ratios; (2) a detailed description of the 
company's business, including a complete list of 
subsidiaries and (3) a concise capital structure 
section at the beginning of the company report 
providing the details on capital stock and long 
term debt, with bond and preferred stock 
ratings. The "Full Measure Coverage Section" 
presents (1) financial information for seven 
years including income accounts, balance steets, 
and financial and operating information; (2) a 
detailed description of the company's business, 
including a complete list of subsidiaries and 
plant and property locations, and (3) a special 
capital structure section at the beginning of 
the company report providing details on capital 
stock and long term debt, with bond and 
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preferred stock ratings and two year stock and 
bond price ranges. The most complete 
information is found in the "Complete Disclosure 
Section", which presents all of the information 
as found in the "Full Measure Coverage Section" 
as well as an extensive presentation of material 
from the company’s annual report including the 
letter to the stockholders, the report of the 
independent public accountants, general notes to 
the financial statements and a financial review 
of management. 
8. Rosenberg and Houglet (1974) compare monthly 
stock price relatives on the Center for Research 
in Security Price (CRSP) tapes with similiar 
data from COMPUSTAT from March 1962 to June 
1968. They reported error rates of 
approximately three percent. Errors consisted 
of mistakes in recording prices and errors in 
treating stock splits. Miguel (1977) examined 
the reliability of research and development data 
in the COMPUSTAT industrials tape with 10-K 
reports for 256 companies for the year 1972. 
For 78, or 30 percent of the companies reviewed, 
differences were noted. Miguel suggested the 
the large discrepancy between the computerized 
data and that shown in the 10-K reports appeared 
to be due to newly implemented 10-K research and 
development .rules. Stone and Bubletz (1984) 
consider the reliability of changing price and 
pension information on specialized data tapes, 
and found error rates for incorrect amounts 
ranging from one to four percent, with an 
average of two percent for all variables. 
Except for Miguel, no study was found which 
examined data on the COMPUSTAT industrials tape. 
The reliability of the data on this tape remains 
unclear. However, the above studies suggest 
that computerized data tapes are not subject to 
massive errors, except perhaps when a variable 
undergoes a change in definition. None of the 
elements used in this research is subject to 
this problem. Therefore, measurement problems 
for computerized data are not expected to be 
serious. The actual degree of potential 
measurement error is beyond the scope of the 
present work. 
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9. Accounting Trends and Techniques describes 
itself as follows: 
(Accounting Trends and Techniques) 
is a compilation of data obtained by a 
survey of 600 annual reports to 
stockholders undertaken for the 
purpose of analyzing the accounting 
information disclosed in such reports. 
(Preface, 1980 edition). 
All 600 companies included in the 
survey are registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and 
are reported in either 
Moodys Industrial Manual or 
Moodys PTC Industrial Manual. Ninety 
percent of the survey companies have 
securities traded on one of the major 
stock exchanges . . . (1980 edition, 
page 1). 
CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS, MODELS AND STATISTICAL TESTS. 
Chapter 1 suggested the possibility of a relationship 
between accounting decisions and firm characteristics 
associated with potential conflicts between groups 
interested in the financial reporting process. Potential 
conflicts considered to date include those between 
stockholders and bondholders, stockholders and regulators, 
and stockholders and firm managers. These are referred to 
as the debt-covenant, political-cost and profit-sharing 
hypotheses, respectively. In general, each proposition 
discussed below comprises three sub-propositions for each 
of these hypotheses. Propositions 1 through 3 involve the 
choice of the accounting alternative, while propositions 4 
and 5 are concerned with the attempt to influence those 
' 
who set financial accounting standards. The final 
proposition is concerned with the relationship between 
these sets of decisions. 
The current research extends previous research in 
several respects. Regarding the decision of the choice of 
the accounting alternative, improvements are suggested in 
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proxies for theoretical constructs. In addition, pro 
forma quantities are devised to estimate reported income 
magnitudes in utilizing non-reported accounting methods. 
This should allow for a more precise measurement of the 
proxy for the dependent variable representing a firm's 
accounting-method income strategy. 
Regarding the decision to attempt to influence the 
financial accounting standard-setting process, several 
improvements are offered. First, additional topics are 
considered by examining submissions related to accounting 
standards involving research and development, 
contingencies and the accounting for certain marketable 
securities. Actual submissions are examined; to date, 
this has only been done by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Lev 
(1979) , Dyckman and Smith (1979) , Dhaliwal (1982), Lasater 
(1982), and McKee, Bell and Boatsman (1984) . Second, the 
decision to make a submission will be modelled using firm 
characteristics relating to economic factors suggested by 
potential group conflicts. This will answer a criticism 
of the Watts and Zimmerman (1978) methodology discussed by 
Christensen (1982). Finally, a test will be conducted to 
consider whether both types of decisions involving the 




Choice of Accounting Method. 
Pl.l For any given year, the greater the relative 
importance of non-equity financing, the more 
likely a firm will utilize an accounting method 
which increases reported income. 
PI.2 For any given year, the greater the potential 
political costs faced by a firm, the more likely 
the firm will utilize an accounting method which 
decreases reported income. 
PI.3 For any given year, firms with income-related 
bonus plans will be more likely to utilize an 
accounting method which increases reported 
earnings. 
Proposition 1 is essentially what has been tested in 
previous research described in Chapter 3. Discarding the 
assumption of independence of choice between accounting 
methods allows for the consideration of an income strategy 
of choice of accounting method yielding the following 
propositions: 
P2.1 For any given year, the greater the relative 
importance of non-equity financing, the more 
likely a firm will develop a strategy of 
utilizing accounting methods which increase 
reported income. 
P2.2 For any given year, the greater the potential 
political costs faced by a firm, the more likely 
a firm will develop a strategy of utilizing 
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accounting methods which decrease reported 
income. 
P2.3 For any given year, firms with income-related 
bonus plans will be more likely to develop a 
strategy to utilize accounting methods which 
increase reported earnings. 
Proposition 2 replicates the work of Zmejewski and 
Hagerman (1981) . Their approach considered each 
accounting alternative as a bi-polar extreme of maximizing 
or minimizing reported income. Various assumptions were 
made about the magnitude of the income effect of each 
accounting method. A possible extension of this research 
is to develop estimates of the income effect of each 
accounting alternative. This leads to the following 
propositions: 
P3.1 For any given year, a positive association will 
exist between the amount of non-equity financing 
and the difference between reported earnings due 
to the accounting-method strategy utilized by 
the firm and the maximum income strategy that 
the firm could have employed. 
P3.2 For any given year, a negative association will 
exist between the potential political costs 
faced by the firm and the difference between 
reported earnings due to the accounting-method 
strategy utilized by the firm and the maximum 
income strategy that the firm could have 
employed. 
P3.3 For any given year, a positive association will 
exist between firms with bonus plans based on 
reported earnings and the difference between 
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reported earnings due to the accounting-method 
strategy utilized by the firm and the maximum 
income strategy that the firm could have 
employed. 
Submissions to the FASB. 
The financial reporting process discussed in Chapter 
2 suggests that the decision to make a submission to the 
FASB is related to firm characteristics associated with 
potential conflicts between groups interested in the 
financial reporting process. Proposition 4 is concerned 
with this relationship, while proposition 5 examines 
whether the position taken regarding the timing of 
reported income .is associated with firm characteristics. 
These propositions are shown below. 
P4.1 The greater the relative importance of 
non-equity financing, the more likely a firm 
will make a submission to the FASB on topics 
involving the timing of reported income. 
P4.2 The greater the potential political costs 
faced by a firm, the more likely a firm will 
make a submission to the FASB on topics 
involving the timing of reported income. 
P4.3 Firms with income-related bonus plans will 
be more likely to make a submission to the 




Propositions 4.1 to developed from the 
criticism of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) by Christensen 
(1982). Probit analysis will be employed with the 
dependent variable indicating if company management made a 
submission to the FASB on one of three exposure drafts 
discussed below. Independent variables will be as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
P5.1 The greater the relative importance of 
non-equity financing, and the possession of 
an income-related bonus plan by a firm will 
make it more likely that company management 
will favor the setting of accounting 
standards allowing for a faster recognition 
of reported income. 
P5.2 The greater the potential political costs 
faced by a firm, the more likely that 
company management will favor the setting of 
accounting standards allowing for a slower 
recognition of reported income. 
Each of the above propositions has considered a 
separate type of accounting decision. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, a possible view is that these decisions are 
interrelated. This suggests a final proposition: 
P6.1 The decision of which alternative accounting 
method to employ is related to the position 
taken regarding the establishment of 
financial accounting standards. This 
relationship is due to economic factors 
representing potential conflicts between 
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groups concerned with the financial 
reporting process. 
Each research proposition suggests a statistical 
model which can be used to test the propostion. These 
models and statistical tests are presented below. 
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Models Suggested by Research Propositions. 
Models will be constructed to represent each research 
proposition. Definitions of independent and dependent 
variables are discussed more fully in Chapters 4 and 7. 
Specific models are discussed below. 
Consider propositions 1 through 3. Model 1A is 
merely a replication since the dependent and independent 
variables will be the same as those used in previous 
research by Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) (hereafter, HZ). 
The remaining models will extend earlier research by 
adjusting both dependent and independent variables. Model 
IB retains HZ1 s dependent variable but will adjust the 
proxies for the potential group conflicts as discussed in 
Chapter 4. Model 2 considers the decision to choose an 
accounting alternative as part of an overall strategy. 
Model 2A replicates the work of Zmejewski and Hagerman 
(1981) (hereafter, ZH) ; model 2B extends this work by 
retaining their dependent variable while devising more 
appropriate independent variables. Models 3A and 3B 
adjust the measurement of an accounting-method income 
strategy, while retaining the independent variables used 
by ZM, the reduced set, or the larger or full set of 
variables discussed in Chapter 4. These models can be 
represented as follows: 
Model 1A. 
Dhz = F ( I reduced set) + Ela 
Model IB. 
Dhz = F ( I full set) + Elb 
Model 2A. 
Dzh = F ( I reduced set ) + E2a 
Model 2B. 
Dzh .= F ( I full set ) + E2b 
Model 3A. 
RI/RIMA = F ( I reduced Set ) + E3a 
where 
RI is reported income. 
RIMA is maximum possible reported income 
Model 3B. 
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RI/RIMA = F ( I full set ) + E3b 
These models refer to the accounting decision 
involving choice of the accounting alternative as 
considered by propositions 1 through 3. As a data 
validity check, several models replicate previous work. 
Models 1A and 2A relate to Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) 
and Zmejewski and Hagerman (1981) , respectively. The next 
set of models refers to propositions concerned with the 
attempt to influence the establishment of financial 
accounting standards. 
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Attempt to Influence Accounting Standards. 
Model 4A. 
FASB Submission = F ( I reduced set ) + E4a 
Model 4B. 
FASB Submission = F ( I full set ) + E4b 
Model 5A. 
Position on Exposure Draft = F ( I reduced set ) + E5a 
Model 5B. 
Position on Exposure Draft = F ( I full set ) + E5b 
These models refer to propositions 4 and 5, 
respectively. These propositions deal with the decision 
to submit correspondence to the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and the income-related timing-pattern 
position taken in the submission. 
Searching for a relationship between both types of 
accounting decisions yields proposition 6 and the related 
models 
Model 6A. 
Ela = F ( E5a ) 
Model 6B. 
+ E6a 
Elb = F ( E5b ) + E6b 
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Hypotheses and Statistical Tests. 
This section presents and suggests tests of 
hypotheses pertaining to the propositions listed above. 
Test of Proposition 1. 
Four probit analyses will be conducted. For each, 
the dependent variable will be the ex ante expected 
reported income effect of each of four accounting methods. 
These methods include the depreciation method employed to 
allocate the cost of fixed assets over their estimated 
life, the method chosen to account for the investment tax 
credit, the amortization period of past service pension 
costs and the selected inventory flow method. The ex ante 
expected reported income maximazation or minimization 
alteratives are shown in Chapter 3. Independent variables 
will be proxies for economic factors associated with 
potential conflicts between groups involved with the 
financial reporting process. These variables were 
discussed extensively in the previous chapter. 
Independent variables are classified into three 
categories: political cost (PC), debt covenant (DC), and 
profit sharing (PS). The specific independent variables 
considered as the "full set" are listed in the column 
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headed "K" in table 7. 
Model. 
Dhz = A0+A1* f(DC)+A2* f(PC)+A3* f(PS) + El 
Statistical hypotheses can be stated in terms of 
coefficients of the model: 
Null: A1=A2=A3=0 
Alternate A1 > 0; A2 < 0; A3 > 0. 
Expected Relationship. 
Since variables used in model IB are expected to be 
closer to theoretical constructs, it is expected that 
model IB will produce better results than model 1A. It is 
expected that model IB will be significant in that the 
coefficients of the full model not utilized in the reduced 
model will be statistically different from zero. In 
addition, better company classification results are 
expected in terms of the "confusion matrix" of reported 
income maximizing or minimizing accounting method 
predicted by the model to that of the actual method used 
by the firm. SHAZAM will be the statistical package used 
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to test these hypotheses. Results are discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
Test of Proposition 2. 
An n-chotomous logit analysis will be conducted with 
the dependent variable consisting of various income 
strategies based on an assumed income effect for each 
method in the study (see test of proposition 1). The 
following cases will be examined: (1) all methods have an 
equivalent income effect (5 strategy case); and (2) 
inventory valuation and depreciation have the same income 
effect while each of the other stratagies has the same 
income effect (9 strategy case). 
Model 2. 
Dzh = A4+A5* f(DC)+A6* f(PC)+A7* f(PS) + E2 
Statistical hypotheses are as follows: 
Null A5=A6=A7=0. 
Alternate A5 >0; A6 <0; A7 >0. 
Expected Relationships. 
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Expected relationships for models 2A and 2B are 
analogous to those of model 1, discussed above. QUAIL, 
which has a statistical package for multinomial logit 
analysis, will be used to construct the model. Results 
can be found in Chapter 7. 
Test of Proposition 3. 
This extends work by Zmejewski and Hagerman (1981) by 
estimating a magnitude rather than just a direction for 
the expected income effect. Estimating magnitudes rather 
than sign effects has been a natural extension in the 
financial accounting literature (Ball and Foster, 1982). 
In the area of financial reporting, this extension is 
important for several reasons. First, the actual expected 
income effect may differ from the a priori effect. 
Consider the inventory flow assumption. An estimate of 
the income-increasing inventory alternative can be 
obtained by examining price indices from the Department of 
Labor. If the sales markup is relatively constant over 
time for each industry group, then a decrease in the price 
index would indicate that LIFO rather than FIFO would be 
the income-maximizing accounting alternative. In 
reviewing yearly average Department of Labor Wholesale 
Price Indices in terms of four-digit SIC Codes for the 
six-year period from 1974 through 1979, 17 of the 83 SIC 
code grouping with complete data had at least one two-year 
period during which the second year price index was lower 
than the first. Second, estimating the magnitude of the 
income effect should lead to more powerful tests. Models 
developed to date have not been very successful at 
explaining much variation in the choice of accounting 
methods as shown in Chapter 3. 
Model 3. 
RI/RIMA = A8+A9* f(DC)+A10* f(PC)+A11* f(PS) +E3 
where RI = Reported income. 
RIMA = Maximum possible reported income. 
Statistical hypotheses are as follows: 
Null A9=A10=A11=0 
Alternative A9>0; A10<0; A11<0 
Since the dependent variable is continuous with an 
upper limit of one, tobit analysis rather than probit 
analysis will be employed. Hypotheses and expected 
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results are analogous to those of model 1. 
Test of Proposition 4. 
Propositions 4.1 to 4.3 are a result of the criticism 
of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) by Christensen (1982). 
Probit analysis will be employed with the dependent 
variable indicating if company management made a 
submission to the FASB on one of the exposure drafts 
discussed below. Independent variables are as discussed 
in Chapter 4. Testing the model for overall significance 
and testing model coefficients for statistical 
significance will constitute the tests of this 
proposition. 
Model 4. 
FASB Submissions = A12 + A13*f(DC) + A14*f(PC) + 
A15* f (PS) + E4 




Alternative A13=0; A14=0; A15=0. 
This model examines whether the decision to send a 
letter to the FASB is related to economic factors based on 
potential group conflicts between stockholders and 
managers, stockholders and bondholders, and stockholders 
and regulators. Specific proxies for these factors have 
been discussed in Chapter 4. All firms used in testing 
propositions 1 to 3 will constitute the universe of 
interest. Based upon whether firm management made a 
submission to the FASB on any of the exposure drafts for 
those SFAS's discussed below, firms are classified as 
submittors or non-submittors. Using the largest number of 
responses pertaining to a specific issue reveals that a 
total of 134 companies made submissions on these three 
topics. These are evenly spread over each of the topics: 
SFAS No. 2 (51 letters), SFAS No. 5 (52 letters), SFAS 
No. 12 (31 letters). 
This model will help to answer the criticisms of 
methods used by Watts and Zimmerman (1978).. Contrary to 
previous work investigating the decision to attempt to 
influence the FASB, selection will comprise a fixed set of 
companies, including all Fortune 300 companies for the 
year 1979 and 283 non-Fortune 300 companies meeting the 
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data availability conditions discussed in Chapter 4. 
These companies are included without reference to whether 
or not their management had made a submission to the FASB. 
If the classification results are poor, one can say that 
the economic factors as proxied are not associated with 
the decision to attempt to influence the FASB. If the 
classification results are adequate, then the hypothesis 
of an association between the attempt to influence the 
FASB and firm characteristics will have survived an 
attempt at refutation. If the results for model 4 allow 
us to reject the hypothesis of no association between the 
attempt to influence the accounting regulators and firm 
economic factors, then the analysis will proceed to model 
5. 
Test of Proposition 5. 
Model 5 examines whether the attempt to influence the 
FASB on matters pertaining to the timing of the 
recognition of reported income is related to firm 
characteristics suggested by economic factors of interest. 
The model's emphasis on income-related timing effects was 
the determining factor in deciding which topics examined 
by the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) to include in 
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this study. There are advantages in limiting the study to 
those matters discussed in the FAF Statement of Position. 
First, the FASB considered these the most significant. 
Second, for these topics, the FASB staff has identified 
specific issues which involve the timing of the 
recognition of income. Finally, as shown in Table 11, a 
number of responses support both the income-increasing and 
decreasing alternatives. 
As with the other models, model 5 will be estimated 
twice. The first estimation employs variables suggested 
by HZ (reduced model). The second estimation will consist 
of the refined proxies discussed in Chapter 4 (full 
model). It is expected that the full model using refined 
proxies for theoretical constructs will produce better 
classification results. 
Model 5. 
Position on EDs = A16 + A17*f(DC) + A18*f(PC) + 
A19* f (PS) + E5 





Number of Submissions by Business Enterprises Pertaining to 
Income Timing Recognition Issues o-f Various Exposure Dra-fts 
Income Not Income 
Topic I ssue Maximizing Maximizing 
SFAS No. 9 A 17 34* 
SFAS No. 5 B 2* 50 




♦Concur with FASB. 
Issue Legend: 
A. Should all research and development costs not directly 
reimbursable by others be charged to expense when 
incurred? 
FASB Position: Exposure Draft Yes 
Statement Yes 
B. Should accruals be permitted for loss contingencies 
from self-insured risks? 
FASB Position: Exposure Draft Yes 
Statement Yes 
C. Should declines in market value below cost of 
marketable equity securities be included in determining 
income currently? 
FASB Position: Exposure Draft 
Statement 
Yes 
Yes, where listed 
as current 
assets. 
Source: FAF (1977, Exhibit B) 
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Alternative A17>0; A18<0; A19<0. 
A probit analysis will be employed to test these 
hypotheses. The dependent variable will consist of the 
position taken by management on the exposure drafts 
discussed above. These hypotheses will be tested by 
examining the statistical significance of the related 
models. 
Test of Proposition 6: Accounting Decision Relationships. 
The argument has been made that management is likely 
to view accounting-method selection and the decision to 
att.empt to influence the FASB as a joint decision. It has 
been suggested that the financial reporting process should 
be considered as a set of joint decisions rather than as 
independent decisions. Several methods can be used to 
test this view. 
If economic factors are driving both types of 
accounting decisions, then the partial correlation between 
these decisions after extracting the effect of these 
factors should be statistically lower than the simple 
correlation between decisions. In addition, a firm with a 
strong tendency to minimize (maximize) reported income 
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should be more likely to attempt to influence the FASB in 
the setting of standards enabling the company to continue 
its strategy. 
The first test can be described as follows: 
Let 
Y1 = A20 + A21* f(DC) + A22*f(PC) + A23*f(PS) + El 
Y5 = A24 + A25* f(DC) + A26*f(PC) + A27*f(PS) + E5 
where 
Y1 is the a priori accounting alternative 
selected by each firm for each accounting 
method of interest. 
Y5 is the income position of the firm pertaining 
to the three EDs discussed above. It is 
coded as one if the a priori income 
increasing position is selected for any of 
the three exposure drafts. 
The first step is to calculate the Spearman rank 
order correlation between the dependent variables Y1 and 
Y5. Next, determine the correlation between El and E5. 
This latter correlation should be statistically lower than 
the first correlation. If the accounting decisions are 
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based solely on economic factors pertaining to potential 
group conflicts, and the independent variables in the 
models adequately proxy these factors, then this latter 
correlation should not be statistically different from 
zero. 
To conduct a second test, firms can be categorized as 
income maximizers or minimizers based upon whether 
reported income is 75% or more, or 25% or less of the 
maximum possible reported income determined (as discussed 
in Chapter 6). This smaller set of firms can constitute 
the data used to rerun the models described above. If the 
financial reporting process indeed entails related 
decisions and if accounting decisions are related to 
factors pertaining to potential group conflicts, then the 
models constructed using the smaller sample of firms 
should have greater explanatory power than models derived 
using all firms in the sample. If this is not so, 
tentative evidence will be obtained suggesting that the 
decision of which accounting alternative to select is 
unrelated to the decision to attempt to influence those 
who set accounting standards. This second test will be 
reserved for future research. 
Before considering results from the testing of these 
models, the next chapter will address the development of 
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methods to estimate pro forma effects of non-reported 
accounting alternatives for use in extending work 
concerned with the investigation of an income strategy. 
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Footnotes. 
1. See Financial Accounting Foundation (1977), page Bl. 
CHAPTER VI 
PRO FORMA ESTIMATES FOR NON-REPORTED ACCOUNTING 
ALTERNATIVES. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Zmejewski and Hagerman 
(1981) (hereafter, ZH) discard the assumption that the 
choice of each accounting method is made independently; 
rather, they suggest that these decisions are made by 
management as part of an overall strategy. 
ZH translated the choice of accounting method into an 
income strategy by assuming various income effects based 
on the choice of each accounting alternative. For 
example, one set assumed that each method affected 
reported earnings equally. This assumption allowed for 
the classification of companies into five categories, from 
income maximizer (choice of all income-increasing 
alternatives) to income minimizer (choice of all 
income-decreasing alternatives). The current research 
extends ZH by developing estimates of these income 
effects. These estimates are standardized as a percentage 
of the income-maximizing alternative to allow for 
comparison among companies. This extension will produce a 
dependent variable which is continuous with an upper limit 
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of one. Thus, as discussed in Chapter 5, in estimating 
the model tobit analysis — designed for modeling 
restricted dependent variables -- rather than n-chotomous 
probit analysis, will be employed. 
An initial review of the literature failed to detect 
any work whose primary emphasis was the development of 
methods to estimate the effect of alternative accounting 
methods. The closest body of research was work on 
restating nominal dollar financial statements to general 
purchasing-power adjusted (GPPA) financial statements. A 
number of these studies were reviewed to determine the 
types of assumptions that had been made to adjust the 
various types of accounts. Assumptions used in 
constructing GPPA financial statements are considered in 
developing methods to construct pro forma estimates of 
alternative accounting methods. 
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Estimation of Pro Forma Alternative Accounting Methods. 
For each of four accounting methods of interest 
discussed in Chapter 4, this section discusses methods to 
obtain estimates of information not currently reported in 
the company's set of financial statements. 
Depreciation Methods. 
If one knows the cost of an asset, its salvage value. 
and its estimated life, it is very easy to calculate 
depreciation under any of the generally accepted 
allocation methods. Typically, this information is not 
presented in the financial statements of a firm. What is 
shown is the cost and accumulated depreciation of the 
asset at the beginning and end of the period, the total 
amount of capital additions and deductions, and the 
depreciation expense for the period. Thus, it will be 
necessary to estimate the expected life of the assets to 
be depreciated in order to calculate pro forma 
depreciation estimates. 
To perform this task, a number of assumptions will be 
made, including: 
1. Assets possess no salvage value. 
Capital deductions for each year are 2. 
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composed of items from each of the previous 
year's asset layers. 
3. For each year, all capital additions have 
the same expected life, which is a function 
of the length of the cost allocation periods 
of previously acquired assets. 
Specific methods to determine pro forma estimates of 
the income effect of non-reported depreciation 
alternatives are discussed below. 
Firms Reporting On Straight Line Depreciation. 
For firms currently 
the estimated life of 
fashion as follows: 
using straight line depreciation, 
assets is calculated in a layer 
1. Determine a composite asset life 
held by the company at the end 
first year of the time horizon of 
for all assets 
of 1974, the 
interest. 
LIFEijk= (TOTAL COST^ j k) / DEPRE. EXP.^ 
For company i, current year of interest j 
(j=1974), year of asset layer k (k=1974). 
2. For the years 1975 through 1979, allocate capital 
deductions, CDED, to prior years based on the 
weighted total cost for each year. Thus, each 
year's new cost layer, C, becomes: 
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Cijn~ cij-ln CDEDijn(cij-ln/ cij-lm) 
For n = 1, 2, . . . j 
3. Initially estimate the life for the current 
year's cost layer (i.e., capital additions) as 
the weighted average of the previous cost layer 
lives. Thus, as an initial estimate, the 
procedure assumes that the company maintains a 
relatively homogeneous mix of fixed asset lives. 
This assumption may not be tenable; it is 
possible that newly acquired assets possess 
expected lives which are markedly different from 
previously acquired assets. If this occurs, 
then estimated depreciation will tend to differ 
from actual depreciation. As discussed below, 
step five is a feedback procedure which results 
in restating the expected lives of each asset 
layer if the difference between the estimated 
and actual depreciation is greater than one 
percent of the actual depreciation expense for 
the period. This initial estimate of an asset's 
life, L, can be represented as follows: 
pijk (cijl*Lijl+ * * + cijk-l*Lijk-1^ / 
w • • 
i jm 
For m=l to k-1. 
4. Estimate depreciation expense for the -period 
based on the estimated lives for each prior 
year's asset layers and the initial estimate 
determined at step three above. This, estimate 
becomes: 
DEPEXRij = Cijm / Lijm 
5. Determine the difference, actual less estimated 
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depreciation expense. If the difference is not 
equal to zero, adjust the estimate of asset 
lives by splitting assets into oldest and newest 
halves. If the difference is positive 
(negative), determine a weighted allocation for 
each cost layer, subtract (add) this amount from 
the total accumulated depreciation expense of 
the oldest assets and add (subtract) the 
weighted allocation from the total accumulated 
depreciation for the newest assets. Divide the 
adjusted accumulated depreciation expense by the 
age of the assets to obtain an average 
depreciation expense for each cost layer. Use 
the average depreciation expense to obtain an 
adjusted asset life for each asset layer. 
Compute an adjusted depreciation expense and 
compare with actual depreciation for the period 
of interest. 
6. Various stopping rules, inserted in the program 
to end the iterative process, are as follows: 
a. Repeat step five until the adjusted 
estimated depreciation is within 
one percent of actual depreciation. 
b. After three iterations, terminate 
the iterative process if the change 
in the adjusted depreciation 
expense is less than one percent of 
the corresponding amount for the 
previous iteration. 
c. For the declining balance method, 
terminate iterating when the 
adjusted depreciation expense 
"crosses" the actual depreciation 
expense over two iterations. 
"Crossing" indicates that, for . the 
first iteration, adjusted 
depreciation expense is higher 
(lower) than actual depreciation, 
while for the following iteration, 
it is lower (higher). 
d. Terminate after 40 iterations. 
138 
Firms Currently Using Accelerated Depreciation. 
To determine pro forma straight line depreciation 
estimates for firms currently using an accelerated 
depreciation method, procedures similiar to those 
discussed above are employed. If one knows the year that 
an asset was acquired, it is possible to determine an 
average composite life using the same procedures as for 
the straight line method discussed above. Thus, 
determining a composite life for the asset layer created 
by capital additions presents no new difficulties. 
In estimating a vintage asset life for the initial 
year, several adjustments must be made. If a company uses 
an accelerated declining balance method, then the average 
composite life can be estimated as follows: 
Lijk= 1 / DRATEijk 
Where 
DRATEijk= DEP EXPij/ 2* (Cijk-ACCUM DEPi;j_lk) 
For company i, current year of interest j, year of asset 
layer k. 
DEP E XP ^ j- Depreciation expense for period. 
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ACCUM DEP Total accumulated depreciation at 
J beginning of period j. 
The procedure is a bit more involved if the company 
utilizes the sum-of-the-years' digits method since the 
rate of depreciation is a function of both the estimated 
life of the asset (J), and the age of the asset (K). An 
initial estimate of these quantities can be obtained by 
solving a set of simultaneous equations as follows: 
(1) D = C* (J-K+1)/(J* (J+U/2) 
Thus 
(2) K = (J+l)*(2*C - J*D) / (2*C) 
where 
D is depreciation expense of the period. 
C is cost of depreciable assets at the initial year 
of interest. 
A is accumulated depreciation of the initial year 
assets. 
J is the estimate of the average life of these 
assets. 
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K is the estimate of age of these assets at the 
initial year. 
Equation (1) is simply the general form for determining 
period depreciation expense using sum-of-the-years' 
digits. In addition, total accumulated depreciation can 
be represented by equation (3): 
(3) A = C*( J + (J-l) + . . + (J+l-K)) / (J*(J+l)/2) 
Substituting equation (2) into equation (3) and using the 
result for the sum of an arithematic series, one obtains: 
2C (J+l)(2C-JD) (4JC-(J+l)(2C-JD)+2C) 
(4) A= - -  
2J (J+l) 2C 2C 
which can be reformatted into a quadratic equation shown 
as equation (5): 
(5) D2 J2 + D2 J + 4AC - 4C2 - 2CD = 0 
Solve for J, the estimate of the average life of a 
company's initial fixed asset base, using the binomial 
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theorem and substitute into equation (2) to solve for K, 
the estimate of the age of the layer of initial assets. 
Comments can be made regarding the pro forma 
depreciation model. First, the average life for each year 
is a composite of the lives of each individual asset 
acquired during the year. The initial year of acquisition 
would produce the minimum estimate for this composite. As 
short-lived assets expire, the average life of the 
remaining assets will tend to increase. Step 5 of the 
estimation procedure will result in increasing the average 
life of the oldest assets whenever the difference between 
estimated and actual depreciation is positive. 
Second, reviewing the literature on adjustments of 
nominal dollar depreciation charges revealed that 
researchers also found it necessary to estimate the date 
of acquisition of long-lived assets. The most common 
method was to estimate the average age of the firm's 
assets by dividing accumulated depreciation by the 
depreciation expense for the year (Parker, 1977 p. 76; 
Petersen, 1973, p35; Davidson and Weil, 1975, p. 31; 
Harmelink and Kendzele, 1975 p. 31). In contrast with an 
overall composite, Buckmaster and Brooks (1974, p. 52) 
determined yearly asset layers. Our method is similiar to 
that of Buckmaster and Brooks. 
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Third, an alternative procedure for capital 
deductions would be to make some flow assumption — for 
example, subtracting all capital deductions from the layer 
of oldest assets. In restating nominal dollar 
depreciation charges, Buckmaster and Brooks adopted a 
first-in, first-out concept for both retirements and 
depreciation expense since they determined their estimate 
of the composite asset age by subtracting depreciation 
expense and gross retirements from the earliest asset 
layer. Samuelson (1972, p. 332) also adopted a FIFO flow 
assumption, but only for capital deductions. The approach 
used for this study appears more reasonable as it is 
unlikely that in actuality the oldest assets are always 
disposed of first. 
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Inventory. 
If one possesses detailed information about the 
quantity and price of beginning inventory, the quantities 
of purchases and sales, and the price of purchases, then 
it is relatively simple to calculate the cost of goods 
sold using any flow assumption. Although this information 
is available to management, it usually is not shown in 
financial reports. Even if company management permitted 
access to company records, a great deal of effort would be 
required to calculate the cost of goods sold (CGS) under 
alternative inventory flow methods. Accordingly, a 
procedure is described, as in Derstine and Huefner (1974) 
(hereafter, DH), to estimate the purchase and sales 
quantities and the purchase price needed to calculate FIFO 
and LIFO CGS for a company reporting under the alternative 
flow assumption. 
DH describe a method to determine pro forma inventory 
amounts. They selected twenty-four companies which 
reported both a LIFO and FIFO inventory valuation for at 
least one year during 1951-1960. For years when no pro 
forma amounts were presented, they utilized the 
dollar-value technique to determine the appropriate pro 
forma amounts. They described this technique as follows: 
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. . . the dollar-value LIFO technique 
adjusts reported FIFO Inventory amounts to 
remove changes in these amounts due solely to 
price changes. The price change component in 
inventory is removed by using price indices to 
express reported inventory amounts in terms of 
base year prices. Only the actual quantity 
change (the difference between the current 
inventory converted to base year prices and the 
actual base year inventory) is then used as a 
basis for determining the incremental (or 
decremental) LIFO layer adjustment to the LIFO 
inventory. This technique can similiarly be 
used to convert from LIFO to FIFO. For further 
details, see (Wixon and Kell, 1963) . 
We recognize various difficulties in 
constructing LIFO (or FIFO) data. 
Multi-industry firms were represented by the 
price index appropriate to their primary 
business classification, and this index was 
applied to all levels of inventory. A uniform 
50 percent tax rate was assumed, and no other 
effects on income (such as profit sharing) were 
recognized as being influenced by the LIFO-FIFO 
alternative.^• 
The dollar-value method appeared to be very 
successful at generating pro forma estimates. DH reported 
that the method resulted in estimates which averaged 102% 
of the disclosed values, with a range of 86 to 105% on a 
company by company basis. 
Developing pro forma inventory estimates requires 
adoption of assumptions, such as the following: 
1. Purchases for any period are bought at the 
same price. 
2. Applying the ratio, CGS/Sales, to the above 
unit sales price can serve as a proxy for 
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the initial year purchase price. 
3. Layers of beginning inventory can be 
represented by an average unit price. 
These assumptions enable one to generate a system of 
simultaneous equations whose solution produces the 
desired unit measures for each period. It is then 
relatively simple to create pro forma inventory amounts 
for any time horizon of interest. The procedure is 
illustrated below for a company using the FIFO cost-flow 
assumption to value inventory. 
FIFO to LIFO Inventory Valuation. 
The inventory process can be represented by a set of 
equations as follows: 
(1) QOPO = EIO (Cost of beginning inventory) 
(2) CGS1 = EIO + Q1P1 - Ell (Cost of Goods Sold) 
(3) (QO+Ql-Qsl)Pi = Ell (Cost of ending inventory) 
(4) Qsl = Salesl/Psl 
(5) Psl = D0L1 
where 
Qi - - Quantity purchased during period i. QO 
represents the average composite units of the 
initial inventory. 
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Pi - - Price of items purchased during period i. PO 
represents the average composite price of the 
initial inventory. 
Qsi - Unit sales during period i. 
Psi - Unit sales price during period i. 
EIO - Total cost of the beginning inventory. 
Eli - Total cost of ending inventory, year i. 
DOLi - A constant representing the composite sales 
price for period i. This number is obtained 
from the Department of Labor's Table of 
Wholesale Price Indices by SIC code 
groupings. 
CGSi - Cost of Goods Sold under FIFO inventory 
valuation method, period i. 
Salesi- Total Sales revenue for period i. 
Here, there are five equations and six unknowns 
(QO,Q1,Qsl,P0,P1,Psl); the system is underidentified. At 
first glance, one might expect to add an equation 
representing total dollar purchases for the first year of 
the time horizon of interest. However, due to the 
accounting identity, this equation would merely be a 
linear combination of equations (1), (2) and (3), and, 
thus, no new information would be added. 
An additional assumption must be made to determine 
the initial year magnitudes. This is that the purchases 
for the first year were bought at a fixed percentage of 
the composite sales price. Total CGS as a percent of 
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sales will be used as the appropriate percentage. This 
provides an additional equation, and, thus, the system is 
identified. 
(6) PI = Psl(CGSl/Salesl) 
An additional assumption is made that the year's 
sales always exceed the beginning inventory for the year; 
inventory turnover is at least equal to one. Thus the 
set of equations for the second year can be represented 
as; 
(7) CGS2 = Ell + Q2P2 - EI2 
(8) (Q0+Ql+Q2-Qsl-Qs2)P2 = EI2 
(9) Qs2 = Sales2/Ps2 
(10) Ps2 = D0L2 
Here, there are four equations and four unknowns 
(Q2,Qs2,P2,Ps2), and the system is solvable. There is no 
need to make any assumption concerning the input index 
price (P2); in fact, any such assumption would cause the 
system to be overidentified. For subsequent years, 
variables can be determined similiarly to the second year 
shown above. Once total dollar amounts have been 
disaggregated into quantities and prices, it is easy to 
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utilize these amounts to convert FIFO magnitudes to LIFO 
magnitudes. 
This section of the research extends work relating 
to the choice of accounting methods as an income 
strategy. The section develops estimates of the 
magnitude of the impact on reported income if a firm had 
chosen some generally accepted accounting principle other 
than what was used in constructing its financial 
statements. These alternate income effects are developed 
by constructing models to estimate parameters for 
calculating pro forma income effects. The models to 
develop these intermediate parameters — i.e., estimated 
life of fixed assets, purchase and sales quantities, and 
purchase prices — are only means for developing the 
desired pro forma income effects. If a company provides 
estimates of pro forma income effects, these amounts 
should, and will, be used in the analysis. 
As Biddle (1980) has noted, companies reporting 
under the LIFO inventory valuation method typically 
continue to report FIFO pro forma income amounts. Of 
the 583 companies in the study, sufficient data to 
directly estimate the pro forma FIFO effect are available 
for 324 companies, using LIFO predominately, or for only 
a portion of their inventories. This seems to be a 
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sufficient quantity of firms to test for an income 
strategy. Thus, no models will be developed to estimate 
parameters for developing estimates of pro forma income 
amounts for firms using LIFO for the predominate portion 
of its inventories. 
Previous Research on General Price Level Adjusted 
Statements. 
In restating nominal dollar FIFO inventory, the most 
common assumption was that purchases occurred fairly 
evenly throughout the year. Buckmaster and Brooks (1974) 
estimated a series of acquisition dates for LIFO layers 
by determining the number of months of purchases 
represented by an inventory increase and deducting from 
the most recent layers for an inventory decrease. 
Petersen (1973, p. 35) regressed the dollar magnitude of 
total basic cost inventories on time to estimate the rate 
of inventory growth over time and the probable average 
age of the inventory. These procedures allow one to 
separate a batch of nominal dollar-inventory amounts by 
time periods and, thus, are appropriate to use in GPLA 
adjustments. However, since they do not provide any 
estimate of cost per physical unit of inventory, they are 
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unsuited for use in estimating pro forma quantities under 
alternative inventory flow assumptions. 
Firms Using More Than One Accounting Alternative. 
Many firms utilize more than one method in 
determining the depreciation expense and cost of goods 
sold. For example, the Martin Marietta Corporation uses 
two methods in computing depreciation: 
Provisions for depreciation and 
amortization of properties are computed over 
estimated service lives by the straight line 
method, except that accelerated depreciation 
methods are employed in the Aerospace 
business.2• 
If a firm does use a number of accounting 
alternatives, each part of the company will be considered 
separately. The segment disclosure footnote from the 
company's financial statements for fiscal 1979 will be 
used to obtain the necessary data. The percentage for 
1979 will be assumed to have been constant over the 
previous five-year estimation period of interest. In 
considering depreciation methods, if the only available 
information is asset mix, then it will be necessary to 
assume that capital additions and deductions occur in the 
same proportion as the percentage asset mix of the 
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segments. 
Other Accounting Methods. 
Estimating pro forma amounts for the other 
accounting methods of interest involves relatively 
straightforward assumptions and recalculations. 
Consider the investment tax credit. If a company is 
utilizing the deferral method, an estimate of the amount 
of investment tax credit can be obtained by assuming that 
all capital additions are subject to the credit. 
Applying the applicable rate will yield the gross ITC. 
The amount of ITC recapture can be calculated after total 
capital deductions have been allocated to the preceeding 
year's capital assets. Gross ITC less ITC recapture 
yields a net estimate of ITC for the year. If the 
company is using the flow-through method, then the total 
yearly ITC would be available from the COMPUSTAT 
industrials tape. Utilizing the estimate of asset life 
for the year's capital additions, a determination can be 
made of how much ITC to allocate to each year. 
The alternatives for amortization of past service 
pension costs entail the choice of amortization period. 
For a company using an amortization period of less than 
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thirty years, the income maximizing amount will be 
determined by using a forty year amortization period. 
For companies using an amortization period of thirty 
years or more, an income minimization amount will be 
determined by assuming a ten year amortization period. 
These amortization periods are consistent with the 
maximum and minimum limits for the determination of 
annual pension costs (APB Opinion No. 8, paragraph 17). 
The total of unfunded pension costs for past or prior 
service can be obtained from the COMPUSTAT industrials 
tape. 
Validity Test. 
Models have been suggested that estimate the effect 
on reported income of utilizing alternative accounting 
methods in the areas of the length of time to amortize 
past service pension costs, accounting for the ITC, the 
method of allocating the costs of fixed assets and 
inventory flow assumptions. The first two topics involve 
recomputations and a minimum of assumptions, while the 
latter two involve the estimation of a number of 
parameters, in order to determine the income effect of 
the non-reported accounting alternatives. For these 
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latter topics, data from the reported financial 
statements are used to estimate depreciation and 
inventory parameters including the expected life of each 
year's asset layers and the price and quantity of the 
initial inventory and each year's purchases and sales. 
How good are these models at estimating these parameters 
and ultimately at estimating the income effects of 
accounting alternatives not reported in the company's 
financial statements? This question involves model 
validity. 
To answer this question, model results will be 
compared with actual company estimates. Comparing model 
estimates with actual estimates presents cost problems in 
obtaining the actual results. In some cases the data are 
available. For example, APB Opinion No. 20 on accounting 
changes, requires the calculation of pro forma amounts 
for the year of the change when companies change 
accounting methods. 
Use of APB Opinion No. 20 Data as a Validity Check. 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20 addresses 
disclosure requirements when a company changes from one 
generally accepted accounting principle to another. For 
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r c: the c3 = r.ge, the company zus: report pro feme 
amounts of what r.e: inccne would have been if r.o chance 
had oc curred.-* _hus. accountin 
natural source of data to validate 
A. number of steps were taken 
which changed either inventory o 
First, in reviewing footnotes fron all available 1979 
annual reports for the 583 ccnpanies included in this 
study, special attention was given no noting accounting 
changes. In addition, the accounting change section fren 
me nut-icatic: Accountme .rends and fecund cues « = = 
reviewed for the years 195C through 1978. Ccnpanies 
included in this publication as exanples of accounting 
changes were then centered with the list of ccnpanies 
included in this study, 
cent_ete mrcrnaticn »as avai.at_e. 
Any notches were included if 
resulted in two and twenty- two 
changed either depreciat ion or 
oectively For a firn to be 
usable firns which 
inventory nethods, re: 
included, it was necessary that sufficient infornation be 
available of either the net inccne effect of the change 
or what the ending balance of the asset would have been 
had no change ocurred. In addition, sufficient ancillary 
data needed to construct the pro ferna estination nodel 
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had to be available. 
Since the number of noted depreciation changes is so 
small, only the inventory flow method change from FIFO to 
LIFO is used as a validity check. 
APB Opinion No. 20 Inventory Changes - FIFO to LIFO. 
Determination of the income effect of a change from 
FIFO to LIFO inventory is not completely consistent with 
the method of calculation of the fifth year and five-year 
pro forma income effects. The authoritative accounting 
literature admits to the difficulty of determining 
cummulative effects in this case and allows a company to 
show results for the year of change only. Thus, pro 
forma models address the problem as if the company was de 
facto on the non-reported accounting method over the 
entire five-year period. APB Opinion No. 20 permits a 
company to start the new method from the year of change 
and not present any cumulative effect.5* Thus, it is 
necessary to adjust the pro forma estimation model to 
make it consistent with these facts. 
Method of Calculation. 
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The APB Opinion No. 20 FIFO to LIFO inventory 
estimation model is similiar to that of pro forma 
estimation models. As in the pro forma estimation model, 
the inventory process is represented by a set of 
equations. Since LIFO assumes that the last units 
purchased are the first units sold, an increase or 
decrease in inventory will yield different sets of 
equations. However, the process is simplified since no 
cumulative effect is calculated; a model for only a 
single year need be constructed. These considerations 
V 
lead to the following sets of equations: 
(11) Q0P0 = EI0 
(12) EI0 + Q1P1 - Ell = CGS1 
(13) Q0P0 + (Q1 - Qsl)Pi = Ell 
(14) Qsl = SALES1 / Psl 
(15) Psl = DOL1 
(16) PI = DOL1 / (CGS1 / SALES1) 
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Subscripts refer to the initial balances (0) or to the 
change year amounts (1). Variables are defined elsewhere 
in the chapter. 
Inventory Decrease. 
Only equation (13) will change for an inventory 
decrease; all other equations will be as above. The new 
ending inventory equation is; 
(13') (Q0 + Q1 - Qsl)P0 = Ell 
Both sets of equations are solved. The acceptable 
solution must be consistent with either an inventory 
increase or decrease. If both are consistent, then the 
set relating to an inventory increase is selected. 
Having determined composite amounts, the next step is to 
use these results to determine APB No. 20 change 
estimates and to compare these results with a company's 
disclosed amounts. 
Note that it was rare for a company to go from zero 
adoption to 100% adoption in a single year. Thus, it was 
necessary to estimate the proportion of inventory being 
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affected by the change. This estimate consisted of the 
proportion of the cost of LIFO inventories to total 
inventories at the beginning and end of the change year. 
After this calculation, all company variables were 
weighted by this proportion before they were used to 
develop the APB No. 20 change estimates. 
APB Opinion No. 20 Model Results. 
To calculate an estimate of the actual cost of the 
FIFO inventory, it was assumed that all companies were 
subject to a corporate income tax rate of 48%. The 
estimate of the actual cost of the inventory if FIFO had 
been continued is calculated as follows: 
FIFOactual = LIFOactual + (NI Effect) / (1-.48) 
Having calculated an estimate of the actual FIFO 
inventory balance, the model uses the disclosed LIFO 
amounts in the APB No. 20 estimation model to develop pro 
forma estimates of the FIFO inventory balance. 
Results are presented in terms of the difference 
between the estimated actual and pro forma FIFO inventory 
balances. Specific results for each company, along with 
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a frequency distribution of the error rate is presented 
in Table 12. These results are very encouraging. For 
eighteen of the twenty-two companies, the difference 
between the model estimate and the calculated actual FIFO 
inventory balance is less than five percent of the 
calculated actual FIFO inventory balance. 
Based on the APB No. 20 results, the pro forma 
inventory method model appears to have a sufficient 
degree of validity to justify its use in estimating the 
income strategy section of this paper. 
Having developed procedures to estimate pro forma 
income effects of non-reported accounting alternatives, 
the next chapter presents results of tests of research 
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1. See Derstine and Huefner (1974) page 218. 
2. See the 1979 Annual Report for the Martin Marietta 
Company, page 18. 
3. The applicable section of APB Opinion 20 is as 
follows: 
. . . The nature of and 
justification for a change in accounting 
principle and its effect on income 
(emphasis added) should be disclosed in 
the financial statements of the period in 
which the change is made. 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20, 
Accounting Changes 1972, paragraph 17. 
4. A number of companies were noted as disclosing that 
the depreciation method was being changed for newly 
acquired assets. Although these were presented as 
accounting changes in Accounting Trends 
and Techniques, they are not accounting changes per 
APB Opinion No. 20: 
. . . Changes in Accounting Principles 
are numerous and varied. For example . 
. a change in depreciation method for 
previously recorded (emphasis added) 
assets. 
In any event, these situations tend to have a 
non-material effect on net income, and thus, the 
actual impact typically is not disclosed. 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20, 
paragraph 9. 
5. APB Opinion No. 20 considers that the change from 
FIFO to LIFO makes it impossible to determine the 
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cumulative income effect: 
. . . Computing the effect on retained 
earnings at the beginning of the period in 
which a change in accounting principle is 
made may sometimes be impossible. In 
those rare situations, disclosure will be 
limited to showing the effect of the 
change on the results of operations of the 
period of change . . . The principle 
example of this type of accounting change 
is a change in inventory pricing from FIFO 
to LIFO . . . Ibid. Paragraph 26. 
CHAPTER VII 
MODEL RESULTS 
Chapter 2 provided a theoretical framework of the 
relationship between accounting decisions and firm 
characteristics relating to potential conflicts between 
groups involved in the financial reporting process. 
Chapter 3 summarized previous research. Chapter 4 defined 
proxies for three classes of firm characteristics: 
political costs, debt covenants and profit sharing. 
Chapter 6 described methods for estimating pro forma 
effects of non-reported accounting alternatives needed to 
refine tests of whether the typical manager employs an 
overall income strategy related to firm characteristics 
when making accounting decisions. Finally, Chapter 5 
presented various models with hypotheses and statistical 
tests of the relationship between firm characteristics and 
accounting decisions. Actual results upon testing these 
models are presented in this chapter. 
Before presenting model results, descriptive 
statistics for both dependent and independent variables 
are reviewed in Tables 13 to 21. Statistics of interest 
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include the mean, standard deviation, and range for 
continuous variables and a frequency distribution for 
dichotomous variables. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, theory involving political 
costs suggests that company size is important. 
Accordingly, results are presented in terms of non-Fortune 
300 and typically larger Fortune 300 companies. The study 
considered 283 and 300 firms in each category. 
In addition to a review of basic descriptive 
statistics, the first part of this chapter presents data 
on the association of variables within a variable class 
and across variable classes. Spearman correlations are 
calculated since a number of variables are not continuous, 
and thus, not normally distributed. 
Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics. 
Choice of Accounting Method. 
The choice of accounting alternative in four topical 
areas becomes the dependent variable used to test 
proposition 1 of Chapter 5. Table 13 shows the number of 
companies using either an a priori income-increasing or 
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income-decreasing accounting alternative. Companies are 
grouped into either Fortune 300 or non-Fortune 300 
companies. In addition, the total of all companies is 
presented. The last section on the table represents 
comparable data from Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) 
(hereafter, HZ) which serves as a check on the validity of 
this manually-collected data. 
Table 13 clearly reveals a tendency for both Fortune 
300 and non-Fortune 300 companies to choose a priori 
income-increasing accounting alternatives. For both types 
of companies, this tendency is most pronounced for the 
method of amortization of the investment tax credit. A 
total of 513, or 89% of the companies with the complete 
data, chose the flow-through, or a priori 
income-increasing accounting alternative, as the method of 
accounting for the investment tax credit. 
Conversely, the method with the lowest number of 
companies choosing the income-increasing alternative is 
for the amortization period of past service pension costs, 
defined as a period of more than thirty years (PEN30M). 
Since thirty years is the most common alternative for the 
amortization period of past period pension costs, an 
alternative variable is defined. For this variable the a 
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period of thirty years or more (PENSION). When the first 
definition is employed, a total of 139, or 28% of all 
companies, chose the a priori income-increasing accounting 
alternative. In their paper, HZ state that they use an 
amortization period of thirty years or more as the 
income-increasing alternative for the amortization of past 
service pension costs. However, upon further review of 
their text it would appear that they, in fact, used a 
definition of more than thirty years. According to this 
latter definition 69 of 300 companies, or 23%, chose the a 
priori income-increasing pension alternative, comparable 
to that data used in this study. 
A total of 449, or 82% of all companies, chose the 
straight line or a priori income-increasing depreciation 
method. The choice of the inventory flow assumption is 
the only method where the number of companies using either 
an income-increasing or income-decreasing accounting 
alternative are about equal. A total of 324 companies 
(57%) chose FIFO, the a priori income 
increasing-accounting alternative. 
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Company Size and Accounting Method Choice: A First Test. 
Theory pertaining to political costs suggests that 
larger companies will tend to select income-decreasing 
accounting alternatives. This tendency is evident for 
each of the four topical areas presented in Table 13. 
However, differences between Fortune 300 and non-Fortune 
300 companies tend to be only a few percentage points for 
all accounting methods, except for the choice of the 
inventory flow method. To see if differences are 
statistically significant, a test of proportions is made. 
Under the alternative hypothesis that the proportions of 
Fortune 300 and non-Fortune 300 companies choosing an 
income-increasing accounting alternative are not equal, it 
is possible to reject the null hypothesis of equal 
proportions for both groups under two of the four 
accounting methods. These two methods are (1) the choice 
of inventory method (p-level of .01), and (2). the choice 
of the method to account for the investment tax credit 
(p-level of .05). This suggests the unlikeliness that 
company size as a proxy for political costs will be a 
significant variable in descriptive models for the 
remaining accounting methods: inventory method choice, and 
the amortization period of past service pension costs. 
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Accounting Method Strategies. 
Zmejewski and Hagerman (1981) (hereafter, HZ) 
translate the choice of accounting method into an income 
strategy by assuming various a priori income effects based 
on the choice of each accounting alternative. A number of 
separate assumptions are considered. 
In testing proposition 2, two cases are examined: (1) 
each of the four accounting methods has an equivalent 
income effect (five strategy case), and (2) inventory 
valuation and depreciation have the same income effect, 
while each of the other methods have half the effect of 
depreciation or inventory (nine strategy case). Table 14 
presents the number of companies adopting each particular 
alternative for each case. Code zero represents a company 
choosing the income-minimizing alternative for each 
accounting method, while codes four and eight represent 
the choice of all a priori income-maximizing accounting 
alternatives for each particular case. Since only one 
company received a code of zero, this alternative is 
eliminated and this case is dropped in the models 
considering proposition 2, discussed below. 
By examining Table 14, it can be seen that the size 
of a company has little effect on the choice of an a 
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priori accounting-method income strategy. Both Fortune 
300 and non-Fortune 300 companies tend to select a priori 
income-increasing accounting alternatives. A total of 81 
Fortune 300 and 73 non-Fortune 300 companies possessed 
complete data. These companies are used in the models for 
testing proposition 2, discussed below. 
As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the preliminary 
work on accounting-method income strategies initiated by 
ZH is extended by estimating a magnitude rather than just 
a direction for the expected income effect. Proposition 3 
in Chapter 5 presents the expected results upon making 
this extension. The magnitude of the pro forma income 
effect is determined on an a priori and absolute basis. 
In addition, the effect is calculated for a single year 
and a five-year . time horizon. This leads to the 
definition of four variables used to test proposition 3. 
In general, each variable is defined as the ratio of 
reported income before extraordinary items for 1979, 
divided by this same term plus the pro forma effect on 
reported income of having adopted those accounting methods 
which would have yielded the greatest reported income. 
Using the models presented in Chapter 6, pro forma effects 
are determined for each of the four accounting methods of 
interest. The pro forma effect on reported income is 
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defined as the difference between the pro 
and the actual amount for each year 
Formally, this becomes: 
forma estimate 
of interest. 
Pro Forma Income 







J = The particular accounting method of interest. 
t = The tax rate assumed to be equal to .48 unless J 
is the investment tax credit method, in which 
case t is equal to 0. 
T = The time horizon of interest. If the focus is 
the year 1979., then T equals 1979; if the focus 
is the five-year estimation period discussed in 
Chapter 6, then T equals 1975, 1976, 1977,1978, 
and 1979. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the a priori 
income-maximizing accounting alternative may not be the 
actual a priori income-maximizing accounting alternative. 
To resolve this problem, comparisons are made between each 
accounting-method alternative, and the actual largest pro 
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forma effect is determined. This produces two different 
types of variables; one based on the a priori 
income-maximizing alternative and the other based on the 
actual pro forma estimate with the largest income impact. 
If a company is currently using those accounting 
methods which would produce the largest possible reported 
income, the pro forma effect would be zero. Therefore, 
each variable has an upper limit of one. 
In order to maintain the proper relationship if a 
firm has negative net income, it is necessary to reverse 
the sign of the pro forma effect if net income is less 
than zero. Consider two companies, each incurring losses 
of $200. If the pro forma amount by which each company 
could have increased its income is $250 and $300 
respectively, the ratio of reported income to maximum 
possible reported income would be -4 and -2 under the 
original definition. This is opposite the intended 
meaning for this variable, since the larger the potential 
unreported income, the smaller this variable should be. 
The adjusted procedure will calculate scores of .44 and 
.40 for these companies, which is consistent with the 
intended meaning of the variable. 
Descriptive statistics pertaining to these variables 
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expected. When the actual rather than a priori 
income-increasing accounting alternative is selected, the 
effect on reported income increases, resulting in a 
decrease in the mean for the variable. In addition, use 
of a five-year time focus is expected to result in a 
larger reported income effect than considering a single 
year in isolation. For example, in the early years of an 
asset's life, double-declining balance depreciation will 
result in lower reported income than would be obtained by 
using straight line depreciation. However, this 
relationship will reverse at some point, and the 
double-declining balance method will be the 
income-increasing accounting alternative. As discussed 
above, both variable definitions are used since no 
specific, definition is provided by ZH. 
Models using these variables as dependent variables 
are described after discussing the dependent variables 
used to test the research propositions relating to the 
accounting decision of whether to make a submission to the 
accounting rule makers. Also discussed are .the particular 
independent variables suggested by the theory on potential 
conflicts between groups involved in the financial 
reporting process. 
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Submissions to the FASB. 
The financial reporting process discussed in Chapter 
2 suggests that the decision to make a submission to the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board is related to firm 
characteristics associated with potential conflicts 
between groups involved in the financial reporting 
process. To test this supposition, letters sent to the 
FASB on three different topics were obtained and examined 
to ascertain the letter writer's position on the timing of 
the recognition of reported income. The three topics 
involved exposure drafts on SFASs Nos. 2, 5 and 12. 
Two variables are defined. FASB1 is coded as "one" 
if an employee of the company made a submission on any of 
the three exposure drafts. If no submission was made, 
then this variable is coded as "zero". The second 
variable relates to the content of the letter. This 
variable, FASB2, is coded as "one" if the content analysis 
of the letter indicated that the position taken on any of 
the exposure drafts served to hasten the timing of an 
increase in reported income. The income-related issues 
for each of these exposure drafts has been discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
A total of 172 Fortune 300 companies and 152 
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non-Fortune 300 companies possess complete data for all 
variables used to model propositions four and five. 
Forty-two Fortune 300 companies and eight non-Fortune 300 
companies made a submission to the FASB. Forty-two of the 
fifty companies which made a submission for which complete 
information is available favored the a priori 
income-increasing position on at least one of the three 
exposure drafts. 
This concludes the discussion of the dependent 
variables which will be used to test the research 
propositions of Chapter 5. The next section presents 
descriptive statistics for the independent variables used 
in the models testing these propositions. 
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Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics. 
Political Cost Variables. 
Various types of variables are used to proxy for 
political costs. These include size, capital intensity, 
concentration ratio, effective tax rate and company risk 
measures. Descriptive statistics for these variables can 
be found in Table 16. 
A number of variables are used to proxy for the size 
of a company. These include net sales (TOTSAL), total 
assets (TOTASS) and the number of company employees 
(TOTEMP). Descriptive statistics for these, and all 
continuous independent variables, are presented in Table 
16. This table groups data by Fortune 300 and non-Fortune 
300 companies. 
As expected, Fortune 300 companies tend to be larger 
than non-Fortune 300 companies. In fact, they are on 
average more than ten times larger in terms of net sales 
and total assets, and slightly less than nine times that 
of non-Fortune 300 companies in terms of number of 
employees. 
Fifteen non-Fortune 300 companies have net sales that 
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Company (net sales of $941.6 million). Fortune 300 
companies are the largest industrial companies in terms of 
sales. Fortune magazine defines sales as follows: 
Sales include service and rental revenues 
but exclude dividends, interest and other 
non-operating revenues. All companies on the 
list must have derived more than 50 percent of 
their sales from manufacturing and/or mining. 
Sales of subsidiaries are included when they are 
consolidated.1• 
Of the fifteen non-Fortune 300 companies, four are 
engaged in wholesale trade and are thus excluded from 
consideration as Fortune 300 companies. Each of the 
remaining companies was reviewed against the list of 
Fortune 300 companies; no matches were detected. 
It is possible that total sales for these companies 
might be less than that of Scoville Company. 
Alternatively, data coding problems might exist on the 
COMPUSTAT industrials tape or in the Fortune 300 listing. 
In any event, due to the small number of companies and 
their proximity to the net sales of the Scoville Company, 
no further investigation is deemed necessary. 
Capital intensity (CAPINT) is defined as gross fixed 
assets divided by net sales. Fortune 300 companies tend 
to be slightly more capital intensive. .53 versus .51. 
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However, non-Fortune 300 companies exhibit a wider range 
of capital intensity. 
The concentration ratio (CONRAT) is a measure of the 
potential monopoly power of a company. As suggested by 
Scherer (1970), it is defined as company net sales divided 
by the sum of net sales for up to the eight largest firms 
per four digit SIC Code.3* As expected. Fortune 300 
companies possess the higher average concentration ratio 
(.25 versus .10) . 
As in previous studies, the effective tax rate 
(TAXRAT) is defined as total federal income taxes divided 
by income before extraordinary items. The larger the 
effective tax rate, the more restrictive it will be in 
terms of the amount of taxes payable. Since income tax 
expense often differs from income taxes payable due to 
permanent or temporary timing effects, it is possible for 
tax payments to be positive while income is negative. 
This is a restrictive condition. However, as the variable 
is simply defined, if income is negative while tax 
payments occur, the magnitude of the variable would 
indicate a less restrictive situation than if the company 
paid no taxes for the year. 
To remedy this contradiction, an alternative 
definition is devised. First, the maximum (6.0) of the 
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previously-defined variable is determined. Next, the 
largest negative income amount and the mean of federal tax 
payments is also determined. Using these data, a new 
definition for effective tax rate is made for companies 
with income less than or equal to zero: 
TAXRAT = 6 + ((DMAX18-D18i)/DMAXI8)(D63i/DAVE63)) 
where 
DMAX is the largest negative income of all companies 
included in the study. 
D18i is income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations for company i. 
DAVE63 is the average federal income taxes paid by 
all companies in the study. 
D63i is the total federal income taxes paid by 
company i. 
Somewhat surprising is that non-Fortune 300 companies 
have a higher effective tax rate than Fortune 300 
companies. The relative magnitude of the effective tax 
rate suggests that, for a large number of companies, 
income tax timing reversals occurred. 
Both an accounting beta (ABETA) and market beta 
(FMBETA) are calculated as risk measures. The accounting 
beta is calculated as the coefficient of the regression 
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between a company's income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations to a similarly-defined market 
index for annual periods from 1962 through 1979. The 
market index is an equally-weighted index for the years 
1962 to 1979 of all companies on the 1982 COMPUSTAT 
industrials tape. Similiarly, the market beta represents 
the coefficient of the regression between the monthly 
return for a company to an equally-weighted monthly market 
return for the sixty months ending December 1979. A 
company's return is defined as: 
RETURN = (Pfc -Pt-1 +Dt )/Pt_1 
where 
Pt is the price of the company's stock at period t. 
Dt is the amount of dividends paid to common 
stockholders during period t. 
The market return is the equally-weighted monthly 
return from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) tapes. 
The larger Fortune 300 companies have, on average, a 
greater degree of accounting risk. This relationship is 
reversed when the market-risk factor is considered. The 
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market beta for all companies included in the study 
averaged 1.0, identical to the average if a market beta 
were calculated for all firms used in constructing the 
market index. 
Debt Covenants. 
Descriptive statistics for various debt covenant 
variables are discussed in terms of the classification 
scheme presented in Chapter 4. Classifications include 
the existence of a debt covenant, the restrictiveness of 
the debt covenant, the potential for default on a debt 
covenant and traditional accounting ratios used as proxies 
for debt covenants. 
The presence or absence of a particular debt variable 
is designated through use of a dichotomous variable. 
Frequencies for the occurrence of a particular debt 
covenant are shown in Table 17 for both Fortune 300 and 
non-Fortune 300 companies. Other debt covenant variables 
are continuous. Descriptive statistics for these 
variables can be found in Table 18. 
Covenants for an outstanding debt issue are obtained 
by reviewing Moodys Industrial Manual, using the data 
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outstanding debt issues are considered for each company. 
If more than five issues are outstanding, either the 
largest issues or those with the most restrictive debt 
covenants are selected. Table 17 lists the number of 
companies which possessed a debt covenant on any of the up 
to five outstanding debt issues utilized in this study. 
Three debt covenants relate to restrictions on 
maintaining various amounts of accounting ratios, three 
require the maintenance of accounting levels, while three 
impose various miscellaneous restrictions. 
Ratio covenants consist of the following: (1) net 
tangible assets divided by long-term debt (DC1), (2) 
capital divided by long-term debt (DC2), and (3) current 
ratio (DC5). Accounting levels considered include the 
level of working capital to maintain (DC71), the level of 
tangible net worth to maintain (DC73), and the amount of 
unrestricted retained earnings which can be used for the 
payment of dividends (DCDIV). It was noted that both 
accounting-ratio and level debt covenants were written 
either in terms of a simple restriction or in terms of no 
new debt allowable if the covenant was broken. In 
defining debt covenant variables, this additional 
dimension is ignored, thus reducing the number of 
variables to consider. 
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Miscellaneous debt covenants include (1) restrictions 
on issuing bonds of higher priority unless the old 
bondholders claims are upgraded to the priority of the new 
bondholders (DCBB), (2) the amount of new long-term debt 
allowable to be issued subjected to aggregate dollar 
limits (DCCC) and (3) the prohibition of sale and 
leaseback type transactions (DCEE). 
In reviewing Table 17, it is clear that the most 
common debt covenant is restrictions on the declaration of 
dividends (DCDIV) (69% of all companies), followed by 
restrictions on issuing debt of higher priority (DCBB) 
(43%) and sales-leaseback transactions (DCEE) (38%) . 
Accounting ratios and levels have both a long-term 
focus (DC1, DC2, DC73, DIVDC) and a short-term focus (DC5 
and DC71). As is evident in Table 17, covenants with a 
long-term focus tend to be included in debt issues more 
frequently than covenants of a short-term time focus. 
This seems reasonable since the debt issues found in 
Moodys Industrial Manual tend to be medium- or long-term. 
Table 18 presents descriptive statistics for the 
continuous debt covenant variables. These categories 
include the most restrictive debt covenant, the potential 
for defaulting on a debt covenant, the cost of default, 
and traditional debt covenant variables. The coding 
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scheme for the most restrictive debt covenant variables is 
identical to that used for the existence of a debt 
covenant described above; i.e., TRES1 relates to the 
restrictiveness of the accounting ratio debt covenant net 
tangible assets to long-term debt. Accounting ratios and 
unrestricted retained earnings become more restrictive as 
the amount per the debt covenant is reduced; accounting 
levels become more restrictive as the required amount of 
the level increases. 
As expected, the magnitude of the most restrictive 
accounting level debt covenants is greatest, on average, 
for Fortune 300 companies. This is probably an effect of 
size. This relationship holds for the current ratio; 
however, the reverse is true for long-term covenants. 
Non-Fortune 300 companies tend on average to have more 
restrictive covenants. 
If the actual amount of a particular debt covenant is 
missing, or if the covenant is not noted on any of the 
possible five outstanding debt issues used in the study, 
then the covenant restrictiveness variable is given the 
value zero. 
Similiarly, the potential for defaulting on a debt 
covenant is coded as those variables designating the 
existence of a debt covenant; i.e., TW3DP1 is the 
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potential for defaulting on the accounting ratio covenant 
net tangible assets to long-term debt. The potential for 
default is one minus the ratio of the limits per the debt 
covenant minus the actual amount divided by the debt 
covenant limitation. Thus, the value of one is the 
neutral value for no debt covenant or for missing data 
pertaining to the debt covenant restriction. As an 
example, assume that a company has a debt covenant 
limitation on the current ratio of 2.5 to 1, while the 
actual current ratio is 2.0. Under this scenario, the 
potential for defaulting on the current ratio debt 
covenant variable would be .8, (TW3DP5=1-(2.5-2)/2.5)). 
Thus, the closer the covenant to one, the greater the 
potential for default. If a debt covenant is in default, 
it receives a value of less than one. 
Table 18 presents descriptive statistics pertaining 
to the potential for default in terms of the most 
restrictive of each type of debt covenant. Examining 
variable means, the potential for default for Fortune 300 
companies is most severe for ratio covenants (TW3DP1, 
TW3DP2, and Tw3DP5). The default potential of the 
variable net tangible assets to long-term debt (TW3DP1) is 
1.47, while the current ratio (TW3DP5) is 2.0. The 
















































P C ctf 
O TO *H Cp +j > 
C W g 
CO 
TT o o o O O O O O CO 
rH rH 05 
CO 
rH CO 
o rjl CO 0 0 o o o o o 




o o CO rH N~ O in m m NO00H m 
• • 




co co co g co m o 
CO 
co 
CO rH LO N- CD CO CD 00 
CO 00 rH O CO t> in co tJ* 05 CD 
• rH 
rH lO h cd in • 
CO rH rH in CO 





H CD C- H CD 
rH CO CO O lO 00 • • • • • • 
• • • • • CO CO N 
rH rH 00 CO 
05 in io io lo 
t> CO CO CO CO O O O O O nH 
o 
CO r—I CD CO 
• • • • 
I I to I 
I 
in co O) co h 
OO OO CO oooooo 
_ CD 















































O O CO 
CO* Tf co’ 
COON 
n in n 
CO rr 
S'0 CO ^ lO TT 
• • • • • 
38 
m m 05 
• oo • 
CD rf 
OQ C5 CD CD lO rr 



























severe on average for all variables except for the ratio 
of capital to long-term debt (TW3DP2). 
The final sets of debt covenant variables are the 
cost-of-default and traditional accounting ratios. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables can also be 
found in Table 18. 
The cost of default is represented as the impact on 
pre-tax income of refunding outstanding debt issues. 
Since interest rates were at historic levels for the year 
of interest of the study (1979), if the company is forced 
to finance its outstanding debt, it would be forced to 
incur a higher reported interest expense. It is assumed 
that the company's financial condition has not changed 
over time. Thus, a measure of the cost of default is the 
difference between the rate of interest when an 
outstanding debt issue was first issued and the rate of 
interest at December 1979. The applicable interest rate 
is that for corporate long-term bonds rated Aaa. The cost 
of default (C0STWT1) is thus defined as the difference 
between interest rates times the outstanding principle 
balance of each issue considered in the study. As 
expected, the average cost of default is greater for 
Fortune 300 companies than for non-Fortune 300 companies. 
Traditional debt covenant variables are defined for 
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leverage, dividend payout and interest coverage. Two 
leverage variables are considered. The first leverage 
variable (ALEV1) is defined as long-term debt plus 
preferred stock at liquidating value divided by retained 
earnings plus common equity. The second leverage variable 
(ALEV2) is long-term debt plus preferred stock at 
liquidating value divided by total assets. Non-Fortune 
300 companies have higher average leverage than Fortune 
300 companies. 
Two dividend payout variables are considered. The 
first (DIVPAY1) is the ratio of common stock dividends to 
retained earnings. An alternative definition (DIVPAY2) is 
the ratio of total dividends to income before 
extraordinary items. The definition of the dividend 
payout variable is adjusted if income is negative. The 
adjustment procedure is performed in the same manner as 
for the effective tax rate variable discussed above. This 
new dividend payout variable is the absolute value of the 
previous definition plus 22, the maximum of the positive 
range of the variable simply defined. Reviewing Table 18 
shows that smaller-size companies tend to have greater 
dividend payout ratios. 
The final traditional debt covenant variable is 
interest coverage (COVINT1), defined as income before 
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extraordinary items plus interest expense divided by 
interest expense. Fortune 300 companies tend to have a 
slightly higher interest coverage ratio. 
A number of additional accounting ratio and level 
debt covenants were observed while reviewing 
Moodys Industrial Manual; however, less than 2.5% of the 
companies in the study possessed these debt covenants. 
Accordingly, these debt covenants are not considered in 
the study. Omitted debt covenants include: (1) income to 
earnings charges, (2) working capital to funded debt, (3) 
level of current assets required, (4) level of contingent 
liabilities permitted, (5) level of capital expenditures 
permitted, (6) prohibitions of issuing claims of higher 
priority, (7) clean-up provisions, (8) lease payments 
restricted to a fraction of net income, and (9) capitalize 
lease obligations and use in asset and debt definitions. 
Profit Sharing Variables. 
Profit sharing variables are grouped into four 
categories, (1) existence of a key executive incentive 
plan, (2) ownership control, (3) likelihood to monitor, 
and (4) content of the key executive incentive plan. 
Variables for each area are considered next. Descriptive 
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statistics for these variables can be found in Table 20. 
The existence of a plan (PSPLAN1) is designated as a 
zero-one variable. It is coded as one if a key executive 
profit-sharing plan based on reported pre- or post-tax 
income is noted upon reviewing a company's proxy 
statements. 
Table 19 presents a classification by plan type. 
Corporate key executive incentive plans typically are 
stated in terms of allowing the board of directors to 
authorize the transfer to a fund an amount based on some 
percent of award earnings. Award earnings are usually 
defined as pre- or post-tax reported income in excess of 
some percent of stockholder equity or total assets. In 
addition, awards are often restricted to some percent of 
an individual's remuneration and are allowable only if 
dividends have been declared. 
Table 19 clearly shows that larger companies are more 
likely to have a key executive incentive plan. In 
addition, if a plan exists, it is typically stated in 
terms of a threshold based on a percent of net capital 
(35%) or net worth (27%). Only 48 of 233 companies with 
plans did not have any type of threshold. 
Three variables are used to designate ownership 
control. The first, OWN1, represents the fraction of a 
196 
Table 19 
Classification of Key Executive Incentive Plans 





No Plan 58 128 186 
Plan with Threshold Based On: 
Net Capital 66 15 81 
Net Worth 40 22 62 
Net Sales 1 2 3 
Earnings Per Share 3 2 5 
Other 22 12 34 
No Threshold 32 16 48 
Plan Exists, Not Enough 
Details to Classify 39 48 87 
Unclear if Plan Exists 39 38 77 
Total 300 283 583 
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company's common stock owned by top management and the 
board of directors. The second, 0WN2, is defined as the 
fraction of company common stock owned by the board of 
directors. The last, 0WN3, is the fraction of common 
stock plus potential ownership control in terms of 
unexercised stock options owned by top management and the 
board of directors. Information pertaining to stock 
ownership is obtained from company proxy statements. 
Table 20 reflects the expected ordering of these 
variables. Note that smaller companies have greater 
ownership control, as expected. 
In addition to the above continuous variables, 
dichotomous variables are constructed. The first, OWNER1, 
indicates whether stock ownership by top management and 
the board of directors exceeds five percent of total 
outstanding common stock. If this limit is achieved or 
exceeded, the variable is coded as "one". Similiar values 
are assigned variables OWNER2 and OWNER3 if their 
respective continuous variables, OWN1 and OWN2, are 
greater or equal to .05. 
Several variables have been defined in an attempt to 
capture the likelihood of outside parties to monitor the 
behavior of company management and the board of directors. 
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outstanding common stock owned by parties, including 
company trustees, not on the board of directors nor a part 
of top management. An analogous dichotomous variable, 
OUTMON, is given the value "one", if this fraction exceeds 
twenty percent of the outstanding common stock. As shown 
in Table 20, the average likelihood to monitor (AMONIT) is 
slightly greater for non-Fortune 300 companies (.09 versus 
.07). This suggests that an individual with significant 
stock ownership in a Fortune 300 company is more likely to 
be represented on the board of directors or in top 
management than an individual or trust with a comparably 
significant company ownership in a non-Fortune 300 
company. 
The final profit-sharing variables involve the 
content of the key executive profit-sharing plan. Three 
variables are defined: the total potential bonus, the rate 
of bonus in terms of total management and board 
compensation, and the rate applied to pre- or post-tax 
reported income. Each variable is discussed in turn. 
The estimate of the maximum potential bonus, BONUS, 
takes into consideration whether the plan is stated in 
terms of pre- or post-tax income as well as the threshold 
amount to be achieved. A corporate tax rate of .48 is 
assumed for all companies. As shown in Table 20, the 
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average bonus is much higher for Fortune 300 companies 
(4.6 versus .19). If a company does not have an incentive 
plan for key executives, then this variable is given a 
value of "zero". Since this variable relates to the 
amount of potential rather than actual bonus, it can be, 
and sometimes is, negative. This occurs if the company 
reports a pre- or post-tax loss. 
The second profit-sharing content variable, BONRAT, 
consists of the total potential bonus divided by the 
amount of total compensation for the board of directors 
and top management. Information on total compensation is 
obtained from a company's proxy statement. If the average 
rate is used as a guide then, as theory suggests, a key 
executive incentive plan is more important to managers of 
large rather than small companies. For large companies, 
this potential bonus represents 61% of total compensation. 
The comparable figure is 9% for non-Fortune 300 companies. 
The final profit-sharing content variable, RATE, 
represents the bonus rate stated in the plan. If more 
than one rate is used by a company, the rate chosen is the 
one for the segment of incentive earnings immediately 
greater than the threshold earnings level. In examining 
Table 20, there seems to be little difference in rates for 
either group of companies. Rates range from zero, if a 
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company did not have a plan, to 20% and 25% for Fortune 
300 and non-Fortune 300 companies, respectively. 
Frequency distributions for dichotomous profit 
sharing variables discussed above can be found in Table 
21. 
This section presented a brief review of descriptive 
statistics for variables serving as proxies for firm 
characteristics. The next section considers the degree of 
association between dependent variables, independent 
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Association Between Variables. 
Table 22 presents Spearman correlations between 
variables used to represent the a priori income effect of 
four alternative accounting methods. Spearman 
correlations are calculated since these dependent 
variables are not normally disrtibuted. Regarding the 
period of amortization of past service pension costs, two 
variables are defined. These definitions differ in the 
treatment of companies which choose thirty years, the most 
likely choice, as an amortization period. The first 
pension variable defines the a priori income-increasing 
alternative as thirty years or more (PENSION), while the 
second variable defines this alternative as more than 
thirty years (PEN30M). 
Disregarding the relationship between pension 
variables, it is evident that no strong simple 
relationship exists between dependent variables. The 
strongest positive correlations are between the choice of 
depreciation method and the accounting for the investment 
tax credit (.11), and between the depreciation method and 
inventory method (.09). The largest negative relationship 
is between the inventory method and PEN30M (-.09). 
The lack of a strong positive association between 
Table 22 
Spearman Correlations of Choice of Accounting 
Alternatives for All Companies 
DEPREC AITC PENSION PEN30M 
DEPEC 
AITC .11 
PENSION -.02 -.01 
PEN30M 0 -.04 .31 






accounting method choice suggests that companies follow a 
more complex strategy than simply adopting a set of a 
priori income-increasing or income-decreasing accounting 
alternatives. Tests on the models presented in Chapter 5, 
and described below, examine whether the strategy used by 
management is associated with factors suggested by theory. 
Table 23 examines the degree of association between 
variables representing the a priori income effect of 
various accounting methods and firm characteristics 
suggested by theory as influencing the accounting method 
decision. Spearman correlations and the sign of the 
expected relationship between variables are shown in this 
table. 
As explained in Chapter 5, political cost variables 
are expected to be inversely related to the 
income-increasing accounting alternative. This is because 
the larger the company, or more concentrated the industry, 
the more likely will the company be subject to scrutiny by 
political regulators. Similiarly, accounting beta and 
market beta measure the risk of the firm. Finance theory 
suggests a trade-off between the risk and return of an 
investment. As discussed in Chapter 4, Hagerman and 
Zmejewski (1979) use this theory to suggest that, on 
average, a riskier company will earn a higher return than 
206 
a company with less risk. To avoid the appearance of 
excessive profits and their potential political costs, 
managers of riskier companies are expected to choose 
accounting alternatives which lead to a lower present 
value of reported accounting income. This results in an 
expected inverse relationship between risk measures and 
choice of accounting alternative, given the manner of 
defining the a priori income-increasing accounting 
alternative as "one". 
Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) argue that the 
opportunity cost of capital is not reported in measuring 
reported income. Thus, the greater the capital intensity 
experienced by a company, the larger its accounting 
earnings will tend to be. This is expected to result in a 
tendency for managers to choose a priori income-decreasing 
accounting alternatives, producing an expected inverse 
relationship between capital intensity and choice of the 
accounting method alternative. 
Reviewing Table 23, it is evident that correlations 
between political cost variables and accounting 
alternatives tend to be negative. In general, the weakest 
expected relationships are for the market-risk factor 
(FMBETA) and the effective tax rate (TAXRAT). The 
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the accounting-risk factor (ABETA) and the different size 
variables (TOTSALE, TOTASS and TOTEMP). The relationship 
between accounting beta and choice of accounting 
alternative may be spurious, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
since accounting income is used in calculating a firm's 
accounting-risk factor. 
In considering accounting methods separately, the 
weakest of the expected relationships occurs for pension 
variables. Expected relationships are especially weak 
when the a priori income alternative is defined as an 
amortization period of more than thirty years (PEN30M). 
The strongest relationships are for inventory method and 
the accounting for the investment tax credit. 
Debt covenants are typically stated in terms of 
maintaining some .level of income or some level of assets. 
Since the larger the amount of income, the larger the 
amount of assets possessed by a company, all things equal, 
both types of debt covenants are expected to have similiar 
effects. Since the a priori income-increasing accounting 
alternative is defined as "one", a positive relationship 
is expected between the choice of the accounting 
alternative and the presence and restrictiveness of a debt 
covenant. Examining Table 24, this expected positive 
relationship is observed, except for pension variables. 
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Accounting-level debt covenents (DC71 and DC73) tend to 
have the strongest expected relationship, while accounting 
ratios, especially those with a long-term time emphasis 
(DC1 and DC2; RES1 and RES 2) have the weakest 
relationship. 
As potential-for-default variables are defined, the 
greater the magnitude, the less likely is default on that 
debt covenant. As the likelihood of default decreases, 
the less need has management to adopt an a priori income 
increasing accounting alternative. Thus, an inverse 
relationship is expected for this variable and the choice 
of the accounting alternative. This expected inverse 
relationship is noted in reviewing Table 24. The 
relationship is strongest for depreciation and weakest for 
the pension variables. 
The greater the cost of default, the more likely that 
steps will be taken to avoid default on a debt covenant. 
Thus, a direct relationship between this variable 
(C0STWT1) and the choice of the accounting alternative is 
expected. Similiarly, traditional accounting ratios for 
leverage, dividend payout and interest coverage serve as 
proxies for the existence of debt covenants. Thus, a 
positive relationship between these variables and the 
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In general, as shown in Table 24, actual 
relationships for the cost of default and the traditional 
accounting ratios are not as expected. Only a few of the 
leverage variables behave as expected, and these only for 
methods other than the amortization period of past service 
pension costs. 
Turning to profit sharing variables, the existence of 
a plan (PSPLAN1) along with the content of that plan 
(BONUS, BONRAT, RATE) are expected to vary directly with 
the choice of the accounting alternative. This 
expectation is due to the assumption that managers would 
prefer to maximize the present value of their expected 
future cash inflows. Examining Table 25, this expected 
relationship is not observed for plan existence. Better 
results are obtained for plan-content variables; however, 
here too the results are weak, especially for decisions 
involving the accounting for the investment tax credit and 
inventory flow method. 
As the likelihood for outside parties to monitor 
management increases, the expectation increases that an 
income-increasing alternative will be chosen to forestall 
monitoring. Thus, a direct relationship is expected. 
Generally, this expected relationship is not observed in 
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Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, if a firm is 
completely managed by its owner, then no agency costs 
between owners and managers could exist. Conversely, the 
lower the degree of ownership control, the more likely 
will potential agency costs develop. This suggests that, 
the lower the degree of ownership control, the more likely 
will managers choose an income-increasing accounting 
alternative. Thus, an inverse relationship is expected 
for ownership-control variables and the choice of 
accounting-method alternative. 
Examining Table 25, the expected relationship tends 
to be stronger for dichotomous, rather than continuous, 
owner control variables (0WNER1, 0WNER2, and, 0WNER3). 
However, in no case, either across variables or across 
accounting methods, is the expected relationship 
consistently maintained. 
In general, the degree of association between the 
choice of accounting alternative and variables 
representing firm characteristics is weak in terms of the 
magnitude of the relationship and the failure for the 
expected relationship to be maintained. This suggests 
that weak results will be obtained for models involving 




degree of associat 
for firm character 
ics discussed in this paper. Before 
models, a consideration is made of the 
ion between variables serving as proxies 
istics. 
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Measures of Association of Firm CharacteiStic Variables. 
Spearman correlations are calculated using all 
companies considered in the study for all variables 
serving as proxies for firm characteristics. 
Non-parametric correlations are calculated since variables 
are not normally distributed. Correlations are calculated 
under pairwise deletion. Under this option, a case is 
included if neither value of the respective variables has 
a missing value indicator. 
% 
Tables 26A to 26C present Spearman correlations for 
inter-group variables. Political cost variables are 
listed in Table 26A, debt covenant variables in Table 26B 
and profit sharing variables in Table 26C. Intra-group 
correlations tended to be less than .5 and are not 
presented. 
Pairwise correlations exceeding .5 are marked with an 
"X". Due to the large number of similarly-defined 
variables, there is a danger of severe multicollinearity, 
resulting in the inability to obtain an. empirical solution 
if all firm-characteristic variables are included in each 
model. As a first attempt to limit the degree of 
multicollinearity, one variable for each variable pair 
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Table 26B (Continued) 
Spearman Correlations Debt Covenant Variables 
ALEV1 ALEV2 DIVPAY1 DIVPAY2 
ALEV1 
ALEV2 .93 
DIVPAY1 -.18 -.19 
DIVPAY2 -.17 -.17 .66 
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models discussed below. If this pair consists of a 
continuous and its related dichotomous variable, the 
dichotomous variable is excluded. If the pair of 
variables are either both continuous or both dichotomous, 
that variable with the higher correlations with other 
variables is excluded.Model results are discussed 
below. 
Test of Propositions. 
Proposition 1 involves the relationship between 
choice of an a priori income-increasing or 
income-decreasing accounting-method alternative and firm 
characteristics suggested by theory involving potential 
conflicts between groups involved in the financial 
reporting process. Proposition 1 is a partial replication 
of work by Hagerman and Zmejewski (1979) (hereafter, HZ). 
It is not an actual replication since HZ analyzed data for 
1975, while the current study considers data for 1979. 
However, since variable definitions are identical and 
since managers of firms tend to change accounting methods 
slowly, comparing models serves as a check on the overall 
data validity of the current work. 
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Proposition 1 extends HZ by refining proxies of firm 
characteristics. Two models are constructed for each 
accounting method. The first model consists of variables 
as used by HZ (reduced model). The second, or full model, 
is a nested model consisting of variables suggested by 
theory as well as the independent variables considered in 
the reduced model. Descriptive statistics for these 
additional variables have been discussed above. Chapter 4 
describes why these variables are closer to the unobserved 
theoretical constructs of group conflicts than variables 
used in the past. 
In testing proposition 1, results for both models are 
examined. If the additional variables included in the 
full model are indeed better proxies for the theoretical 
constructs, and if these constructs do bear on the 
accounting-method choice decision, then the coefficients 
of these variables should be statistically different from 
zero. 
Two tests are used to measure the significance of the 
full model. First, an examination is made of the 
classification results for both models. Nex t, the 
information content of the additional variables in the 
full model is tested for statistical significance. 
Probit analysis is used in the development of models. 
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The computer software package employs the maximum 
likelihood technique in developing estimates of the 
model's parameters. Overall model significance is 
determined through the chi square distribution, with the 
number of degrees of freedom equaling the model's number 
of independent variables minus one. The difference in chi 
square values of the full and reduced models is also 
distributed as chi square. Testing this difference for 
statistical significance serves as a test of the 
incremental value of the full model over the reduced 
model. 
Test of Proposition 1. 
Table 27 contrasts results from models estimated from 
data for 1975 (HZ study), and for 1979 (current study). 
Independent variables are similiarly defined in both 
models. Models are specified using both probit analysis 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. 
Four accounting methods are considered as dependent 
variables. For the reduced model replicating HZ, firm 
characteristics include the concentration ratio (CONRAT), 
the existence of a management profit-sharing plan 
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(CAPINT), and net sales (TOTSALE). 
Model summary statistics are presented in terms of a 
model coefficient of determination for regression analysis 
or chi square statistic for probit analysis, as well as 
the percentage of firms correctly classified in terms of 
their actual use of an a priori income-increasing or 
decreasing accounting method alternative. Statistical 
significance of the model is tested using a chi square 
statistic (probit analysis) or an overall F statistic 
(OLS). 
Consider the sign of model coefficients. For the 
model with depreciation alternative as dependent variable, 
sign reversals are noted for one variable, risk, under 
both model specifications. However, in neither case is 
the coefficient for the replication model significant. 
Similiar results are observed for inventory, with four 
sign reversals, the investment tax credit (ITC), with 
three sign reversals, and the pension amortization period 
with five sign reversals. Of all these sign reversals, 
only two coefficients, capital intensity for the ITC model 
and the constant term for the pension model, are 
statistically significant at a p-level of .05. 
Examining summary statistics, it is clear that, 
except for the ITC model, the percent correctly predicted 
230 
is close to the results of HZ. The difference for the ITC 
model appears to be due to the higher percentage of a 
priori income-increasing accounting method cases in the 
current study than in HZ. 
The partial replication compares well with the HZ 
results in terms of overall F statistic and OLS model 
significance. In addition, for all probit models, chi 
square values appear to be comparable across data sets. 
These results provide additional assurance for the overall 
validity of the data used in the current study. Other 
data validity procedures were described in Chapter 4. 
Tables 28A and 28B present results for the test of 
the full model, involving expected superior proxies for 
the theoretical constructs of interest than those used by 
HZ. Models employing only those variables used by HZ are 
designated the reduced model. Model parameters are 
estimated using probit analysis. Table 28 presents model 
coefficients and asymptotic t-values, model chi square 
values, and classification success. 
As shown in Table 28, only marginal improvement is 
noted in terms of overall classification success. The 
full inventory model shows the most improvement over the 
reduced model, from a rate of 56.5% to 64.0%. For all 
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success of the less-frequently selected accounting method 
alternative. Models are relatively unsophisticated 
because they tend to classify all firms into that of the 
predominate group. Consider the depreciation model. This 
model is estimated with unequal-sized groups: 246 
companies with complete data select the income-increasing 
alternative while only 53 companies with complete data 
choose the income-decreasing alternative. The reduced 
model classified 278 of the companies as income-increasing 
cases. The high classification rate shown by the reduced 
model is due to the unequal-sized groups used in 
estimating the model. 
Inventory is the only model where the number of firms 
in each group is fairly equal. For the inventory model, 
the full model not only attains a higher classification 
rate than the reduced model, as noted above, but it also 
produces a vast improvement — from 29 of 132 to 61 of 132 
in predicting firms reporting under the income 
decreasing alternative. Having examined the practical 
significance of the models, the next step is to consider 
their statistical significance. 
Examining chi square statistics for the reduced 
models in Table 28, it is evident that the depreciation 
model is significant at the .01 level, those for the ITC 
240 
and inventory at the .05 level, while the reduced model 
(PENSION) for which the a priori income increasing pension 
variable is defined for periods greater or equal to thirty 
years is not significant at any reasonable level. Overall 
model significance for the full models is as follows: the 
ITC and Inventory models are significant at the .01 level 
while none of the other models are significant. 
Considering the difference in chi square statistics 
of the models allows for an examination of the incremental 
significance of the additional variables in the full 
model. The null hypothesis of zero values for these 
coefficients is rejected at a p-level of .05 for the ITC 
model and at the .01 level for the inventory model. The 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the other models. 
In summary, both practical and statistical 
significance have been shown for the full model. The full 
model includes variables that better represent constructs 
suggested by theory involving potential group conflicts 
between groups involved in the financial reporting 
process. The next section considers these same 
independent variables in the context of models examining 
the possibility of an income strategy involved in the 
choice of accounting methods. 
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Test of Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2 involves the formulation of models to 
search for a relationship between firm characteristics and 
the use of an accounting method strategy. Zmejewski and 
Hagerman (1981) investigated the possibility of this 
relationship by assuming various income effects for each 
accounting alternative. Several different sets of 
assumptions were utilized as described previously. These 
assumptions allowed for the calculation of a dependent 
variable to serve as a proxy for a company's accounting 
method income strategy. Two cases are investigated in 
this paper. 
In the five-strategy case, the assumption is that 
each accounting method has an equivalent income effect. 
The company is coded as "zero" if it utilized all a priori 
income-decreasing accounting alternatives. It is coded as 
"four" if all a priori income-increasing . accounting 
alternatives were used. The second case is referred to as 
the nine-strategy case. Under this scenario, inventory 
and depreciation are assumed to have twice the income 
effect of the amortization period of past service pension 
costs and the accounting for the investment tax credit. 
Since the dependent variable is categorical with 
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either five (five-strategy case) or nine (nine-strategy 
case) levels, multinomial logit analysis will be used to 
estimate model parameters. As previously discussed, only 
one company selected all a priori income-decreasing 
accounting alternatives. Accordingly, this alternative is 
eliminated and that company is omitted from the analysis. 
Thus, the dependent valiable will either have four or 
eight levels, depending upon which case is being 
considered. 
Multinomial logit analysis is analogous to simple 
probit analysis. For logit analysis, it is assumed that 
the process follows a logistic rather than a normal 
probability density function. The logistic density has 
somewhat thicker "tails" than the normal distribution 
(Amemeya, 1981). Since the dependent variable consists of 
more than two levels, a number of threshold points — one 
less than the number of levels — must be estimated. In 
addition, n-1 logit functions are estimated, where n is 
the number of levels of the dependent variable. This is 
analogous to the n-1 discriminant functions estimated 
under discriminant analysis. Discriminant analysis is not 
used since it requires the assumption that the independent 
variables follow a multivariate normal distribution. 
Maximum likelihood is used to estimate parameters in the 
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multinomial logit analysis.5* 
As in proposition 1, two models are developed. The 
reduced model consists of variables used by previous 
researchers, while the full model consists of these 
variables as well as additional variables which are 
thought to be superior proxies for theoretical constructs 
of interest. The informational content of these variables 
is tested for statistical significance by calculating the 
difference in chi square statistics for the full and 
reduced models. Model results for the five-strategy case 
are presented in Table 29A, for the reduced model, and 
Table 29B, for the full model. Similiar results are 
obtained for the nine-strategy case. 
Both tables present model coefficients for each of 
the three logistic functions. None of these coefficients 
is statistically significant and, therefore, t-statistics 
are not presented. 
In terms of practical results. a model with no 
independent variables (Intercept model) is able to 
correctly classify 25% of the companies in terms of the 
four levels of the dependent variable for the 
five-strategy case. The reduced model had a 38% success 
rate, while the full model achieved a success rate, of 
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In the five-strategy case, the chi square statistic 
was 52.1 with 22 degrees of freedom, and 83.3 with 52 
degrees of freedom for the reduced and full models. Both 
models are statistically significant at a p-level of .01. 
However, the difference in chi square values is not 
statistically significant at a p-level of .10 or less. 
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the 
superior proxies of the full model do not provide 
incremental informational content. One explanation for a 
failure to detect any incremental informational content is 
in the method of defining an accounting method income 
strategy. This is investigated under the section testing 
proposition 3. 
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Test of Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3 also considers the possibility of an 
accounting method income strategy. As discussed above. 
Proposition 2 makes various assumptions about the a priori 
income effect of utilizing various accounting methods. 
Proposition 3 is a natural extension in that a magnitude 
for an income strategy is estimated using methods 
described in Chapter 6. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the dependent variable becomes the ratio of 
reported income to maximum possible reported income. 
Four separate definitions are used for maximum 
possible reported income. For variable AP79, maximum 
possible reported income is reported income plus the 
difference between the pro forma estimate for each 
accounting method and the actual amount for 1979 only. 
Considering differences for all five years used to develop 
the pro forma estimates rather than merely the-last year, 
1979, produces the variable, AP5. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, due to various timing 
considerations, the a priori income-increasing accounting 
alternative may not be the actual income-increasing 
accounting alternative for any particular year of 
interest. The last two definitions for maximum possible 
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reported income take this into consideration. If the 
focus is the year 1979, for each alternative, a choice is 
made of the actual income-increasing accounting 
alternative for each accounting method. Having made this 
determination, the maximum possible reported income is the 
difference between this estimate and the actual amount for 
each accounting method. This procedure produces the 
variable, AM79. Finally, a determination is made of the 
largest difference over the five years for each accounting 
method, and this amount is used to determine the maximum 
possible reported income. Variable AM5 is produced under 
this scenario. 
As previously mentioned, each of these variables has 
an upper limit of one. This upper limit is achieved for a 
company using the a priori income-increasing accounting 
alternative for each of the four accounting methods of 
interest. The number of companies achieving this limit 
for each variable definition is as follows: AP79 — 48 
companies, AM79 — 34 companies, AP5 — 25 companies, and 
AM5 — 19 companies. A total of 179 Fortune 300 and 
non-Fortune 300 companies are available with complete 
information. Since the descriptive statistics did not 
indicate large differences among these groups of 
companies, the data are grouped in constructing models. 
249 
An examination of any possible difference between groups 
of companies will be reserved for future research. 
As noted above, the dependent variable is limited in 
range, and a number of observations occur at this limit. 
The use of regression analysis is inappropriate since the 
tilting of the regression plane might tend to yield 
overestimates at the low range of the data horizon. This 
problem has been examined by Tobin (1958) , who has 
produced a method for dealing with limited dependent 
variables called tobit analysis.6* in the discussion which 
follows, results are presented for both regression 
analysis and tobit analysis. As in probit analysis, 
maximum likelihood is used to determine the parameters of 
the tobit model. Since this method is theoretically 
preferable, tests of model significance are presented only 
for the tobit model. As in probit analysis, model 
significance is determined by examining the difference in 
chi square values for each model. Two models are 
examined. The reduced model consists of variables used by 
HZ. The full model considers these same variables as well 
as other possible independent variables used in testing 
propositions one and two above. Model results are 
presented in Tables 30 to 33. 
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t-statistics, as well as chi square statistics for the 
tobit models and coefficients of determination for the 
regression models. As expected, better results tend to be 
obtained when the time focus is over five years rather 
than 1979 alone, and when using the actual rather than the 
a priori income increasing accounting alternative. 
For the case of a single year focus and the use of 
the a priori income-increasing accounting alternative (as 
shown in Table 30) neither the reduced nor the full model 
is statistically significant. The coefficient of 
determination under regression analysis is .054 and .125, 
respectively, for the reduced and full models. Using the 
actual rather than the a priori income-increasing 
accounting alternative (AM79) does improve the model as 
shown in Table 31. For this case, the reduced model is 
significant at a p-level of .01, while the full model is 
significant at a p-level of .05. For the regression 
models, the coefficients of determination are .094 and 
.210, respectively. 
Consider models with a five-year time horizon. Both 
sets of models are now statistically significant at a 
p-level of .05. As shown in Table 32, when the maximum 
reported income is calculated using the a priori 
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coefficients of determination are .061 and .213 for the 
reduced and full models. As discussed above, as the time 
period of interest increases, the maximum possible income 
will be about the same whether the actual or a priori 
income-increasing accounting alternative is utilized. 
Thus, it is not unreasonable that there is only a slight 
improvement in models using AM5 as dependent variable. As 
shown in Table 33, the coefficients of determination for 
these models only increase to .066 and .214, respectively. 
Clearly the signs of the model coefficients do not 
always meet expectations. Coefficients with significant 
t-statistics and expected sign are the effective tax rate 
(TAXRAT), total sales (TOTSAL), and the potential for 
defaulting on the current ratio (DP5). Statistically 
significant variables which fail to achieve the expected 
sign in at least one of the four types of models are 
concentration ratio (CONRAT), the level of restrictiveness 
of tangible net worth to maintain (RES73), the cost of 
default (COSTWT1) and the extent of ownership by top 
management (OWN1). The failure of coefficients to achieve 
their expected sign may be due to problems of 
multicollinearity. Although pairwise correlations were 
considered in narrowing the set of independent variables, 
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certain degree of collinearity is to be expected. 
Therefore, rather than comparing the sign on the model 
coefficients with the expected sign, the measure of 
success of the full model is to test the null hypothesis 
that each of the coefficients of the variables in the full 
model which are not in the reduced model has a value of 
zero. Since the full model is nested, this becomes a test 
of the difference in the chi square values of the full and 
reduced models. 
When the focus is on 1979 as a single year, the full 
model possesses no explanatory advantage over the reduced 
model. The differences in chi square statistics are 13.12 
and 21.60 for models with dependent variables AP79 and 
AM79, respectively. For 19 degrees of freedom, neither 
chi square value is significant at a p-level of .10 or 
less. 
Results drastically change when a five-year period is 
the time focus. In this case, the differences in chi 
square statistics are 32.96 and 31.13 for models with AP5 
and AM5 as dependent variables. For 19 degrees of 
freedom, these statistics are significant at p-levels of 
.025 and .05, respectively. 
The above results indicate that, when formulating a 
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consider the time period of interest. Using a five-year 
time period in calculating the maximum possible reported 
income does provide support for the theory of potential 
conflicts between groups involved in the financial 
reporting process. This is because the full model 
possessing variables closer to the theoretical constucts 
contains incremental information which is not observed 
when only a single year is considered. 
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Test of Proposition 4. 
Two research propositions deal with submissions to 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Proposition 4 
considers the relationship between firm characteristic and 
the decision to make a submission to the financial 
accounting standard setters. For firms which did make a 
submission on exposure drafts related to SFASs 2, 5 and 
12, proposition 5 suggests the existence of a relationship 
between the position taken regarding issues having a 
priori income-increasing or income-decreasing implications 
and firm characteristics. 
The methodology used to test proposition 4 is 
suggested by Christensen's criticism of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978). Christensen (1981) suggests that one 
should search for contradictory rather than confirmatory 
evidence. If a company possesses characteristics which 
would lead to the expectation that a particular position 
would be taken, then it would be expected that the company 
would make a submission to the FASB. Thus, a first test 
of the theory is to develop a model to relate firm 
submissions to firm characteristics. 
The dependent variable of this model is coded as one 
if it is noted that a representative of the company wrote 
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a letter to the FASB on any of the three exposure drafts 
mentioned above. If no submission is noted, the variable 
is coded zero. Independent variables used in testing 
propositions one to three, are discussed above. 
Two models are constructed. The reduced model is 
defined as before; the full model is nested, allowing for 
a test of the incremental information value of variables 
which have been suggested as being theoretically superior 
to those of the reduced model. A total of 324 companies 
possess complete data and are used in estimating model 
coefficients. Probit analysis is used in constructing the 
models. Model results can be found in Table 34. 
In the reduced model, the only variable with a 
statistically significant coefficient is total sales 
(TOTSAL). This variable has a positive coefficient. 
Thus, the larger the size of the company, the more likely 
it is to make a submission to the FASB. The expected sign 
for all coefficients is positive since, if the factor is 
important in the decision-making process involving the 
reporting of accounting income, then it is expected to be 
positively related to the making of a submission to the 
FASB. 
In the full model, both total sales (TOTSAL) and the 
magnitude of the rate of the key executive incentive plan 
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Table 34 
Proposition 4 Model Results: 
Firm Submissions to the FASB 
Accounting Method Choice 
Firm Probit Analysis 
Characteristics Reduced Model Full Model 
Political Cost 
TOTS ALE .000137 .00011 
(4.83) A (2.39) A 
CAPINT - -0992 - .31 
(-.48) (-1.19) 
C0NRAT - .44 - .46 
(-.98) (-.91) 
FMDETA .041 .068 
(.16) (.21) 
TAXRAT - .036 - -099 
(-.52) (-1.37) - 
Debt Covenant-Presence 
DCBB - .101 
(.22) 
DCCC - .345 
(-.105) 
DCEE (-.23) 
Debt Covenant-Potential for Default 
DPI - .068 
(-.53) 







RES71 - .0033 
(-.67) 
RES73 - .0022 
(-.24) 
DIVIvlAX - .00048 
(-1.56) C 
Debt Covenants-Traditional Ratios 
ALEV1 - .666 
(-1.50) C 






Table 34 (Continued) 
Proposition 4 Model Results: 
Firm Submissions to the FASB 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Accounting Method Choice 
Probit Analysis 
Reduced Model Full Model 
Debt Covenants-Cost of Default 
OOS'IWTl 
Profit Sharing-Existence 
PSPLAN1 ' .109 
(.54) 
Profit Sharing-Ownership Control 
0WN1 
Profit Sharing-Likelihood to Monitor 
AMONIT 



























Submission 13 of 50 
No Submission 270 of 274 
18 of 50 
271 of 274 
Classification Rate 87.3% 89.2% 
A - P level of .01 
B - P level of .05 
C - P level of .10 
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are statistically significant and positively related to 
the making of a submission. Several variables with 
statistically significant p-levels are inversely related 
to the making of firm submissions. These variables 
include the effective tax rate (TAXRAT), the potential for 
default on the current ratio (DP5), the level of 
unrestricted retained earnings (DIVMAX), long-term debt to 
stockholders equity (ALEV2), and the existence of a profit 
sharing plan (PSPLAN1). No explanation, other than the 
inherent data problems of variable collinearity, is 
offered as to why these variables are inversely related to 
the making of a submission to the FASB. 
Both the reduced and full models are statistically 
significant. The difference in the chi square statistic 
for the full and reduced models is 28.7 with 19 degrees of 
freedom, which is statistically significant at a p-level 
of .10. This suggests that there is incremental 
information content in variables suggested as better 
proxies of underlying theoretical constructs for the 
process. Having demonstrated that various firm 
characteristics are indeed related to the decision of 
whether or not to make a submission to the accounting 
regulators, the next step is to develop models to explain 
the position taken in these submissions relating to the 
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timing of reported income. 
Test of Proposition 5. 
As discussed above, a content analysis was made of 
the position taken on issues involving the timing of the 
recognition of reported income for three exposure drafts 
dealing with SFASs 2, 5, and 12. Although 143 companies 
made submissions on one or more of these exposure drafts, 
only fifty companies have usable data. The remainder 
lacked various data elements or were not included in the 
original data sample. 
Results for the full and reduced models are presented 
in Table 35. Due to the limited number of cases, certain 
variables are not included in the full model in testing 
this proposition. Omitted variables tend to be 
categorical and those lacking statistical significance in 
the models testing proposition 4. It appears that 
collinearity is still a problem since it took 26 
iterations for the full model to converge, while the 
reduced model converged in five. In addition, the 
coefficients of the full model are unlike any seen in 
testing the previous propositions. None of the 
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Table 35 
Proposition 5 Model Results: 
Type of Submission to the FASB 
Firm 
Characteristics 
and Expected Sign 
Accounting Method Choice 
Probit Analysis 

















Debt Covenant-Potential for Default 
DPI (-) 
DP5 (-) 




Debt Covenants-Cost of Default 
C0STIVT1 (+) 
Profit Sharing-Existence 
PSPLAN1 (+) - .129 
(-.23) 
































Table 35 (Continued) 
Proposition 5 Model Results: 
Type of Submission to the FASB 
Finn 
Characteristics 
and Expected Sign 
Accounting Method Choice 
Probit Analysis 
Reduced Model Full Model 
Constant 2.44 -1498.7 
(1.93) (-.02) 
2 
X 13.13 , 43.967 




Income Increase 41 of 42 42 of 42 
A Priori 
Income Decrease 2 of 8 8 of 8 
Classification Rate 861 100% 
A - P level of .01 
B - P level of .05 
C - P level of .10 
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coefficients of the full model is statistically 
significant. 
Turning to overall model results, it is evident that 
both models are statisticaly significant. In addition, 
the difference in the chi square statistic for the full 
and reduced models is significant at a p-level of .01, 
indicating informational content for the additional 
variables included in the full model. 
In terms of practical results, the reduced model 
correctly classifies the position taken on these three 
exposure drafts for 43 of the 50 companies making 
submissions. This improves to 50 of 50 for the full 
model. Note that these results will tend to be biased 
upwards, since the same sample used to construct the model 
is later, classified by the model. The construction of 
additional computer software programs to eliminate this 
limitation is left to future research. 
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Test of Proposition 6. 
Proposition 6 suggests that the financial reporting 
process presented in Chapter 1 is composed of a set of 
joint decisions rather than independent decisions. This 
notion is tested by examining the degree of association 
between the choice of accounting methods and the position 
taken regarding the timing of the recognition of reported 
income in submissions to the FASB. Propositions 1 and 5 
have each examined the relationship between firm 
characteristics and these decisions. 
In searching for a joint relationship, the first step 
is to consider the degree of association between variables 
used as proxies for each type of accounting decision. For 
the choice of accounting method, variables include 
depreciation method (DEPREC), the method of accounting for 
the investment tax credit (AITC), the amortization period 
of past service pension costs (PENSION), and the choice of 
inventory method (AINV). FASB2 designates the variable 
coded as one if a company representative took a position 
involving the faster recognition of accounting income on 
any of the three exposure drafts discussed above. 
As previously discussed, only fifty companies were 
available to test proposition 5. These same companies are 
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used to test this proposition. Of these companies, six 
had missing data involving the length of pension period 
amortization. Accordingly, bivariate correlations between 
PENSION and other variables are calculated with forty-four 
cases only. Spearman correlations are calculated since 
each variable is categorical. Correlation coefficients 
and levels of significance, in parentheses, are as 
follows: DEPREC - FASB2, .19 (.093); AITC - FASB2, .22 
(.064); PENSION - FASB2, -.04 (.408); and AINV - FASB2, 
.06 (.347). 
The strongest relationships between the different 
types of accounting decisions are obtained for DEPREC and 
AITC. The other accounting methods are not statistically 
significant. Results for DEPREC and AITC provide 
tentative evidence, for the hypothesis that accounting 
decisions are made jointly. 
Finally, correlations between the residuals of the 
full models used in testing propositions 1 and 5 are 
determined. If the independent variables used in 
constructing these models are the only factors bearing on 
each type of accounting decision, and if these effects are 
purged, then the degree of association between the 
residuals should not be statistically different from zero. 
Consider the two cases with statistically significant 
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correlations. When residuals are considered, the 
correlation between the depreciation alterative and the 
position on the FASB submission is .03 (sigificance of 
.42). Upon purging the effect of the independent 
variables for depreciation and the variable reflecting the 
position taken on submissions to the FASB, the resulting 
degree of association between variable residuals is indeed 
not statistically different from zero. This provides 
support for proposition 6. No residuals were obtained for 
the ITC model and, thus, it is not possible to include it 
at this point. 
Having concluded the discussion of all research 
propositions, the final chapter provides an overall 
summary of results and suggests areas for future research. 
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Footnotes 
1. See Fortune Magazine, 30 May 1980; page 296. 
2. The names and net sales of the eleven 
non-Fortune 300 companies with net sales larger 
than those of Scoville Company ($ 941.6 
million), the 300th ranked Fortune 300 company, 
are as follows: Armstrong World ($1341) , UAL 
Inc. ($3831), Inco LTD ($2488.5), Genesco Inc. 
($992.9), Eastern Air Lines ($2881.5), Tektronix 
($971.3), Foster Wheeler Corp. ($1654), Tesoro 
Petroleum Corp ($2370.1), Texaco Canada 
($2258.6), United Telecommunications ($1792.0), 
AMR Corp. ($3252.5). In addition, four 
wholesale companies were noted: Genuine Parts 
Co. ($1337.5), Commercial Metals Co. 
($1141.8), Alco Standard Corp ($1917.1) and 
Super Value Stores Inc. ($3475.2). 
3. See Scherer (1970); pages 50 to 57. 
4. Intra-group variable 





















DP71-TOTASS (.69), DP71-TOTEMP (.68), DP71-ABETA 
(.61), DP73-TOTSALE (.60), DP73-TOTASS (.62), 
DP73-TOTEMP (.57), DP73-ABETA (.54), 
COSTWT1-TOTSALE (.61), COSTWT1-TOTASS (.66), 
COSTWT1-TOTEMP (.51), COSTWT1-ABETA (.54). 
These relationships were also considered in 
selecting variables to exclude from econometric 
models. 
5. QUAIL is the statistical package used to 
determine model parameters using multinomial 
logit analysis. QUAIL was developed by 
Cambridge Systematics in 1982. 
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6. Tobit analysis is a hybrid between probit 
analysis and regression analysis. The 
conditional density function of the dependent 
variable comprises a cumulative normal 
probability function as in probit analysis and a 
normal density function as in regression 
analysis. For a further discussion of this 
technique, see Tobin (1958) and Goldberger 
(1964) pages 251 to 255. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The present study is an empirical examination of the 
relationship between accounting decisions and firm 
characteristics. The first accounting decision involves 
the choice of accounting method in four topical areas: 
depreciation method, inventory flow assumption, accounting 
for the investment tax credit, and the amortization period 
of past service pension costs. The second accounting 
decision considers the making of a submission, and the 
position taken on that submission, on any of three 
proposed accounting standards: accounting for research and 
development costs (SFAS No. 2), accounting for 
contingencies (SFAS No. 5), and accounting for certain 
marketable securities (SFAS No. 12). 
Prior chapters have discussed theoretical 
considerations (Chapter 2), previous research (Chapter 3), 
variable definitions and data sources (Chapter 4), pro 
forma income estimates of non-reported accounting 
alternatives (Chapter 6), and research propositions, 
models and statistical tests (Chapters 5 and 7). The 
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present, final chapter, summarizes these previous 
chapters, discusses research limitations and suggests 
directions for future research. 
Overall Summary. 
Theory presented in Chapter 2 is based on potential 
conflicts between groups involved in the financial 
reporting process. The theory suggests that a number of 
firm characteristics are related to managerial accounting 
decisions. Firm characteristics were classified into 
three areas, based on group conflict dyad. Profit sharing 
variables proxy for potential conflicts between 
stockholders and managers. Debt covenant variables 
involve the potential conflict between stockholders and 
bondholders, while political cost variables involve the 
potential conflict between stockholders and regulators. 
The predominant force for the conflict between 
stockholders and managers is the manager's desire for 
non-pecuniary benefits. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
employed reasoning similiar to the microeconomic 
consumption problem to show that the manager will consume 
more non-pecuniary benefits if he is not the sole 
proprietor of the company. The increased consumption of 
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non-pecuniary benefits will result in a decrease in the 
value of the firm, which is borne by the owner of the 
firm. 
The substitution of projects with higher expected 
return variances for those with lower expected return 
variances and the possibility of a liquidating dividend 
produce tensions between stockholders and bondholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979). Debt 
covenants serve to mitigate these tensions by offering 
protections to bondholders. 
Political costs are imposed on a company by outside 
regulators. These costs include the threat of 
nationalization, break-up, regulation, or imposition of 
special taxes. Incurring political costs appears to be a 
consequence of the company's notoriety, which is related 
to its size or the amount of its income. Other 
influential factors might be the number of company 
stockholders and the sensitivity of the industry. 
The theory based on potential group conflicts was not 
the first attempted to identify factors, important to 
accounting decision-making. The theory of income 
smoothing was an earlier attempt to explain this 
phenomenon. However, the basic premise underlying the 
theory of income smoothing has been called into question 
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by research on capital markets.!• 
Although capital markets research has led to the 
questioning of the basic premises behind the theory of 
income smoothing, it too has failed to explain the 
underlying factors behind accounting decisions. If 
"cosmetic" accounting changes do not have a security 
market effect, why are they made by management? 
Conversely, why are changes to accounting methods which 
could have a real effect on cash flows, and thus a 
potential real effect on the value of the firm, not made 
by management? Security markets research has failed to 
answer these questions.2. 
Thus, the theory on potential group conflicts can be 
seen as a natural extension in the progression of 
developing and testing theories to explain accounting 
decisions involving (1) the choice of an accounting 
alternative and (2) the position taken on submissions to 
the FASB. 
Policy implications of this research include the 
identification of potential influences on managerial 
decision-making, which will assist the FASB in its 
deliberations. Secondly, constructing models of proxies 
for factors underlying accounting decisions will help the 
accounting profession to make financial accounting more 
284 
relevant to those parties involved in the financial 
reporting process. 
Chapter 3 discusses previous research involving 
accounting decisions and firm characteristics involved 
with potential conflicts between groups concerned with the 
financial reporting process. Previous studies of choice 
of the accounting alternative have been classified 
according to the treatment of the variable proxying for 
the accounting method. 
Several deficiencies of this previous research were 
mentioned. First, most previous researchers failed to 
include or control for all possible conflict areas. 
Second, independent variables consisted of accounting 
ratios rather than information about the underlying debt 
covenants and details of any profit-sharing plan for key 
executives. Third, the income-strategy research relied on 
untested assumptions of the magnitude of the income 
effects of non-reported accounting alternatives. Fourth, 
only a few exposure drafts or discussion memoranda were 
considered in testing for a relationship between firm 
characteristics and the position taken on submissions to 
the FASB. Fifth, only one study attempted to model the 
process underlying the decision to make a submission to 
the FASB. Finally, no study was detected which made a 
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direct test of the relationship between both types of 
accounting decisions. 
Chapter 4 discussed variable definitions and data 
sources. Political cost variables include proxies for 
company size, capital intensity, industry sales 
concentration, effective tax rate and company risk 
measures. Four classes of debt covenant variables were 
considered. These include the existence of debt 
covenants, the likelihood of defaulting on a debt 
covenant, the cost of default, and accounting ratios used 
in previous research. Profit sharing variables relate to 
the existence of a bonus plan, the content of the plan, 
the likelihood for outside parties to monitor management 
and whether the company is designated as owner-controlled 
or manager-controlled. 
Chapter 6 developed methods of estimating the income 
effect of non-reported accounting alternatives in four 
topical accounting areas. These estimates were used to 
extend the research into a possible accounting method 
income strategy related to firm characteristics based on 
potential group conflicts. 
Estimates for the accounting for the investment tax 
credit and the amortization of past service pension costs 
required simple recalculations. To determine the income 
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effects for non-reported depreciation alternatives, it was 
necessary to estimate the composite asset life of initial 
assets, capital additions and capital deductions. For the 
income effect of inventory-flow alternatives, it was 
necessary to estimate the quantity and composite price of 
beginning inventory, sales, and purchases. Information 
per APB No. 20 on accounting changes was used to test 
these methods for reasonableness. 
Chapters 5 and 7 considered six research propositions 
of interest. Two sets of models were formulated. The 
first set consists of accounting ratios used in previous 
studies (reduced model), while the second set included 
these variables as well as more appropriate proxies for 
the economic factors representing potential group 
conflicts (full model). 
Models formulated to test propositions 1, 4 and 5 
utilize a zero-one dependent variable. Probit analysis 
was used to estimate model parameters. Multinomial logit 
analysis was used in developing models to test proposition 
2 since, in this case, the dependent variable was 
categorical with more than two levels. Models used to 
test proposition 3 consist of a continuous dependent 
variable with an upper limit of one. Tobit analysis was 
used in estimating these models. Maximum likelihood 
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techniques were employed to estimate all model parameters. 
Statistical tests involve the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of all variables included in the full 
model but not in the reduced model are equal to zero. The 
null hypothesis was tested by examining the difference in 
chi square values of the full and reduced models. The 
rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the full 
model possesses incremental informational content in 
explaining the process underlying the making of decisions 
involving (1) the choice of the accounting alternative and 
(2) submissions to the FASB. 
Proposition 1 examined the relationship between 
choice of the accounting alternative and firm 
characteristics. Model significance for the reduced and 
full models for . each accounting method was as follows: 
depreciation model (.01, .01), investment tax credit model 
(.05, .01), inventory model (.05, .01) and pension model 
(ns, ns). Models which were not statistically significant 
at reasonable levels of significance were designated "ns". 
The difference in chi square values indicated two 
models with statistically significant values. These 
results are as follows: depreciation model (ns), 
investment tax credit model (.05), inventory model (.01), 
and pension model (ns). Thus, for two of four models. 
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incremental information was detected for the full model. 
This provides support for theory relating the choice of 
the accounting alternative to firm characteristics. 
Proposition 2 discards the assumption of the 
independence of the choice of the accounting method to 
test for an income strategy. Both the reduced and full 
models were statistically significant (p-level of .01). 
However, the difference in chi square values was not 
statistically significant. 
Proposition 3 uses the magnitudes of the non-reported 
accounting alternatives estimated in Chapter 6 to refine 
the test of an income strategy. The actual and a priori 
maximum income was determined for both a one- and five- 
year time horizon. The level of significance for the 
reduced and full models for each case was as follows: 
one-year horizon, a priori income maximizing model (ns, 
ns), one-year horizon, actual income maximizing model 
(.01, .05), five-year horizon, a priori income maximizing 
model (.05, .05), and five-year horizon, actual income 
maximizing model (.05, .05). For the one-year horizon, 
neither case possessed incremental informational content. 
As expected, results improved for the five-year horizon 
models. For these models differences are significant for 
both the actual and a priori income-maximizing models 
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(p-level of .05). 
Results from testing propositions 2 and 3 support the 
existence of an income strategy related to firm 
characteristics associated with potential conflicts 
between groups involved in the financial reporting 
process. 
Propositions 4 and 5 are concerned with relating firm 
characteraretics to decisions to make a submission to the 
FASB, and the position taken on those submissions. Both 
the reduced and full models were statistically significant 
(p-level of .01). Similiarly, the full and reduced FASB 
submission models were statistically significant (p-level 
of .05). The difference in chi square values for both 
sets of models was statistically significant (p-level of 
.01). These results suggest that decisions involving the 
attempt to influence the establishment of accounting 
standards is indeed related to firm characteristics 
associated with potential conflicts between groups 
involved in the financial reporting process. 
Finally, tests of proposition 6 provide tentative 
evidence suggesting that both types of accounting 
decisions are made jointly in that they are influenced by 
similiar factors. 
The above section has summarized the main ideas 
290 
presented in this paper. The following sections discuss 
limitations of the current research and offers suggestions 
for future research. 
Research Limitations. 
The current research begins with observed phenomena 
represented by accounting decisions. Theory is used to 
explain the relationship of these decisions to firm 
characteristics. In considering theory, it was necessary 
to define variables to proxy for theoretical constructs. 
Having defined these variables, the next step was to 
collect data for use in estimating models of the process. 
The final step was to test these models for statistical 
significance. This section discusses limitations of the 
current research using the above research process as a 
guide. Thus, limitations are considered in theory, 
variable definition, data collection, model parameter 
estimation and the testing of models for statistical 
significance. 
Theoretical Considerations. 
Alternative theories have been devised to explain the 
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processes influencing managerial accounting 
decision-making. These explanations will be referred to 
as the follow-the-leader hypothesis, the corporate 
personality theory, the positive information theory, and 
the theory of competitive disadvantage. These theories 
have not been controlled for in the current research. 
Accordingly, they must be considered as alternative 
explanations for the findings of the current research.3* 
Variable Definitions. 
As shown in Table 7, a number of alternative 
definitions of the independent variables serving as 
proxies for theoretical constructs have been utilized by 
previous researchers. In addition to these definitions, 
alternative definitions can be envisioned. for example, 
market beta can be calculated using monthly, weekly or 
daily returns, with an equal or value-weighted market 
index and with or without Bayesian adjustments.^* To the 
extent that the variables used in the current study do not 
represent the true variables, then the models presented 
above are misspecified.5• 
Consider next the profit sharing variables. The 
variable measuring the amount of a key executive bonus 
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relates to the maximum amount of the contribution to the 
bonus pool rather than the amount of any yearly bonus 
awarded to managers. The latter amount is probably of 
more interest to managers; however, it is not readily 
available. No studies have been noted which have examined 
the relationship of the maximum possible contribution to 
the bonus pool and the actual yearly bonus paid to 
managers. In addition, the relationship between using the 
maximum award to the bonus pool rather than the expected 
yearly bonus is another area of possible model 
misspecification. 
Regarding debt covenant variables, actual debt 
covenants were considered through use of 
Moodys Industrial Manual. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
Moodys classifies companies into four disclosure classes. 
The comprehensive coverage section disclosed the least 
amount of information about a company's outstanding debt 
issues. Approximately 50 of the 583 companies included in 
the study were listed in this section. Thus, 
approximately 10% of the data were subject to some degree 
of measurement error regarding debt covenant variables. 
The effect of this error on model parameters is unclear, 
although it would appear to reduce the power of the 
statistical tests. 
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Another factor involving debt covenant variables is 
that the current research makes no attempt to consider the 
impact of privately-placed debt on accounting decisions. 
This too could result in model misspecification. 
An additional limitation involving the proxies for 
debt covenants is the lack of knowledge about the 
weighting schemes used by management when more than one 
debt issue is outstanding. This matter was discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
Along with the possibility of alternative variable 
definitions, it is possible that the true model 
specifications consists of interactions between variables. 
No test of variable interactions has been included in the 
current research. The number of possible interactions is 
very large. Considering only two-way interactions for the 
twenty-four independent variables included in this study 
would result in the creation of an additional 276 
variables. If variable interactions were considered, some 
models would not possess sufficient data to estimate 
parameters. Thus, no test of variable interaction was 
made. 
The model's dependent variables have a number of 
limitations. Limitations involve the time period used to 
define variables and the manner in which they are defined. 
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Variables that represent the choice of the accounting 
alternative are static, while the underlying process is 
probably dynamic. Theory abstracts from time 
considerations by referring to the present value of 
expected cash flows. The test of this theory requires 
examination of the set of accounting alternatives at a 
point in time. For any particular company, it is possible 
that conditions would change over time. Changed 
conditions may not cause the adoption of different 
accounting alternatives, but by reducing the power of the 
statistical tests, they would likely cloud the 
relationship between firm characteristics and accounting 
decisions. 
The method of defining the dependent variable 
representing the income magnitude of an accounting method 
strategy is based on various assumptions.^• in addition, 
this variable has an ex post emphasis since the company's 
reported income is recomputed under the assumption that 
the company had been reporting under the particular 
non-reported accounting alternative over the past one or 
five years. Management, in choosing a set of accounting 
alternatives, would likely employ an ex ante focus. 
Management's concern would likely be with the expected 
income effect of a set of accounting alternatives. In 
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addition, the length of the time horizon of concern to 
management is unknown. In as much as the ex post measure 
may be a poor proxy for the ex ante expectations, the true 
income-strategy model for testing proposition 3 would be 
inadequately represented. 
The proxy for the variable representing a submission 
to the FASB was coded as "one" if a company representative 
took an a priori income-increasing position on any of the 
three exposure drafts mentioned above. This is an 
unsophisticated definition. No attempt was made to 
determine the intensity of the company representative's 
stance. To refine this variable, a theory of the relative 
importance of each type of exposure draft to the set of 
accounting decisions to be made by management would have 
to be employed. . This theory does not yet exist.^ • A 
second limitation is that for the exposure draft on 
contingencies, the a priori income-increasing issue 
position is subject to question.®* The extent of any 
possible measurement error on the power of the statistical 




Non-Fortune 300 companies included in this study do 
not represent a random sample of all non-Fortune 300 
companies. As discussed in Chapter 4, 283 non-Fortune 300 
companies were included in this study. This represents 
all firms on the 1980 COMPUSTAT industrials tape with no 
missing information regarding the data elements needed to 
construct the study's variables. Any attempt to select a 
random sample of non-Fortune 300 firms would have resulted 
in a smaller sample than that used in the current study. 
Although no apparent model bias is introduced through use 
of a non-random sample, the descriptive statistics 
discussed in Chapter 7 should not be considered 
representative of all non-Fortune 300 companies. 
As mentioned above, the 1980 COMPUSTAT industrials 
tape was used to obtain accounting data for 1979. This 
was necessary since the 1979 tapes were not readily 
available. The determination of the extent of any 
possible survivorship bias is beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
Parameter Estimation and Classification Results. 
Multinomial probit and logit models are based upon 
different distributional assumptions, as discussed above. 
Multinomial logit analysis is used in testing proposition 
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2. A limitation in conducting sensitivity analysis 
between these types of models is the lack of a multinomial 
probit analysis statistical package. The package included 
in QUAIL is experimental. 
A second limitation in this area is the use of the 
same data for both the estimation of model parameters and 
the determination of the classification success of the 
resulting model. This results in a positive bias in the 
classification success rate (Eisenbeis, 1977). Methods of 
eliminating this bias include the use of a holdout sample 
or some type of "jackknife" technique. The holdout sample 
method has the disadvantage of drastically reducing the 
size of the sample used to estimate model paramenters. 
The "jackknife" technique has been used in this area by 
previous researchers (McKee, Bell and Boatsman, 1984; 
Daley and Vigeland, 1983). Use of either of these 
techniques would avoid a classification bias and perhaps 
yield results closer to those expected when using these 
models for prediction. 
It is not felt that any of these limitations, either 
individually or in combination, would sufficiently negate 
the overall results of the current research. However, 
these limitations do suggest areas for future research. 
Potential future research topics are discussed below. 
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Areas for Future Research. 
The research process described above provides a 
framework in offering suggestions for future research. A 
number of previous researchers have suggested directions 
for research. These prescriptions will be included below. 
In discussing proposed explanations of managerial 
accounting decision-making, a number of alternative 
theories were considered. The failure to control or test 
for these theories was identified as a limitation of the 
current research. Methods to test these theories were 
discussed above. Tests of these theories constitute one 
area of future research. 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) discuss the necessity 
of developing more specific theories to explain links 
between accounting technique choice and firm specific 
factors. For example, in investment decisions, lack of 
theory has served as a criticism of studies -considering 
the relationship between accounting considerations and 
investment decisions (Ball, 1980; Wolfson, 1980; Marshall, 
1980). The development of more specific theories relating 
accounting matters to investment, production or financing 
decisions is a second area of future research. 
The current research has offered a number of 
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improvements to proxies of theoretical constructs. 
Additional improvements might follow from analyzing the 
determinants of contracting and bonding costs (Holthausen 
and Leftwich, 1983). 
A fourth area of future research would be to 
construct alternative models using variables described but 
not employed, in the current study. This would provide 
evidence of the sensitivity of the process to alternative 
variable definitions. The various weighting schemes for 
debt covenant variables discussed in Chapter 4 could also 
be considered at this phase in the research. 
A fifth area of future research would entail the 
examination of additional examples of accounting 
decisions. The current study has only considered four 
accounting methods and three exposure drafts. Accounting 
decisions considered by previous researchers were listed 
in Chapter 3. Alternatively, a time series analysis could 
be undertaken to provide a more formal test of the 
stability of the process. 
An alternative area of research is to develop models 
relating the decision to make a submission to the FASB, 
and the position taken on that submission, to the 
likelihood of making a subsequent submission and the 
position taken on the later submission. It may be 
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possible to develop Markov models determining the 
conditional probability of representatives from certain 
types of companies to attempt to influence the 
establishment of financial accounting standards. 
A sixth area of research is to estimate the 
statistical properties of the data. One can estimate the 
appropriateness of those assumptions underlying the use of 
probit and logit analysis. Tests of the form of the 
models used to represent the process would also be useful. 
Other areas of research are possible. It would be 
possible to examine the cross-sectional variability of 
private and public debt covenants for a sample of firms 
and the portfolio of rules for particular firms and 
industries (Leftwich, 1983). Alternatively, one could 
relate changes in accounting measuremant rules to a time 
series of debt covenants for a single lender (Leftwich, 
1983) . 
The timing relationship of changes in debt covenants, 
profit-sharing plans and accounting decisions would also 
be of interest. Are debt covenants and profit-sharing 
plans adjusted to changes in accounting methods or do 
managers change accounting methods in reaction to the 
adoption or amendment of profit-sharing plans? 
Finally, it would be possible to use results from the 
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accounting choice models to reduce the number of variables 
needed in the FASB submission/position models. This 
should increase the power of the tests of these latter 
models. A second method to increase the power of these 
tests would be to segment the data in terms of the degree 
of use of income-maximizing accounting alternatives. 
Using the top and bottom third of the data should help to 
refine the models of the submission/position processes, if 
indeed, both types of accounting decisions are related to 
similiar factors. 
Summary. 
The discussion above serves to summarize previous 
chapters. This overview examined the identification of 
theoretical factors of interest, the classification of 
previous research, the categories of variables used as 
proxies for theoretical constructs, and the results from 
constructing and testing various models of the process. 
Chapter 8 also discussed limitations of the current 
research and listed areas of possible future research. 
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Footnotes 
1. The literature on income smoothing can be traced to 
Hepworth (1953) and Gordon (1964). Gordon (1964) 
postulated that investors were bothered by wide 
swings in a firm's income. If this variation in 
income could be modulated, he believed that the 
owners of the company would be rewarded in that the 
increased demand for their stock would result in a 
higher price for that stock. Thus, he felt that 
management would attempt to smooth income. In his 
view, the purpose of financial statements was the 
maximization, not measurement, of wealth. 
Most of the empirical research on income 
smoothing has been concerned with the ability to 
identify it. Income smoothing can be achieved by 
altering accounting methods -- termed artificial or 
classificatory smoothing — or by decisions which 
adjust financial, production or investment decisions, 
termed real smoothing. Koch (1981) provides evidence 
that managers are more likely to resort to 
classificatory rather than real smoothing. 
Studies searching for classificatory smoothing 
have either examined established accounting policies 
(Gordon et al., 1966; Copeland, 1968; Copeland and 
Licastro, 1968; Dascher and Malcolm, 1970; White, 
1970; Barefield and Comiskey, 1972; Beidleman, 1972; 
Ronen and Sadan, 1975; and Koch, 1981) or examined 
changes in accounting policies (Archibalb, 1967; 
Cushing, 1969; and Smith, 1976). Evidence for the 
existence of the phenomenon of income smoothing is 
contradictory. Ronen and Sadan (1981) extensively 
discuss the concept. 
Kirchheimer (1968) pointed out the implication 
in the Copeland study (1968) of employing income 
smoothing to fool users of financial reports. If 
management was attempting to hide smoothing behavior, 
Kirchheimer questioned the strategy of searching for 
smoothing by examining a firm's financial statements. 
If the managers of a firm sought to manipulate 
income, then disclosing changes in accounting 
policies would likely be counterproductive. This 
reasoning is similiar to that of those such as 
Gonides (1972) and Watts and Zimmerman (1978), who 
suggest that research on the efficient markets 
hypothesis casts doubt on Gordon's basic premises 
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underlying the existence of income smoothing. 
2. Fama (1970) extensively reviews literature in the 
area of security markets research. 
3. In responding to the income-smoothing hypothesis 
(Gordon, 1964) , Archibald (1967) suggested the 
follow-the-leader hypothesis. Under this theory, a 
company will make a change in its set of accounting 
methods in response to a change by an industry 
leader. Archibald suggested that the adoption of 
uniform accounting standards by all firms in an 
industry would facilitate the analysis of the 
financial reports of companies in that industry. He 
suggested that this would broaden the market for the 
stock of companies in the industry, thus leading to 
higher stock prices. 
A first test of this theory would be to see if 
firms in the same industry tend to use similiar 
accounting alternatives. If they do and if industry 
leadorship can be defined, then a second test would 
involve examining the sequence of adoption of each 
set of accounting alternatives by industry leaders 
and followers. Controlling for this hypothesis would 
necessitate the segmenting of data by industry and 
then reestimating the models described in the 
previous chapters. This step has not been performed. 
Therefore, the follow-the-leader theory must serve as 
an alternative hypothesis to explain the set of 
accounting alternatives chosen by company management. 
Corporate personality theory (Sorter et al., 
1964) perceives a company as possessing 
individualistic qualities. This theory also 
addresses firm characteristics. However, for this 
theory, firm characteristics include such things as 
the financial and operating structure of the firm, 
its industry, the position of that industry in the 
industry life cycle, and managerial aggressiveness. 
A test of this theory would be to examine the 
differences in the choice of accounting alternatives 
for groups of companies possessing differences in the 
above firm characteristics while being matched on the 
firm characteristics suggested by theory concerning 
potential conflicts between groups involved in the 
financial reporting process. Since traditional debt 
covenant variables include accounting ratios which 
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measure the degree of financial leverage, the models 
described above control for at least one element of 
the corporate personality theory. Since variables to 
proxy for the remaining firm characteristics have not 
been included in the models described in Chapters 5 
and 7, this theory remains as an alternative 
explanation for management’s accounting decisions. 
A difficulty in testing or controlling for this 
theory is in operationalizing such characteristics as 
industry life cycle and the degree of managerial 
aggressiveness. 
Positive information theory (Fama, 1980; 
Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983) has also been offered 
to explain the set of accounting alternatives chosen 
by management. This theory assumes that the human 
capital of managers is partly determined by their 
efficiency at reporting information about the value 
of the firm. Specific tests of this theory and/or 
ways to control for it are presently unclear. 
In an earlier draft of their published paper, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1982, page 63) state: "At 
this time, we have not developed positive information 
theory to the point where we have refined predictions 
and specific tests in mind." They do make certain 
predictions about the relationship between 
price-earnings ratios and accounting decisions. In 
their published draft of this work, Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1983) are silent on these matters. 
The last theory is the theory of competitive 
disadvantage (Chandra, 1974; Buzby, 1975; and Choi, 
1973) . This theory posits that due to economic 
competitive pressures, the management of a firm might 
attempt to reduce the amount of information disclosed 
to the public in order to lessen the likelihood of 
disclosing information of value to its competition. 
Craft (1981) suggested that the amount of -information 
disclosed by management might also be important in 
collective bargaining. 
Researchers considering this . theory have 
typically utilized disclosure indices (Cerf, 1961) to 
quantify the amount of disclosure presented by a 
company's financial statements. They next have 
considered differences in disclosure between groups 
of companies. There appears to be no study which has 
related the amount of financial disclosure in a 
company's annual report to the set of accounting 
alternatives chosen by management. 
This theory would also appear to apply to the 
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ease at which it is possible to develop pro forma 
estimates of the income effect of non-reported 
accounting alternatives. It is unclear whether 
accounting alternatives can be ranked in terms of 
ease of reproducibility. For example, given 
estimates of the cost of goods sold under LIFO, can 
one more easily calculate pro forma cost of goods 
sold under FIFO or vice versa? 
To control for this theory would require the 
ability to classify firms by the degree that they are 
exposed to competition. This information could then 
be related to variables representing the choice of 
accounting alternatives. In addition, the issue of 
collective bargaining would have to be considered by 
determining whether company management faced a 
strong, weak or no union in collective bargaining. 
Since neither of these procedures has been performed 
in the present study, the competitive disadvantage 
hypothesis must remain as a possible alternative 
explanation of the results. 
4. Elgers and Murray (1982) analyze the effect of 
alternative definitions of the market index on the 
stability of the resulting market betas and their 
association with accounting risk measures. 
5. Failure to include a relevant independent variable in 
a multiple regression model will result in biased and 
inconsistent estimators. Including an irrelevant 
explanatory variable in a regression model results in 
least squares estimators of regression coefficients 
that are unbiased but not efficient. See Kmenta 
(1971, pages 392-400) for further details. 
6. Assumptions of the pro forma depreciation model 
include the following: (1) no salvage value for the 
assets, (2) capital deductions are made from each 
year's asset layers and (3) the existence of a 
relationship between the expected life of the initial 
fixed assets and capital additions. Assumptions for 
the pro forma inventory model consist of the 
following: (1) purchases for each year at the same 
price, (2) the ratio cost of goods sold to sales as a 
proxy for the initial year's purchase price, and (3) 
layers of beginning inventory represented by an 
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average unit price. 
A simulation was conducted to determine the 
sensitivity of these models to these assumptions. In 
carrying out the simulation, estimates of parameter 
averages were obtained through use of data in company 
annual reports and on the COMPUSTAT industrials tape. 
Fifty hypothetical companies were constructed. The 
estimated income effect of each accounting method was 
determined as a percent of the actual simulated 
income effect. For the most typical situation, 98% 
of the depreciation estimates and 100% of the 
inventory estimates were within 20% of the actual 
simulated amount. 
The sensitivity of the depreciation pro forma 
model was determined by doubling and halving various 
parameters. Parameters included (1) the expected 
lives of the initial fixed assets and capital 
additions, (2) the magnitude of the initial fixed 
assets and fixed asset additions, (3) the actual 
salvage value of fixed assets, and (4) the magnitude 
of fixed asset deductions. 
The model was most sensitive to changes in fixed 
asset lives. However, even in this situation, for 
most cases the majority of estimates were within 60% 
of the actual simulated amount. 
The sensitivity of the inventory model was 
determined by examining the effects of doubling and 
halving the following parameters (1) the magnitude of 
inventory purchases, (2) the rate of change in 
purchase prices, and (3) the percent of sales to 
inventory purchases. 
The inventory model was most sensitive to 
changes in the percent of sales to purchases. As 
long as sales quantities were within 90% of 
purchases, the model performed quite well. When the 
ratio of sales to purchases fell to 80%, only 44% of 
the cases had an estimated cost of goods sold within 
50% of the actual simulated amount. Based on these 
results and the APB No. 20 data results discussed in 
Chapter 6, it appears that company management 
maintains a close control over inventory levels. 
7. In developing this theory, consideration of the 
political science literature on the legislative 
process would be useful. Amershi, Demski and Wolfson 
(1982) relate the political science concept of 
logrolling to the attempt to influence the 
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establishment of accounting standards. 
8. The a priori income-increasing position for the 
exposure draft on contingencies opposed the use of 
self-insurance reserves. This position is 
questionable for certain defense-related companies. 
For these companies the possibility existed that if a 
company did not use such a reserve it would not be 
able to recover from the government any future losses 
incurred by the company. 
It therefore appears that a contractor 
who normally allows for certain uninsured 
risks through a program of self-insurance 
would be precluded by the proposed Standard 
from making formal accrual entries to 
create a "reserve for self-insurance." On 
the other hand, if the contractor were to 
attempt to recover self-insurance costs by 
a periodic charge to contract costs and a 
credit to a reserve for self-insurance on a 
memorandum basis, the allowability of the 
cost would be questioned by the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency and the contractor 
might thereby be precluded from recovering 
these costs. 
If the contractor fails to accrue for 
self-insurance, then his ability to recover 
for the cost of actual losses is severely 
limited . . . (Letter to the FASB on the 
exposure draft relating to contingencies. 
The letter, dated December 26, 1974, was 
sent by Mr. Arthur Schoenhaut, executive 
secretary of the Cost Accounting Standards 
Board). 
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Comporate Key Executive Incentive Plan 
and Profit Sharing Questionnaire 
Corporate Key Executive Incentive Plan 
Corporate Key Executive Incentive Plans typically are stated in terms of 
allowing the board of directors to authorize the transfer, to a fund an amount 
based on some percent of award earnings. Incentive earnings are usually defined 
as pre or post tax reported income in excess of some percent of stockholder 
equity or total assets. In addition, awards are often restricted to some per¬ 
cent of an individual's remuneration and are allowable only if dividends have 
been declared. 
For your company's plan, as of 1979, please answer the following questions: 
1. Did your company have a Key Executive (Key officers and members of the board 
of directors) Incentive Plan during 1979? 
Yes _ 
No (Go to question 6) _ 
2. Definition of incentive earnings: 
a. Incentive earnings are in terms of: 
Pre tax reported income _ 
Post tax reported income _, 
Other (Specify) _ 
b. Incentive earnings threshold is in terms of: 
Stockholder equity (Beginning, 
Ending or average - Indicate please) _ 
323 
Appendix A (continued) 
-2- 
Stockholder equity is defined as: 
- Total assets (Beginning, ending or 
average - indicate please) _ 
Earnings per share (Beginning, ending 
or average - indicate please) _ 
Increase in earnings per share _ 
Indicate percentage increase _ 
- Other (Please specify) _ 
c. The threshold rate applied to the particular base specified in ques¬ 
tion 2b is _ percent 
3. The percentage rate applied to incentive earnings to determine the maximum 
amount to transfer to the award fund is as. follows: 
Incentive earnings Rate 
First _ _ 
Next _ _ 
Next _ _ 
Next _ 
Next 
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4. Did the incentive plan place a limit on the total compensation an individual 
could receive? 
Yes _ Limit____ 
- No 
5. Did the incentive plan necessitate the declaration of dividends before any 
amount could be transferred to the award fund? 
Yes _ 
- No 
Employee Profit-Sharing Plan 
6. Did your company have a profit-sharing plan based on reported income for 
all employees during 1979? 
Yes _ 
- No 
7. If a profit-sharing plan was in existence, the plan was based on which of 
the following: 
Plan based on pre tax earnings _ 
Plan based on post tax earnings _ ' 
8. The rate applied to reported earnings to determine the maximum transfer to 
the profit-sharing fund was _%. 
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9. If there were any restrictions on profit-sharing income or on the maximum 
amount any individual could receive under the plan, please specify 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed 
stamped envelope. 
Company Name dcxpPSR ixwsnRLiES 
S 7/1023/rm/3 
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Questionnaire Cover Letter 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST • BOSTON • WORCESTER 
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
AMHERST. MASSACHUSETTS 01003 
August 10, 1984 
Office of the Comptroller 
Cooper Industries 
Two Houston Center 
Suite 2700 
Houston, TX 77002 
Dear Sirs, 
I am currently conducting research related to the existence and nature of corpo¬ 
rate incentive plans. However, I have not been able to gather all required in¬ 
formation from your company's annual proxy statements. 
Please take a moment to complete the enclosed questionnaire dealing with key ex¬ 
ecutive incentive plans and employee profit-sharing plans as of 1979. A 
self-addressed stamped envelope has been enclosed for your convenience. 









List of Non-Fortune 300 Companies. 
AMR Corp-Del 
Acme-Cleveland Corp. 
Acme United Corp. 
Adams Russell 
Aeroflex Laboratories Inc. 
After Six Inc. 
Aileen Inc. 
Alberto-Culver Co. 
Alco Standard Corp. 




Aloha Airlines Inc. 
Amerace Corp. 
American Controlled Inds. 
American Hoist & Derrick Co. 
American Medical Bldgs. Inc. 




Anchor Hocking Corp. 
Anderson, Greenwood & Co. 
Anderson Jacobson Inc. 
Anglo Energy LTD 
Anixter Bros. Inc. 
Armstrong Rubber 
Armstrong World Inds. Inc. 
Arrow Automotive Industries 
Arrow Electronics 






Barnes Group Inc. 
Barry Wright Corp. 
Bay State Gas 
Bell & Howell Co. 
Bergen Brunswig Corp. 
BIC Corp. 
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. 
Briggs & Stratton 
Brown-Forman Distillers 
Browning-Ferris Inds. 





California Portland Cement 
Cameron Iron Works 




Castle (A.M.) & Co. 
Centel Corp. 
Certain-Teed Corp. 
Checker Motors Corp. 
Celsea Industries Inc. 
Chesapeake Corp. of-Va. 
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. 
Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. 
Cincinnatti Milacron Inc. 
Clark Consolidated Inds. 
Clausing Corp. 
Cluett, Peabody & Co. 
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Coleman Co. Inc. 
Collins & Aikman Corp. 





Cone Mills Corp. 
Conrac Corp. 
Continential Steel Corp. 
Conwood Corp. 
Core Industries Inc. 
Crystal Oil Co. 
Culbro Corp. 
Custom Energy Services Inc. 
Dan River Inc. 





Dr Pepper Co. 
Dome Mines LTD 
Donaldson Co. Inc. 





Eastern Air Lines 
Eastern Co. 
Electronic Memories & Magnet 
Electronics Corp. of America 
Emery Air Freight 
Ennis Business Forms 
Essex Chemical Corp. 
Esterline Corp. 
Everest & Jennings Inti. 
Fair-Tex Mills 
Fedders Corp. 
Federal Paper Board Co. 
Ferro Corp. 
Fleetwood Enterprises 
Florida Steel Corp. 
Fluke (John) Mfg. Co. 
Foster Wheeler Corp. 
Freeport McMoran Inc. 
Frontier Holdings Inc. 
Gates Learjet Corp. 
GEMCO National Inc. 
General Cinema Corp. 
General Refractories Co. 
Genesco Inc. 
Genisco Technology 
Genuine Parts Co. 
Gerber Products Co. 
Giant Portland & Masonry Cement Co 
Glenmore Distilleries Co. 
Gorman-Rupp Co. 
Graniteville Co. 
Greenman Brothers Inc. 
Grow Group Inc. 
HMW Industries Inc. 
Hachensack Water Co. 
Handy & Harman 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Co. 
Harnischfeger Corp. 
Harvey Group 
Hasbro Industries Inc. 
Hayes-Albion Corp. 
Hecla Mining Co. 
Helmerich & Payne 
High Voltage Engineering 
Holly Sugar Corp. 
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Hoover Co. 
Howell Industries Inc. 
Hughes Tool Co. 




Inexco Oil Co. 
Intercole Inc. 
Inti. Controls Corp. 
Inti. Flavors & Fragrances Co. 
Jorgensen (Earl M.) Co. 
Jostens Inc. 
Jupiter Industries 





Keystone Cons. Industries Inc. 
Kit Manufacturing Co. 
Kollmorgen Corp. 
Kuhlman Corp. 
Lamson & Sessions Co. 
Lehigh Valley Inds. 
Lenox Inc. 
Louisiana Land & Exproration Co. 
Louisville Cement Co. 
Lukens Inc. 
Lynch Communications System 
Magic Chef Inc. 
Manhattan Industries Inc. 
Manville Corp. 
Masco Corp. 
Masland (C.H.) & Sons 
Masonite Corp. 






Media General Co. 
MEM Co. 
Metra Machine Co. 
Michigan General Corp. 
Midland-Ross Corp. 




Morton Thiokol Inc. 
Nalco Chemical Co. 
National Presto Inds. Inc. 
National-Standard Co. 
New York Times Co. 
Newcor Inc. 
Newhall Land & Farming 
Newmont Mining Corp. 
Noel Industries 
Northwest Energy Co. 
Ocean Drilling & Exploration 
Ohio Art Co. 
Omark Industries Inc. 
Opelika Mfg. Corp. 
Outlet Co. 
Overhead Door Corp. 
Ozark Air Lines Inc. 
Pacific Lumber Co. 
Pacific Tin Cons Corp. 
Park Chemical Co. 
Park Electrochemical Corp. 
Parker-Hannifin Corp. 
Penn Engineering & Mfg. Corp. 
Appendix C (continued) 
Philips Industries Inc. 
Phillips Petroleum Co. 
Piedmont Aviation Inc. 
Pittsburgh Brewing Co. 
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp. 
Porter (H.K.) Inc. 
Potlatch Corp. 
Pratt & Lambert Inc. 
Pratt-Read Corp. 
Products Research & Chem. Co. 
Purolator Inc. 
Quaker State Oil Refining Co. 
Quanex Corp. 
RAI Research Corp. 
RTC Transport Inc. 
Ranco Inc. 
Raymond Inti. Inc. 
Reading & Bates Corp. 
Redman Industries Inc. 
Reece Corp. 




Robertson (H.H) Co. 
Robins (A.H.) Co. 
Roblin Industries 
Rogers Corp. 
Royal Crown Cola Co. 
Rubbermaid Inc. 
SMD Industries Inc. 
SSP Industries 
Safeguard Scientifics Inc. 
Sanmark-Stardust Inc. 
Scott & Fetzer Co. 
Shaklee Corp. 
Smith International Inc. 
Smucker (J.M.) Co. 
Sonat Inc. 
Spencer Cos. Inc. 
Standard Products Co. 
Standex International Corp. 
Stanley Works Co. 
Steego Corp. 
Steelraet Inc. 
Stepan Chemical Co. 
Stokley-Van Camp Inc. 
Stride Rite Corp. 
Sundance Oil Co. 
Super Food Services Inc. 
Super Valu Stores Inc. 






Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 
Texaco Canada Inc. 
Texas International Co. 
Thermo Electron Corp. 
Thomas Industries Inc. 
Tidewater Inc. 
Trane Co. 





Twin Disc Inc. 




Unilever N V 
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Union Corp. 
United Cable Television 
United Foods Inc. 
United Industrials Corp. 
United Merchants & Mfgs. Inc. 
U S Shoe Corp. 
United Telecommunications 
Universal Foods Corp. 
Valmac Industrials Inc. 
Vaspar Corp. 
Vermont American 




Wadell Equipment Co. 
Wells-Gardner Electronics 
West Chemical Products Inc. 
West Co. Inc. 
Western Air Lines Inc. 
Westmoreland Coal Co. 
Westvaco Corp. 
Wilson Brothers 
Winter (Jack) Inc 
Wolf (Howard B.) Inc. 
Wolverine World Wide 
Wometco Enterprises Inc. 
Woodstream Corp. 
Wrigley (Wm.) Jr Co. 
Wyle Laboratories 
Zapata Corp. 
Zurn Industries Inc. 
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Worksheet re Accounting Policies, Debt 
Covenants and Incentive Compensation Plans 
Company Name _ 
Moodys Industrial Manual 
Accounting Policies: 
A1. Depreciation Method 
AIA. Straight line 
AIB. Double Declining 
AIC. Sum of years digits 
AID. 
Company Number 
Buildings Equipment Transport Other 
% Rate(Life) % Rate(life) % Rate % Rate 
B1. Investment Tax Credit 
BIA. Amount Flow-through 
BIB. Amount Deferral Method 
Cl. Amortization of past service pension costs 
Period Amount 
Dl. Inventory Method Amount (%) Inventory type or Division 
DIA. FIFO _ _ 
DIB. LIFO _ _ 
DIC. Ave. Cost  
DID. _ 
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Worksheet continued Company Number _ 
General Information 
Code Amount 0/S Year Issue Due Coupon Discount Acctg. 










Restrictions re payment of dividends Convertibility Provisions 












Appendix D (continued) 
Worksheet continued Company number _ 
Limitations on debt and priority 
Code a b c d e f g 
A. _ _$ _ _ _ _% 
B. $ % 
C. $ % 
D. $ % 
E. s % 
F. $ % 
G • $ % 
H. $ % 
I. s % 
Other 
a. Prohibitions of issuing claims of higher priority 
b. Restriction unless old bonds are upgraded to priority of new bondholders 
c. New debt subject to aggregate dollar limits 
d. Clean-up provisions 
e. restrict sale-leaseback 
f. lease payments restricted to fraction of Net Income 









Income and Cur Assets 










NTA Net atngible assets LTD Long term debt TNW tangible net worth 
Appendix D (continued) 
Worksheet continued Company Number 
Date of Proxy _ 
Threshold of INcentive 
Compensation PLan _ 
Percent o/s stock owned 
by largest parties not 
members of board of 
directors or top mgt. _ 
Percent o/s stock owned 
by bd and top mgt. _ 
Total o/s stock  
Warrents owned by bd. 
and top mgt. _ 
Total o/s warrents 

